A TREATISE
Concerning the
INDIFFERENCIE
OF
HVMANE ACTIONS.

1 *Corinth.* 6. 10. All things are lawfull for me, but all things are not expedient. All things are lawfull for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any.

1 *Cor.* 10, 23. All things are lawfull for me, but all things edifie not.

OXFORD,
Printed by *Hen: Hall*, Printer to the UNIVERSITY,
for *Tho: Robinson*, 1669.

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HVMANE ACTIONS.

OXFORD,
Printed by Hen: Hall, Printer to the Universitie,
for Tho: Robinson, 1652.

To the Right Worſhipfull Sir *WILLIAM WYNDHAM*, of Orchard Wyndham, in the County of *Somerſet*, *BARONET*.

SIR,

THoſe that know the depth of my obligations to you, have long ſince expected my publique acknowledgment thereof; and having now an opportunity to make it: My own Conſcience would condemne me of a moſt diſingenuous ingratitude, if I ſhould any longer deferre it. But not only my private, and perſonall engagements, but your own merit will juſtify this Dedication: for 'tis ſo well, and generally known, as that it may, with a great deale of juſtice, entitle you unto the exacteſt peices of the able pens of the age, therefore much more unto the poore, and meane endeavours of

Your Unworthy, though moſt gratefull Servant HENRY JEANES.

To the Right Worshipfull

Sir WILLIAM WYNDHAM,

of Orchard Wyndham, in the County of Somerset, BARONET.

SIR,

THose that know the depth of my obligations to you, have long since expected my publique acknowledgment thereof; and having now an opportunity to make it: My own Conscience would condemne me of a most disingenuous ingratitude, if I should any longer deferre it. But not only my private, and personall engagements, but your own merit will justify this Dedication: for 'tis so well, and generally known, as that it may, with a great deale of justice, entitle you unto the exactest peices of the able pens of the age, therefore much more unto the poore, and meane endeavours of

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I Have often wondred at some Prelatists, charging the poore non-conformists with deny-all of things indifferent; from which their Writings do sufficiently acquit them. Dr *John Burgess* (*in his Rejoinder, Pag.* 188, 189.) tells us, that Mr *Bradshaw* against all Learning, and sense, resolves, that there is nothing indifferent. But from this accusation, we have Dr *Ames* his Vindication (*in his fresh suite against Ceremonies, pag.* 161, 162.) Dr *Hammond* (*in his grounds of Uniformity*) accuseth *Amesius* him else for this opinion; but with how little truth, the Reader may soone see, if he please to peruse these following places in him, *Med. Theolog. lib.* 2. *cap.* 3. *sect.* 13, 14, 15. *De Conscientia &c. lib.* 3. *cap.* 18. *Gregory de Valentia* informes me, that one of the Articles of *John Hasse* (anathematized in the Council of Constance) was that *nulla sunt opera indifferentia*. That which Papists of old, charged upon him, these men impute to those, whom they have been pleased to nickname Puritan's. But

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for the untruth, and injustice of this crimination, we dare appeale to the more moderate, and Learned of their own party. The Reverend, and Learned Dr *Sanderson* disputeth against them, for making the restraint of the outward man in matters indifferent, an impeachment to Christian liberty; on *Rom*: 14. 3. *Pag*. 24. 25. And this presupposeth that they held somethings to be in their nature indifferent. I shall therefore spend no more time, or paper, to wipe off an aspersion so manifestly untrue, and unjust: But yet however this hath occasioned me to resolve upon the briefe stating of the truth touching things, or actions indifferent: and in order hereunto I shall 1. Premise some *Distinctions* concerning the actions of man; and 2. *Explaine* what is meant by indifferency.

1. *First*, The actions of man are either *indeliberate* or *deliberate*.

1. *Indeliberate*, which proceed, either from the *disposition of naturall qualities* (as hungering, thirsting, the easing and disburdening of nature) or else from the *force of Imagination*, (as rubbing of the beard, or hand, scratching of the head, lifting up of a straw from the ground, and such like things, when a man thinks not of them.)

2. *Deliberate*, which proceed from deliberate reason and are properly humane, and rationall actions, all voluntary actions.

These may be considered two manner of waies. 1. *In the generall, actu signato.* 2. *In the singulars, and individuall's, actu exercito.*

The *former* consideration is meerly in regard of the object, The *latter* taketh in all circumstances whatsoever: The *former* is a consideration of actions, *secundum speciem*, according to their *sort or kind*; The *latter* is a consideration of them in regard of their *actuall existence*.

In a *second* place we are to enquire, what is meant by the indifferency of actions: It apparently carrieth in its notion, a *negation of morall goodnesse, and illnesse*: I say, *significanter*, of morall goodnesse, and illnesse, because the most indifferent actions are *transcendently*, and may be *naturally* good. *An indifferent action then is that, which is neither morally good, nor evill*: The nature of things indifferent, (*saith the great Hooker in his Eccleſiaſt. Policie,*

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Pag.59.) *is neither to be commanded, nor forbidden, but left free, and arbitrary.* With which I would desire Dr *Hammond* to reconcile what he hath in his Treatise of Will-worship, *that the best of morall actions, the highest degrees of vertue, and of worship, the most superlative love of God are uncommanded:* and he, I hope, will give me leave to adde, that they are not forbidden, and hereupon I shall conclude, that (by Mr *Hooker* his definition) they are indifferent; which is as unsober a conceit allmost, as can be uttered, and unworthy of any serious refutation. I shall here onely make use of part of his expressions against *Ames* (*in his grounds of Unifermity, Pag.*14.) He that thinks the highest degree of vertue is indifferent, doth certainly use *other* Dictionaries then we doe. But to leave him, I shall for clearing the nature of indifferency propound, and satisfie *two Queries.*

1. What *medium* indifferent things are betwixt things *morally good*, and *evill?* whether *medium abnegationis*, or *participationis?* The *Author* of *Altare Damascenum* affirmeth it to be medium *or a middle betwixt* them by way of *abnegation*, *Adiaphora non sunt media per participationem, ut rubedo inter album, & nigrum, sed per negationem utriusque extremi, conformitatis & difformitatis ad rectam rationem, seu legem*, pag.496.

But for the disproose of this, I shall desire you to observe out of (a) *Capreolus*, that a thing may be said to be a medium, or middle betwixt that which is morally good, and morally evill, either by

(a) Esse indifferens ad bonum, & malum contingit dupliciter, aut per *modum* abstractionis, secundum quod universale aliquid significat ut abstractum a differentiis, & concontrariis dividentibus ipsum, unde in suâ communitate significatum significatur ut indifferenter se habens ad utramque differentiam. Sicut animal æque significatur ut rationale neque ut irrationale, & tamen oportet omne particulare animal esse rationale vel irrationale. Et similiter est hoc. Si enim significetur actus in eo quod est agere, habet quidem bonitatem in quantum est ens, sed indifferenter se habet ad bonitatem, vel malitiam moralem. Et similiter bonum ex genere indifferenter se habet ad bonum & malum ex circumstantiâ finis, quamvis non inveniatur aliquod bonum in genere particulari, quod non sit aliquâ circumstantiâ vitiatum, & ad aliquem finem ordinatum, unde oportet, quod bonitatem, vel malitiam contrahat. Et secundum hanc considerationem quidam dixerunt omnes actus indifferentes esse in eo quod sunt actus, & quidam dixerunt, quod non omnes, sed aliqui, accipientes magis in speciali nomine actuum, quæ non aprimunt aliquid, unde actus, ad malitiam vel bonitatem determinetur, vel materiam vel finem, vel circumstantiam, sicut comedere, coire, et hujusmodi. Alio modo contingit hoc secundum, quod aliquod particulare significatum deficit a susceptibilitate alicujus perfectionis, sicut sapis a susceptibilitate visus, & hoc modo aliqui actus, qui deficiunt a susceptibilitate bonitatis moralis dicuntur indifferenter. lib. 2 senten. dist. 40. quæst. 1.

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way of *abstraction* from them (as a generall nature is abstracted from it's differences, a subject from it's accidents,) or else by way of *repugnancy* unto them, because it is uncapable of them; and thus a stone is of a middle nature betwixt that which seeth, and is blind, because it is uncapable of both sight, and blindnesse. Now it is this latter way, that a thing is said to be a medium by the abnegation of each extreame, as is evident by the instances usually brought for the exemplification hereof. For they are of such things as are uncapable of, and repugnant unto both extreames. And the most indifferent actions, that proceed from deliberate reason, are capable of becoming either good, or evill, by circumstances, and carry no repugnancy thereunto: so much is confessed by *Didoclavi* himselfe in the place above mentioned. *Tertium quod constituit hujus medii formale est non repugnantia ad utrumque extremum. Actus homicidii in bove cornu-peta nullam habet conformitatem, aut differmitatem ad rectam rationem, non tamen dicitur actus indifferens, quia ibi est repugnantia ad utrumque extremum, nam bos est animal irrationale. Adiaphora igitur sunt dubia, indistincta, & UTROQUE* vergentia, *sed non magis vergentia in unum quam alterum extremum.*

Others therefore conclude, that indifferent actions are a medium, or middle betwixt good, and bad, in a way of *participation*, and that either *potentiall*, or *actuall*.

1. *Potentiall*, There is in them a non-repugnancy unto either of the extreames, unto morall goodnesse or badnesse, so that they may be either good, or bad by circumstances.

2. *Actuall*, and this agreeth onely to such indifferent acts, as become good by circumstances, for they being but imperfectly good, are in part good, and in part evill, and so partake actually of both extreames. By this you may see, though indifferent actions, which proceed from deliberate reason may in some sense be said to be a medium of participation betwixt that which is morally good, or evill, yet they are not said to be a middle of participation in such a *strict sense*, as lukewarmnesse is betwixt cold, and heat, for that alwaies partaketh actually of both extreames (cold, and heat,) whereas indifferent actions doe not alwaies actually partake of the two extreames, (morall goodnesse or badnesse,) but onely when they are good, for many of them may be, and

too often are by circumſtances *totally* and altogether evill, and in *no reſpect* good. *Ameſius* qualifies the matter, and affirmeth that as it is not *medium meræ abnegationis*, ſo it is medium *alicujus participationis*, a middle not of meere abnegation, but of ſome participation. Abſolutely, and ſimply, in ſtrictneſſe of ſpeech, it is neither *medium negationis*, nor *participationis*: 1. Not *negationis*; becauſe it hath no repugnancy unto it's extreames: 2. Not *participationis*, becauſe it doth not *allwaies actually* partake of both extreames; But yet, *ſecundum quid*, after a ſort, and in ſome reſpect, it may be reduced unto both *medium abnegationis*, and *participationis*: It reſembleth *medium abnegationis*, becauſe *as ſuch* it is neither of the extreames; and it reſembleth *medium participationis*, becauſe ſometimes it *actually* participates of both extreames: And thus you ſee how theſe different opinions may be reconciled; But yet (becauſe *denominatio fit à potiori*) we ſhall rather reduce it unto *medium participationis*, becauſe unto that it hath the greateſt reſemblance.

A ſecond queſtion is; Whether all indifferent actions be equally indifferent? no more bending unto evill, then unto good? *Didoclave* holds the affirmative, *Nec ſolum* (ſaith he) *requiritur negatio conformitatis, ſeu diſſonitatis ad legem ceu rectam rationem, ſed etiam majoris propenſionis in unam quam in aliam partem.* And againe afterwards: *Adiaphora non ſunt magis vergentia in unum quam alterum extremum.* The incomparably Learned Dr *Sanderſon* is of a contrary opinion, that ſome things are *unequally* indifferent, *Indifferentia ad unum* (as he is pleaſed to call them) I ſhall tranſcribe his words, and with all due reverence of his perſon briefely examine them.

Dr *Sanderſon* on *Rom*: 3. 8. *pag.* 58. 59.

Things unequally indifferent are ſuch, as though they be neither univerſally good, not abſolutely evill, yet even barely conſidered, ſway more, or leſſe rather the one way, then the other: And that either unto good, or unto evill. Of the former ſort are ſuch outward actions, as being in morall precepts indefinitely commanded, are yet ſometimes ſinfully and ill done: as, giving an almes, hearing a ſermon, reproving an offender; and the like, which are in themſelves good, and ſo to be accounted, rather then evill; though ſome unhappy Circumſtance or other may make them ill. Of the latter ſort are ſuch outward

actions, as being in morall precepts indefinitely prohibited, are yet in ſome caſes lawfull, and may be well done: as, ſwearing an oath, travelling on the Sabbath day, playing for money, and the like: which are in themſelves rather evill, then good, becauſe they are ever evill, unleſſe all circumſtances concurre to make them good. Now of theſe actions, though the former ſorts carry the face of good, the latter of evill; yet in very truth both ſorts are indifferent. Underſtand me aright: I do not meane indifferent, indifferentiâ contradictionis, *ſuch as may be indifferently either done, or not done; but indifferent onely* indifferentiâ contrarietatis, *ſuch as (ſuppoſe the doing) may be indifferently either good, or evill: becauſe ſo they may be done, as to be good, and ſo they may be done alſo, as to be evill; but yet with this difference, that thoſe former, though indifferent, and in ſome caſes evill, are yet of themſelves notably and eminently inclined unto good rather then evill; and theſe latter proportionably unto evill, rather then good.*

For *anſwere:* The firſt ſort of actions, ſuch as being in morall precepts indefinitely commanded, are yet ſometimes ſinfully and ill done, (as, giving an almes, hearing a ſermon, reproving an offender, and the like,) are not in the language of the Schoolmen, indifferent actions: This I ſhall make good by an argument out of *Suarez* (brought by him unto another purpoſe;) He diſputing againſt ſome, that held all humane actions to be indifferent, proves the contrary; Firſt in *inward*, then in *outward actions*: and his argument concerning outward actions ſtands thus. If externall acts be conſidered according to an objective goodneſſe, or illneſſe, this cannot be true, becauſe there are many actions in their own nature objectively evill, and prohibited, and there are other alſo objectively good, and honeſt; becauſe this goodneſſe, and illneſſe is not taken by extrinſick Denomination, from the inward act, but from it's intrinſecall agreement with, or repugnancy unto right reaſon. Thoſe actions which have a *materiall, and objective* goodneſſe, are not indifferent actions in the language of the Schooles. But the actions, that the Doctor ſpeaks of, have an objective, and materiall goodneſſe, becauſe they are commanded, and therefore they are not indifferent. But, ſaith the Doctor, they are indifferent at leaſt *indifferentiâ Contrarietatis*, "ſuch as (ſuppoſe the doing) may be indifferently either good or evill: becauſe "ſo they may be done, as to be good, and ſo they may be done alſo, "as to be evill.

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For *anſwer:* By this account all outward ordinances of God, all externall acts of worſhip, and indeed all outward good works whatſoever ſhould be actions indifferent, becauſe they may be done well, or ill: But to ſay that all theſe are indifferent would be very ſtrange language: for although they may have evill caſt upon them externally by the agent, yet this is no hinderance but that they may be in themſelves *objectively* and *materially good*, as being matter of precept.

But perhaps there may be ſome myſtery in this clauſe, *indefinitely commanded*: They are commanded, but not to be performed alwaies, but only *loco, & tempore debitis*; according to the known rule, *Affirmativa præcepta obligant ſemper, non ad ſemper.*

For *anſwer:* This will nothing alter the caſe; for hereby it will follow, that the matter of all affirmative precepts ſhould be indifferent; And whoſoever ſhall ſay ſo takes indifferency in a different notion from the uſuall acception thereof by both Papiſts, and Proteſtants; who jointly make it to be a middle thing betwixt that morall goodneſſe, and badneſſe, which is called *objective* or *materiall.*

As for the *ſecond ſort* of Actions, I readily confeſſe that in ſome ſenſe they may be ſaid to be unequally indifferent, inclining and ſwaying more to evill, then to good. To cleare which I ſhall diſtinguiſh of a *twofold conſideration* of ſuch actions: They may be conſidered *meerly in regard of their object*, or elſe alſo in regard of the *circumſtances, which uſually are annexed with them:* In regard of their *object* they are equally indifferent; But yet in regard of *Circumſtances* may be ſaid to be more notably and eminently inclined unto evill then unto good; becauſe the circumſtances, which generally, and commonly are connexed with them, are evill.

But as for the reaſon, which the Doctor bringeth to prove them to be unequally indifferent, rather evill, then good; is to me very unſatisfying. His words are, *which are in themſelves rather evill, then good, becauſe they are ever evill, unleſſe all circumſtances concurre to make them good.*

The ground of my exception againſt this reaſon is, becauſe as much may be ſaid of all outward good works, religious duties, and

ſervices whatſoever: They are all ever evill, unleſſe all circumſtances concurre to make them good, according to that of *Dionyſius, Bonum fit ex cauſâ integrâ: malum ex quovis defectu.* I ſhall conclude my anſwer unto this ſecond *Quære*, with rehearſall of Dr *Ames* his propoſall, and deciſion of it. *An actiones indifferentes nihil inter ſe differant, ſed æquè omnes à bono, & malo diſtent?*

Reſp. In ſuâ intrinſecâ naturâ nihil omnino differunt; ſed tamen quædam ſunt, quæ ut plurimum habent circumſtantias malas annexas, atque adeò dicuntur vergere in malum, aut in malum ſonare, ut accuſatoris aut carnificis munere fungi: quædam etiam, quæ ut plurimum habent circumſtantias bonas annexas, atque adeò dicuntur vergere in bonum, aut in bonum ſonare, ut colere agros, diligentiam in ſtudiis adhibere, &c.

In their own intrinſecall nature they differ nothing at all: but yet there are ſome which for the moſt part have evill circumſtances annexed to them, and ſo bend more toward evill, and have an evill name: as to do the worke of an accuſer, the office of an hangman, &c. ſome there be alſo which for the moſt part have good circumſtances, and ſo bend toward good, and have a good name, as to till the ground, to follow our ſtudy diligently &c.

Having premiſed theſe things, I ſhall in the next place, proceed to lay downe ſome concluſions concerning the indifferency of the actions of man: and they ſhall be three.

1. *Concluſion.* The Indeliberate actions of man which proceed from the diſpoſition of naturall qualities, or onely from the Imagination, as to rub the beard, or hands, to ſcratch the head, to move the head, feet, or a ſtaffe (The mind being not intent upon them,) may be, and are indifferent, *not onely in the generall, but in their individuals*, and *ſingulars:* The reaſon which (*b*) *Aquinas* giveth for this is very ſolid; Becauſe ſuch actions to ſpeake properly are not morall, and humane, for they do not proceed from the ſoule as reaſonable: Thoſe actions, which are not morall, or of morall conſideration, are uncapable of morall goodneſſe or badneſſe: for morall goodneſſe, or badneſſe implieth a morall beeing: But now thoſe actions which proceed from the diſpoſition of naturall qualities, or from the force of the Imagination onely are not

(*b*) 1.2 *qu.* 18. *art.* 9.

not morall, are not of morall conſideration, they are *extra genus moris*: And the reaſon is becauſe actions have their morality from this, that they are ſome way or other immediately, or mediately derived from reaſon.

Againſt this reaſon of Aquinas, (c) *Durand* propounds this following objection: that if the acts of the imagination be uncapable of a morall being, and ſo not of a morall conſideration, that then they are uncapable of ſinne: for every ſinfull action is a morall action: But now they are not uncapable of ſinne: for it is moſt evident, that *in ſenſualitate poteſt eſſe peccatum*, that ſin may be in the indeliberate acts of the ſenſitive appetite, and in the acts of the imagination; and the reaſon is, becauſe the ſenſuall powers or faculties are ſaid to belong or appertaine unto reaſon, though not *eſſentialiter*, yet *participativè*, as being under the conduct and guidance of right reaſon, obliged to hearken unto it's voyce, and to obey all it's juſt Commands, and dictates.

Sed contra hoc inſtatur quia ubi invenitur dominium rationis, vel voluntatis, ibi invenitur genus moris, ſed dominium rationis vel voluntatis invenitur non ſolum in actibus qui ſequuntur rationem deliberantem, ſed etiam qui præcedunt, in quantum à ratione præveniri poſſunt, ut dictum fuit, ſupra, diſt. 24. q. 5. (alioquin in ſenſualitate nullum poſſet eſſe peccatum) ergo actus procedentes à ſolâ imaginatione

The *anſwere* here-unto in the ſame Author is, that the *indeliberate* acts of the ſenſitive powers, and faculties are of two ſorts.

1. Some have for their *matter*, *ſinne*, and ſuch are morall: for they are voluntary, though not *directly*, as being produced or commanded by the will, yet *indirectly*, as being that, which the will is able, and obliged to hinder: and therefore reaſon ought to be watchfull to prevent the riſing of them.

But now there are ſome indeliberate acts of the ſenſitive faculties, which have not for their obiects the *matter of ſinne*, ſuch as are above inſtanced in, and of them we may ſay indefinitely, and in the *generall*, that they are not morall; becauſe they are not voluntary, either *directly, or indirectly*; Reaſon is not bound to

pertinent ad genus moris, quia ſubſunt imperio rationis, in quantum ab ea poſſunt prævenirí, et ſic per conſequens ſunt ſuſceptivi bonitatis, & malitiæ moralis, cujus oppoſitum aſſumebatur pro fundamento.

Et ad hoc poteſt dici, quod aliqui actus procedentes ab imaginatione, et prævenientes deliberationem rationis ſunt tales, circa quos ratio debet eſſe pervigil, ne inſurgant, et tales ſunt actus appetitus ſenſitivi circa materiam peccati &c. & reſpectu talium actuum quantumcunque deliberationem prævenant, poteſt eſſe negligens ratio in reprimendo, & peccare &c. Et de his procedit ratio, ſcilicet quod ſunt aliquo modo in genere moris, nec ſunt indifferentes. Alii autem ſunt, circa quos ratio nullo modo tenetur eſſe pervigil, niſi in caſu ratione alicujus adjuncti, quia objecta talium ſecundum ſe non ſunt materia alicujus peccati &c. ut levare feſtucam, vel fricare barbam: Et tales actus ut ſic pervenientes, quos non tenetur prævenire ratio, niſi in caſu ſunt purè extra genus moris, & indifferentes ad bonum, & malum, de quibus intelligenda eſt prædicta opinio.

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keepe any watch over them, nor is the will bound' to reſtraine, and repreſſe them; *niſi in caſu, rationis alicujus adiuncti*, as *Durand* limits it. As when they are a hinderance to Duties, or againſt that decency which is required in the worſhip, and ſervice of God; As for example if a man ſhould be rubbing of his beard, ſcratching of his head, moving of his feete, or any other part of his body in an undecent way in the act of receiving the elements in the Lords ſupper: That which I have ſaid touching this Concluſion is for the ſubſtance of it in *Ames de Conſcientiâ, lib.* 3. *cap.* 18. His words I ſhall tranſcribe. *Actiones quædam ita ſunt hominis, ut non ſint proprie humanæ, illæ ſcilicet, quæ procedunt ab imaginatione nudâ, & non a ratione deliberatâ, ut fricare manus, aut barbam, ſcalpere caput, levare feſtucam, &c. dum aliud aliquid cogitamus. Hujuſmodi actiones non ſunt moraliter bonæ aut malæ: quia non ſunt in genere moris conſtitutæ, dum omni conſilio deſtituuntur. Quamvis enim iſtis etiam poſſit quis peccare, ut ſi tempore precum vagari ſineret imaginationem ſuam, et huiuſmodi nugis indulgere, ipſæ tamen actiones per ſe neque malæ ſunt, neque bonæ. Subijciuntur quidem iſtiuſmodi motus imperio arbitrii humani; ſed ita ſubijciuntur, ut poſſint exerceri nullo rationis actu præeunte: neque vlterius illas ratione prævenire tenemur, quam ut officijs non obſint.- Sicut in oculorum palpebris movendis moderandi poteſtatem habet ratio, et voluntas: ſed non eſt operæ pretium obſervare quoties connivemus, ſi modo caveatur, ne præter decorum, aut officium aliquid in iſtis admittatur.*

1. There be ſome actions, which though they be actions of man, yet they are not humane actions, ſuch are thoſe which proceed from imagination only, and not from deliberate reaſon, as the rubbings of mens hands, to ſcratch the head or beard, to take up a ſtraw, &c. while we are thinking of ſomething elſe: theſe actions are not morally good or evill, they want that which is required to make them ſo, namely counſell and deliberation: for although a man may ſin by thoſe actions, as if in time of prayer he ſuffer his imagination to wander, and do give way to ſuch toyings as thoſe. Yet theſe actions conſidered in themſelves are neither good nor evill. It is true theſe motions are ſubject to the Command of mans will, but yet they are ſo ſubject, that they may be exerciſed without any precedent act of reaſon; neither are we bound

bound any farther by reaſon to prevent them, but only ſo far that they hinder not the duties we are about. So for moving of the eye-lids, reaſon and the will have power to moderate them, but it is not worth the while to take notice how often we winke, if ſo be we take heed, that in ſuch things nothing be done, which is undecent, or againſt our duty.

A *ſecond Concluſion:* There be divers deliberate actions, that proceed from deliberate reaſon, which if they be conſidered *in actu ſignato*, in the generall, *ſecundum ſpeciem*, according to their ſort, or Kind, as abſtracted from all ſingularizing circumſtances. are indifferent, neither morally good, nor evill: This I ſhall confirme by ſcripture, and by reaſon.

1. *By ſcripture:* And here we have a moſt ſignall place. 1. *Cor.* 6. 12. *All things are lawfull unto me.* Here all things are to be taken not *abſolutely*, but *limitedly*, for all indifferent things: for as for things Commanded, they are not onely lawfull, but alſo neceſſary, and therefore muſt be done *loco & tempore debitis*: And as for things prohibited, they are unlawfull and ſinfull. The words then are an undeniable prooſe of the indifferency of ſome actions, and withall an explication of ſuch indifferency: Indifferent actions are meerly lawfull, neither neceſſary, nor unlawfull; They may lawfully be done, and lawfully be abſtained from. In this text then we have the *extent* of our Chriſtian liberty *aſſerted*, and *limited*.

1. We have the extent of it unto all indifferent things *aſſerted*; And the Apoſtle contents not himſelfe to affirme it once, but doubleth the affirmation: The reaſon of which may be, becauſe he thought it an important point, or becauſe he would put it out of all doubt, and controverſy.

2. We have alſo a *twofold limitation*, or reſtraint put upon the uſe or exerciſing of our Chriſtian liberty as touching things indifferent; *But all things are not expedient*; *But I will not be brought under the power of any*.

Many think, that *Paul* ſpeaks theſe words *per mimeſin*, a figure called imitation; that he ſpeakes not in his own perſon, but rehearſeth the words of the Corinthians: ſo that here is, firſt *Corinthiorum* προσοχὴ, the objection of the Corinthians, *All things are lawfull for me*: ſecondly, *Apoſtoli* ἀντιπροσοχὴ, the reply of *Paul*,

But

But all things are not expedient: But I will not be brought under the power of any. But whether the Apoſtle uttered his own words, or the Corinthians is not materiall: becauſe, ſuppoſe they be the words of the Corinthians, he grants them with due limitations: The ſentence of *Paul*, ſaith *Ægidius Hunnius*, conſiſt's of a *conceſſion*, and *correction*.

1. *A Conceſſion* of the lawfulneſſe of all indifferent things. *All things are lawfull for me.*

2. *A Correction* or reſtriction of this large grant: wherein he ſheweth: that though all indifferent things be in their generall nature lawfull; yet they are in ſome caſes to be abſtained from, when they are *inexpedient*: when they *enthrall* us unto either *perſons or things*: *But all things are not expedient*: *But I will not be brought under the power of any.*

A great difference there is amongſt expoſitors about the coherence of theſe words: Some thinke, that the Apoſtle makes way for that Argument which he handles at large *chap*: 9. All things are lawfull for me; therefore to receive a ſalary for preaching of the Goſpell is lawfull: But I will not make uſe of this my liberty: Becauſe it will not be expedient unto the promoting of the Goſpell amongſt you, but an hinderance rather: And becauſe I will retaine my full liberty of reproving you, which I ſhall in great part loſe, if I ſhould receive my whole livelyhood from you: As it fares with the falſe prophets among you, that are no better then Trencher chaplaines, that dare not touch your ſores, medle with either your ſinnes, or errours, for feare that hereupon you ſhould ſhorten your benevolence: *I will not be brought under the power of any.* But the coherence is too farre fetcht, and we may ſay the ſame of others, who would make theſe words to cohere with *chap.* 8. *v.* 9.

Others with more probability derive the connexion of the words onely from the preſent chapter: and they are again ſubdivided: ſome fetch it from the words *foregoing:* Others from the words *following.*

1. *From the words foregoing.* The Apoſtles diſcourſe about going to law with Brethren before the unjuſt, and unbelievers: The Corinthians might be ready to object in behalfe of this their practiſe, that it was a thing in it's own nature indifferent, not prohibited

prohibited by the word of God, and therefore lawfull; for all things are lawfull, that is all indifferent things. True, ſaith the Apoſtle, but. 1. all things are not expedient: And in particular for Chriſtians to ſue Chriſtians before Paganiſh Tribunals is ſo far from being expedient, as that it is an impediment *unto Chriſtians* own glorifying of God in his immediate worſhip and ſervice, as alſo unto their quiet, peaceable, and comfortable communion with Brethren.

2. *I will not be brought under the power of any*, either perſons, or things. And if you goe in this manner to law with your Brethren you will put your ſelves under the power of many both *perſons*, and *things*.

1. *Perſons*: Perhaps you will lie at the mercy of an unjuſt judg: a falſe witneſſe may undoe you; A corrupt lawyer betray you; your own witneſſes will command your table, and purſe, though for atteſting the truth; And though your Advocates be never ſo faithfull, you muſt give them your moſt diligent attendance; As the *proverb* is, you muſt not only pay, *but pray them too.*

2. *Things*: The many matters, the things of the world, which you ſue for, will have you ſo farre under their power, as that they will be a great hinderance to your free, and full ſervice of God; for if they doe not wholly withdraw you from it, they will wonderfully diſtract you in it; Becauſe law ſuits will take up the greateſt part of your time, and the beſt of your thoughts. (*d*)

Adde unto this, that for Chriſtians, eſpecially in thoſe primitive times, to purſue their Brethren unto the judgment-ſeats of heathens, in matters capable of an amicable compromiſe by the mediation of Brethren, was a plaine evidence, that they were under the *power* of the world, and the things thereof; for who but a muck-worme, a vaſſall to his wealth, would doe a thing ſo much unto the diſcredit of the Goſpell, and reproach of Chriſtianity, eſpecially ſeeing they might with greater probability expect juſtice from the umpirage of ſaints, then the ſentences of profeſſed unbelievers?

(*d*) Quidem hanc partem ſic explicant: Sub nullius redigar poteſtate, i. e. Non patiar me propter res pecuniarias, ac temporales, vel eorum poteſtate, vel abſtrahi vel diſtrahi, quo minùs liberè, & abſque impedimento ſerviam Deo, quod non poterò, ſi tempus & cogitationes impendam litibus. Eſtbius in loc.

Others in the next place look for the cohæſion of theſe words forwards, upon the Apoſtles enſuing diſcourſ, touching fornication: not only the Corinthians, but the Gentiles in generall held ſimple fornicatiõ to be a thing indifferent. The old man in the *Comedian*, ſpake the ſenſe of the generality of them: *Credè mihi non eſt flagitium adoleſcentulum ſcortari.* And you will the leſs wonder at this, if you cõſider, that *Durand*, a Popiſh Schoolman, held it to be unlawfull, not by the law of nature, but only by the poſitive law of God: *Quod autem dicunt quidam, quod ſimplex fornicatio eſt peccatum mortale de ſe, excluſâ omni lege poſitivâ, divinâ & humanâ, non benè intelligo, lib. 4. diſt. 33. quaſt. 2.* And upon the Conſideration of this opinion of the Gentiles touching the indifferency of fornication it was, (think interpreters,) that fornication is Acts. 15. by the firſt Council ranged amongſt indifferent things, bloud, and things ſtrangled; The uſe of which was forbidden onely for a time. Unto this erroneous ſuppoſition the Apoſtle anſwereth *per limitationem, & per inficiationem:* He *limits* the generall rule touching things indifferent, and then he *denieth* the inſtance in queſtion. And this his denyall he *illuſtrateth*, and *confirmeth* from *verſ.* 13. *unto the end of the chapter.* Unto this his deniall he premiſeth limitations of the generall rule. *All indifferent things are lawfull:* He puts a double reſtraint upon it. *The firſt, But all things are not expedient, or profitable:* Many indifferent things ſometimes prove an impediment unto our Chriſtian race, and then they are to be forborne. *A ſecond* reſtraint is in theſe words: *But I will not be brought under the power of any:* My affection unto indifferent things ſhall be ſo temperate, as that it ſhall be in my power to forbeare them upon reaſonable and important Conſiderations. There ſhould be an indifferencie in our deſires towards things indifferent, ſo that they ſhould not have the command of us, but we ſhould be able to uſe, or not to uſe them, as the concurrence of particular circumſtances guide us.

To give yet further light unto theſe words, I ſhall briefly conſider their coherence as they lie in 1 *Cor.* 10.23. with little variation. The Apoſtle there ſtates a caſe of Conſcience touching the eating of Idolothytes, things offered unto Idoles. *Firſt*, he reſolves, that to eat them publiquely in the temple of Idoles, at the idolatrous feaſts of theſe Idoles, was to have communion in the worſhip

worſhip of theſe idols to have fellowſhip with Divels, to be partakers of the table of Divels: He that did thus eat them, did eat them conſidered *formally*, as ſacrificed and conſecrated to idoles; He did eat them in the honour of the idols, unto which they were offered; He did *tacitly* acknowledg their Deity, and *interpretatively* approve of the Idolatrous worſhip and ſervice of them; But now the Apoſtle alloweth a private uſe of things offered to idols, If they were not eaten under a religious notion, but conſidered onely and *materially* as meat, matter of food, and as the good creatures of God. *Two caſes* he inſtanceth in, wherein they might be thus eaten; *Firſt*, they might buy them in the ſhambles, and eat them in their own houſes, *verſ.* 25. And *ſecondly*, they might eat them at the tables of their unbelieving neighbours, that invited them: This latter part of the Determination of the queſtion he confirmes, and limiteth, by putting in an exception in the caſe of ſcandall: And unto all this he prefixeth the extenſion of our Chriſtian liberty, unto all indifferent things in the generall, together with two reſtrictions, that we are to put upon it in *the uſe* and exerciſe: Even indifferent things are to be forborne, *when* they are not profitable, and conducing unto the ends, which a Chriſtian ſhould propound: *when* they are deſtructive and ſcandalous unto our Brethren: (*) *All things are lawfull for me, but all things are not expedient: All things are lawfull for me, but all things edifie not.*

(*) Omnia mihi licent, omnia ſcilicet adiaphora, quale eſt comedere idolothyta, non quaſi ſacra, aut quaſi idolothyta, ſed tanquam communes cibos.

Ubi nota, Hactenus egit Paulus de idolothyris, quæ talibus, ſicque veruit ea comedere. Unde v. 14. Fugite, ait, ab idolorum cultu, ſcilicet, ne ſitis menſæ, & calicis dæmoniorum participes, ut explicat v. 20. puta, comedendo eſus idolis oblatos, eo modo & iis circumſtantiis, quibus cenſeamini eos, quaſi ſactos, ſeu quaſi idolothytum in honorem idoli velle comedere: hoc vero verſu tranſit ad ſecundum caſum, ſcilicet, quo idolothytum non formaliter qua idolothytum, ſed materialiter, qua cibus vel caro eſt, comeditur, & de hoc ait: omnia mihi licent, ſed non omnia expediunt, quia, ut ſequitur, non omnia ædificant. Quaſi dicat, Materialiter licet veſci idolothyto per ſe, per accidens tamen non licet, ſi ſequatur ſcandalum, patet ex v. 27. 28. 33. Cornel. Alapide in loc.

Unto theſe two places (1*Cor.* 6. 12. 1*Cor.* 10. 23.) I ſhall adde one more (1*Cor.* 8. 8.) *But meat Commendeth us not to God*: for *neither, if we eat are we the better*: neither *if we eat not, are we the worſe*: Meat (that is) the uſe and eating of meat (*abſtractly* conſidered, *and in the generall*) commendeth us not to God: for the kingdome of God is not meat and drink: for *neither if we eat, are we the better, παρίσταται*, have we the more, (that is) the more vertue in our ſelves, the more grace and favour with God: *Neither if we eat not,*

are *we the worſe* ὑστερούμεθα, have *we the* leſſe, the leſſe vertue in our ſelves, the leſſe acceptation with God: Eating then of any ſort or kind of meat (*conſidered, as abſtracted from all ſingularizing circumſtances*) is a thing indifferent that hath neither vertue, nor vice in it, neither pleaſeth nor diſpleaſeth God: And what the Apoſtle ſpeaketh of eating of meat, is applyable by way of *analogy and proportion* unto a world of things of the like nature, as ſhall be manifeſted by the reaſons for the Concluſion, unto which in the next place I haſten.

The *Proteſtants* generally thus argue: The nature of things indifferent (as the *Learned Hooker* determineth) is neither to be commanded nor forbidden, but left free and arbitrary: But now there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are in the generall neither commanded, nor forbidden (as to eat, drink, goe a journey, walke into the field:) Therefore there are diverſe humane and voluntary actions, that are in the generall, and for the kind indifferent. This argument the Papiſts diſlike becauſe they think, that there are *matters of Counſell*, which containe the higheſt degree of morall goodneſſe, and perfection: And yet thinke they are uncommanded, and no man will ſay that they are forbidden. The Argument of the Schoolmen therefore generally runs thus: Actions, that are neither agreeable, nor diſagreeable unto right reaſon are indifferent: But there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that in their generall nature, and conſideration carry, neither conformity, nor repugnancy unto right reaſon: And therefore there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are indifferent. This argument is thus managed by (*f*) *Durand*: That act is neither good nor evill, but indifferent,

(*f*) Ubi autem ratio non debet eſſe magis recta affirmando quã negando, ibi voluntas non debet magis conformari rationi affirmativæ quam negativæ: unde poteſt ſic argui. Ille actus nec eſt bonus, nec eſt malus, circa quem ratio non poteſt eſſe magis recta in affirmando quam in negando, ſed levare feſtucam, quantum eſt præciſè ex ratione, quam ſortitur actus ex objecto, eſt hujuſmodi, quia ratio neque affirmando quod levanda eſt, neque negando levandam eſſe magis recta eſt, ergo actus de ſe neque bonus eſt, neque malus. Major patet, quia perſecutio & fuga actus voluntatis quoad bonitatem vel malitiam correſpondent affirmationi, & negationi rationis practicæ quoad veritatem & falſitatem, & ideò ubi eſt ratio æque indifferens quoad veritatem, & falſitatem in affirmando & negando, ibi eſt actus indifferens quoad malitiam & bonitatem in proſequendo, & fugiendo. Minor probatur, quia rectitudo rationis conſiſtit in conformitate ad aliquam legem naturalem vel divinam vel ex his derivatam, circa autem tales actus, ut levare feſtucam, vel hujuſmodi, nulla lex aliquid determinat, nec divina, nec naturalis, nec ex his derivata, ergo circa eos ſic acceptos ratio non poteſt habere aliquam rectitudinem, vel obliquitatem magis in affirmando quam in negando, & hæc fuit minor. Sequitur ergo concluſio. lib. 2. diſt. 40. q. 1.

Concer-

Concerning which there is in the reaſon of man no more rectitude, or irrectitude and obliquity in the affirmation, then in the negation in it's dictating either the practice, or in its dictating the forbearance thereof. For the purſuit and eſchewall of the will are in regard of morall goodneſſe, or badneſſe correſpondent unto the dictates of the practicall underſtanding, and therefore where there is an indifferencie in point of truth in the underſtandings dictates concerning the doing, or not doing of a thing, there is an indifferency in regard of morall goodneſſe or badneſſe in the wills imbracing, or eſchewing of that thing. If the underſtanding erre not, whether it preſcribe the performance, or forbearance of an action, then the will ſinneth not, whether it performe or forbeare it: But there are divers acts concerning which there is in the reaſon of man no more rectitude, or irrectitude and obliquity in the affirmation, then in the negation of them, in its dictating the practiſe, or in its dictating the forbearance of them: This he proveth becauſe the rectitude of reaſon conſiſts in conformity unto ſome naturall law, or ſome divine law, or ſome law derived from theſe: But there are divers humane actions concerning which, there occurreth no ſuch law, either forbidding, or commanding: and therefore there is no rectitude or obliquity in the reaſons or underſtandings affirming or denying of them. It is indifferent, which way the underſtanding takes, whether it dictates the doing or not doing of them: and conſequently it is indifferent, whether the will willeth, or nilleth them. Here by the way I cannot but take notice, how *Durand* unawares croſſeth their doctrine of Evangelicall Counſels: for *Suarez (de leg. lib. cap.* 14.) will tell him, that *Counſell is not properly a Law*: By this doctrine of *Durand* then in matters of Counſell there ſhould be no rectitude of reaſon, becauſe no conformity unto any law: But this by the by.

This argument is yet further improved by (g) *Gregory de Valen-*

(g) Sunt quidem complures actus, quos dum præciſè conſideramus, ut verſantur circa hoc, vel illud objectum; nec laudamus, nec vituperamus tanquam bonos vel malos, ſed cenſemus eſſe indifferentes. Loquimur enim in propoſito de bonitate, & malitiâ morali propriè, ut ſcilicet bonitas non eſt qualis cunque congruentia cum ratione; & voluntate hominis, ſed congruentia ejuſmodi, ut habeat laudem ſecundùm æſtimationem hominum; tanquam aliquid, nempe quod quadret in rationem hominis, etiam ut recta eſt, & ut is habet ſibi à Deo propoſitam beatitudinem, ut ultimum finem. Quemadmodum etiam contra, malitia moralis, cui opponitur moralis bonitas, conſiſtit in repugnantiâ quâdam erga rationem rectam hominis, quæ ſecundum humanam æſtimationem habeat vituperium, tanquam aliquid repugnans, & nocens homini, ut is habeat beatitudinem propoſitam ſicut ultimum finem omnium actionum. Sic itaque loquendo proprie de bonitate, vel malitiâ morali affirmamus quoſdam eſſe actus, qui ex objecto ſuo nec boni, nec mali ſunt, ſed indifferentes. *Tom.* 2. *Com. Theol. qu.* 13. *punct.* 2.

tia. The Morall goodneſſe (ſaith he) which we ſpeake of, is ſuch a congruence unto reaſon, as carrieth praiſe with it according unto the uſuall eſtimate of men, and appertaineth unto mans everlaſting happineſſe, his chiefe, and ſoveraigne end; and anſwerably the morall ilneſſe or badneſſe of an action ſtands in ſuch a repugnancie unto right reaſon, as that according to the uſuall eſtimation of men, it is worthy of diſpraiſe, and is an impediment unto his attaining his ſupreame end, the eternall bliſſe of his ſoule; But now there are ſeverall humane actions that conſidered in themſelves have neither praiſe nor diſpraiſe, neither prejudice, nor advantage the ſalvation of our ſoules, are neither helps, nor lets unto the obtaining of our higheſt end and happineſſe, and therefore there are actions morally indifferent.

Unto what hath been ſaid, I ſhall adde two arguments more out of a late Philoſopher. *Ireneus*, A Carmelite or white Frier (*b*)

Firſt, upon actions morally good, or bad, we may lawfully paſſe our Cenſures, that they are ſuch; But we ſhould paſſe raſh judgment, if we ſhould cenſure Divers actions of our Bretheren to be determinately virtuous, or determinately vitious, moraly good or bad: *Let not him that eateth not judge him which eateth. Rom.* 14. 2. There are therefore ſome actions, which for their kind are neither good, nor bad, but indifferent.

Secondly, Many acts are evill, onely by the prohibition of ſome poſitive law; As unto the Jewes it was unlawfull to *eate Swines fleſh, to weare a garment of divers colours, as of woollen and linnen together*, *Deut.* 22. 11. Theſe actions therefore, and many the like, were of themſelves, and in their owne nature, indifferent, and became unlawfull onely by the ceremoniall law given unto the Jewes, which law being abrogated, it is now a thing indifferent and lawfull for Chriſtians to eate ſwines fleſh, or not to eate it, to weare a garment of linſey-woolſey, or not.

Unto theſe ſcriptures and reaſons I ſhall adde the teſtimony of *Hierome*, frequently quoted for this purpoſe. *Bonum, inquit,*

(*b*) Si omnis actus eſſet bonus aut malus ex ſuo objecto, ſeu ſuâ ſpecie, liceret nobis judicare de qualibet proximi opere, & tale ipſum aſſerere, quale habet objectũ, ſicuti actus ex objecto determinatos pronuntiamus bonos, aut malos determinatè: ſed non licet ita de ſingulis judicare, ex *Mauh* 7. cujus ratio eſt apud patres, & Interpretes quod plerique actus ſint medii, ſcilicet de ſe indifferentes, ut ſint boni, aut mali: ergo, &c.

Multi actus ſunt mali præciſe ratione prohibitionis, *V.G.* portare arma de nocte: ergo illi ſunt ex ſpecie ſuâ indifferentes. *Ethic cap:* 3. *Sect:* 2.

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eſt continentia, malum eſt luxuria. Inter utrumque indifferens ambulare, capitis, naribus purgamenta projicere, ſputis rheumata jacere. Hoc nec bonum, nec malum eſt: ſivè enim feceris, ſivè non feceris, nec juſtitiam habebis, nec injuſtitiam. *Ariſtotle, and Sextus Empyricus* give in their verdict for the truth of this aſſertion, whoſe ſayings the reader may peruſe at large in *Raynaudus moral. diſciplin. diſtinct. 4. quæſt. 1. Art. 3. num. 39. pag. 550.*

There is but one Conſiderable *objection*, which I ſhall briefly propound and anſwere. Whatſoever agreeth unto the ſpecies, the ſort or kind of a thinge, agreeth unto all individuals contained under it, And therefore if there be humane actions, that be indifferent, *ſecundum ſpeciem*, according to their kind, the Individuals of ſuch actions are indifferent too, which will be oppoſed in a *third Concluſion:* That which doth agree unto a thing *per ſe*, the oppoſite thereof cannot agree unto it, either *per ſe*, or *per Accidens*: And therefore if ſome actions are *per ſe* of themſelves indifferent, it is impoſſible for the Individuals of ſuch actions to be morally good, or evill.

Unto this obiection *Durand anſwereth*, by diſtinguiſhing of a *twofold ſenſe* of this expreſſion. An act is indifferent *ſecundum ſpeciem*, according to it's kind. *The firſt is*, that indifferency is of *the ſpecifick nature* of ſuch an act. And this ſenſe, which is the ſenſe of the objection, is falſe, for then it would be impoſſible for any individuals of ſuch an act not to be indifferent: But now there is a ſecond ſenſe of the expreſſion, that the *ſpecifick nature of ſuch an action doth not involve, or imply in it's notion morall either goodneſſe*

(1) Dicendum eſt quod actum eſſe indifferentem ſecundum ſpeciem ſuam poteſt intelligi dupliciter, ſcilicet ſecundum quod negatio importata per hoc quod eſt indifferens, poteſt

duplicitet ordinari ad copulam verbalem: uno ſenim modo poteſt poſi poni, & ſic eſt ſenſus, qd de ratione ſpecificâ actus eſt, quod ſit indifferens et ſi iſto modo aliquis actus ſecundum ſpeciem eſſet indifferens. non ſolùm eſſet impoſſibile dare ſub tali ſpecie actum individualem indifferentem, immo impoſſibile eſſet ſub tali ſpecie dari actum, niſi indifferentem, quia ea quæ ſunt de ratione ſpeciei conveniunt omni individuo ſub tali ſpecie, ſed ſi nullus eſt actus indifferens ſecundum ſpeciem ſuam; ſub quo tamen ſenſu argumentum procedit. Alio modo poteſt negatio importata per hoc, quod eſt indifferens, præponi copulæ verbali ſub hoc ſenſu, quod de ratione ſpecificâ actus non eſt, quod ſit indifferenter, vel determinate bonus vel malus, ſed tamen utrunque poteſt ipſi per aliud convenire, ſicut homo ex ſuâ ſpecie non habet quod ſit determinate albus, vel determinate niger: et tamen per aliud ei utrunque iſtorum convenit. Et hoc modo ſunt multa actus qui ſunt indifferentes ſecundum ſuam ſpeciem, nullus tamen ſecundum individuum, quia individuum multa includit quoad exiſtentiam ſuam quæ ad rationem ſpeciei non pertinent. *Lib. 2. diſt. 40. q. 1.*

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or ilneſſe, But is equally and indifferently abſtracted from both: And this ſenſe is true: It is not of the ſpecificke nature of many actions to be determinately good, or determinately evill; though they may be either by circumſtances. As for the confirmation which is added; *The anſwer unto it is uſually as followeth; A thing may be ſaid to agree unto another *per ſe, either poſitively, or negatively.*

*Moriſ. in Ethic. Marc: Phyſic.

1. *Poſitively*, when it is predicated *in primo*, or *ſecundo modo dicendi per ſe*, when it is either an eſſentiall predicate, or proper paſſion: And thus it agreeth unto man to be a ſenſitive creature, to be indued with the powers of underſtanding, willing, laughing, &c: And in this ſenſe indifferency doth not agree *per ſe*, unto any humane voluntary actions, for then it would agree unto them alwaies, and in all places, ſo that it would be utterly impoſſible for the individuals of ſuch actions to be morally either good, or bad.

2. *Negatively*, When a thing of it ſelfe is not ſuch, although by accident it may be ſuch: And thus we may ſay of a man, that *per ſe* he is not white, he is not blacke, he is not tawny, he is not of an olive colour, or the like, becauſe each of theſe colours conſidered *ſeparately*, are *accidentall* unto the nature of man, conſidered in the generall, and in it ſelfe: And yet the individuals of the nature of man may ſome of them be white, ſome blacke, ſome tawny, ſome of an olive colour, or the like: Even ſo we may ſay of divers voluntary rationall actions of man; that *per ſe*, (conſidered, as deveſted from all circumſtances) they are indifferent, morally neither good, nor bad: becauſe morall goodneſſe and badneſſe is accidentall unto the nature of ſuch actions conſidered in themſelves, and yet the individuals of ſuch actions are all of them either good, or evil, as ſhall be cleared by the next concluſion, unto which before we proceed, let us make ſome application of this ſecond concluſion.

Againſt this doctrine of Indifferency there are two *failings*, one in *the defect*, Another in the *exceſſe*:

There are, *Firſt*, ſome, that faile in *the defect*, who know not the full extent of indifferency: and ſo either impoſe, as neceſſary, or condemne, as ſinfull, things that are in their owne nature indifferent. Thus in the primitive Romiſh Church there were ſome new converts, who abſtained from ſwines fleſh, and other meats prohibited by the ceremoniall law, as unlawfull; The uſe of which yet

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was indifferent and lawfull under the Goſpell: *I know, and am perſwaded* (ſaith *Paul,*) by *the Lord Jeſus, that there is nothing uncleane of it ſelfe. Rom.* 14. 14. Thus alſo amongſt the Corinthians there were ſome weake Chriſtians, that branded for Communion, and fellowſhip with Idolaters all eating of things offered unto idols, Though bought in the market, or eaten at private meetings; In both which yet *Paul* pronounceth in generall there was no unlawfulneſſe, 1. *Cor.* 10. 25, 27. Amongſt us there are divers perſons, that are doubtleſſe well affected in matters of Religion, and yet are too rigid in cenſuring as ſinnes divers innocent and harmleſſe recreations: This is an errour in, and conſequently a blemiſh unto the underſtanding: *Paul* calls it a weakneſſe in the faith, *Rom.* 14. 1. that is an imperfection in point of knowledg, and that *privative*, or blameable: For the faith and conſcience of indifferent things is never indifferent, we are never to judg a thing indifferent, to be either ſinfull or neceſſary. Our Saviours command, *John* 7. 24. Judge righteous judgment may be extended unto things and actions as well as perſons: Therefore as we are not to call good, evill, or evill, good; ſo neither are we to call things indifferent, either evill, or neceſſary. This is injuriouſly to ſtraiten the grand Charter of our Chriſtian liberty, and preſumptuouſly to make the narrow way to heaven narrower then ever God made it. Beſides, it openeth a gappe unto many miſchiefes, it filleth the Church of God with needleſſe, and endleſſe diſputes, it perplexeth the minds of many conſcientious people with unneceſſary and unprofitably ſcruples; it cauſeth many bitter and uncharitable cenſures, and occaſioneth many dangers: In the believing Jewes that lived in the Church of Rome, in *Pauls* time, there was but a little miſtake touching things indifferent, meats and daies; but how pernicious was the ſequele hereof? Hereupon the ſtrong deſpiſed the weake, and the weak judged the ſtrong, *Rom.* 14. And this was a great diſturbance unto the peace of the Church, and a great hinderance unto the comfortable communion of the Saints.

2. *Againſt* this doctrine of indifferency there are ſome, *ſecondly*, that faile in the *exceſſe*, who make things neceſſary or ſinfull, to be but indifferent. There be ſome, that hold obſervation of the Lords day, preaching of the word, in diſtinction from meer rea-

ding of it to be no ordinances of God, but things meerly indifferent; *Eraſtians* affirme that Church Government, and Eccleſiaſticall cenſures are onely matters of indifferency: The Heathens in the Apoſtles times generally ranked fornication amongſt things indifferent: The like eſtimate ſome of the Corinthians had of eating things offered to Idols, in the midſt of an Idols temple, at a religious feaſt of that Idol, which was a palpable communicating with Devils, and therefore a fact in it's own nature unlawfull: And ſome Travailers, that profeſſe themſelves Proteſtants, have as large and looſe Conſciences, as theſe Corinthians had; for they have the ſame opinion of being preſent at an idolatrous maſſe, and bowing to popiſh Idols. Dr *Peter Heylin* (as himſelfe informeth us) made no ſcruple of kiſſing a Crucifix, when it was deſired of him, to diſcriminate him from a Hugenot: No leſſe looſe were the Principles of the *Adiaphoriſts*, and *Flaccians* in Charles the 5th his time, who preſſed the *Interim*, which gave allowance to divers errours, and ſuperſtitions of the Church of Rome, as matters that were indifferent: Our Prelatiſts ever and anon in the controverſy of Symbolicall ceremonies alleadge their indifferencie as a thing without diſpute, which is never granted by us; however it may ſometimes for diſputation ſake be ſuppoſed. But what talke we of Ceremonies, whil'ſt ſome of greateſt note among'ſt them have ſo eagerly pleaded for ſuch ſports, and paſtimes upon the Lords day as indifferent, which a devout Papiſt would reckon a groſſe profanation thereof? Now this latter failing againſt the Doctrine of indifferent actions, in a way of exceſſe, is as much againſt the Purity of the Church, as the former fayling, in a way of defect, was againſt the peace of the Church: It opens as wide a dore to all licentiouſneſſe and profaneneſſe to call good and evill indifferent, as it doth to call good evill, or evill good, and therefore a woe equally belongs unto it with this latter.

Secondly, we may be exhorted unto thankfulneſſe, Becauſe God hath indulged us Chriſtians a greater extent of our liberty about things indifferent, then he ever vouchſafed unto the Jewiſh Synagogue. Many things, in their own nature indifferent, were prohibited them by poſitive precepts, and ſo made unlawfull unto them; This was a yoak (ſaid *Peter*,) which they were unable

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to beare, *Acts* 15.10. Blessed therefore be God, who hath freed us from this yoake by our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath *abolished* in *his flesh* the law of *Commandments contained in Ordinances*, *Eph.*2. 15. So that now *all* (indifferent) *things are lawfull* unto us; *There is nothing uncleane of it selfe*, Rom.14.14. *all things indeed are pure*, Rom.14.20. *Unto the pure all things are pure*, *Tit.* 1.15. *Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused*, 1 *Timoth.* 4. 4.

There be *two waies*, unto which I shall direct for expressing our thankfulnesse for the inlargement of this our liberty. 1. *A stout asserting of it.* 2. *A due and discreet use of it.*

1. *A stout asserting of it* against Judaisme, Popery, or any other sect or party, that shall be so presumptuous towards God, and injurious towards us, as to abridg us thereof in any part. *Stand fast therefore in the liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not intangled again with the yoake of bondage*, *Gal.* 5. 1. The Apostle would have us not to be intangled againe with the Jewish yoake of bondage; And there is the same reason, why in indifferent things we should decline any other yoake of bondage, which any man whatsoever should make, and attempt to put upon our necks: for liberty towards things indifferent is one branch of that liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free: and therefore we should stand fast against all opposers. But now in this our asserting of our Christian liberty we should use a great deale of moderation towards weake dissenting brethren: 'Tis the Advice which the Apostle *Paul* gives in the like case, *Rom.* 14. 3. *Let not him that eateth, despise him, that eateth not*: The eating of meats prohibited by the Mosaicall Law was after Christ's death indifferent; But yet there were among the Romans some weaklings in the faith, who thought the ceremoniall law still in force, and consequently judged, the eating of all meats therein forbidden, to be sinfull; Now the Apostle would not have those that were strong in the faith, that is, more knowing, better principled, and more fully instructed in the extent of their Christian liberty to despise, to disdaine, and contemne those poore soules for their ignorance, and weaknesse in judgment; But to reach out the right hand of fellowship unto them, to receive them into an intimate communion, to deale gently, and tenderly with them, restoring them in the spirit of meeknesse, with all possible prudence, and

caution: *Him, that is weak in the faith, receive you, but not to doubtfull diſputations*, *Rom.* 14.1. The Apoſtle doth not prohibite altogether all diſputations for the future touching the point in controverſy: for he himſelfe elſewhere very zealouſly diſputes the matter, only he interdicts ſuch diſputes as were unſeaſonable for the preſent: becauſe theſe Jewiſh converts were ſo extreamly wedded unto the Law of Moſes, as that to have preſt upon them in their firſt converſion an abolition thereof, was the ready way to have utterly prejudiced them againſt and alienated them from Chriſtianity: He would have them firſt to be taught *the firſt principles of the Oracles of God, the firſt Principles of the Doctrine of Chriſt*, *Heb.* 5.12. and *chap.* 6. *verſ.* 1. And when they were well principled, and ſetled in the Chriſtian faith, then they might proceed to a calme, and peaceable debate of this ſubject: for then their mind would be more capable of inſtruction, and the forementioned prejudice would be more eaſily removed: Indeed, after a while, there would be no place for ſuch a prejudice: for when once there was a plenary promulgation of the Goſpell, to obſerve them afterwards would be a *virtuall* abrenunciation of the Chriſtian Religion, a denyall, that Chriſt is come in the fleſh: When once the Apoſtles had gived the Jewiſh Synagogue and Ceremonies an honourable funerall, and reſpective buriall, for any man afterwards to revive the obſervation of them, would be to rake in their duſt, and ſacrilegiouſly to violate their grave: *Proindè nunc quiſquis Chriſtianorum, quamvis ſit ex Judæis, ſimiliter ea celebrare voluerit, tanquam ſopitos cineres eruens, non erit pius deductor vel baiulus corporis, ſed impius ſepulturæ violator, Auguſt: Epiſt.* 19.

A ſecond way of expreſſing our thankfulneſſe for the extenſion of our Chriſtian liberty *in* things indifferent *is a due and diſcreet uſe of it*, ſuch an uſe of it as may ſt, and with Gods glory, and may be no waies inconſiſtent with our own or others edification. Touching this uſe of our liberty *Paul* gives us a generall caution, *Gal.* 5. 13. *only uſe not liberty for an occaſion unto the fleſh*, that is, to live according unto the fleſh. Suitable unto which alſo is the advice of St *Peter*, 1 *Pet.* 2.16. *not uſing your liberty for a cloake of malicioufneſſe, But as the ſervants of God*: In which advice there are *two parts*: *One negative:* not uſing your liberty for a cloak of malicioufneſſe:

malicioufneſſe: that is, for a colour or pretence unto any ſinne for κακία is (as Dr *Sanderſon* well obſerveth) taken here more largly for all manner of evill and naughtineſſe, according unto the adequate ſignification of the Greek and Latine Adjectives, from whence the ſubſtantive uſed in the text is derived. *Another part of the advice is affirmative*, uſing your liberty as the ſervants of God: that is in the uſe of this liberty admit of nothing, that may be prejudiciall unto the ſervice, unto the honour and glory of God: for this would be a moſt unthankfull abuſe, and not a true uſe of it.

To informe us more fully, and particularly what we are to doe in this weighty point, I ſhall briefly propound ſuch reſtraints, as we are by the rule of Scripture to put on the uſe, and exerciſe of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent, for without ſuch reſtraints we can never uſe this our liberty aright, and as we ought: There be ſome looſe people, that are impatient of all theſe reſtraints: If they judg a thing lawfull in it ſelfe, they never conſider, or conſult farther, but without more adoe adventure on it: But theſe men ever and anon abuſe their libertie unto Gods diſhonour, their own danger, and the ſcandall of both brethren, and aliens: *They uſe their liberty as an occaſion to the fleſh, for a cloake of malicioufneſſe*: He that gives himſelfe the full ſwing in things indifferent, He that will doe whatſoever is lawfull, will ſoone ſlide into things unlawfull, and ere he is aware indulge himſelfe in the practice of them: So *Clemens Alexandrinus* παχὺ, καταπίπτουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον τὸ μὴ ἔξον, οἱ πάντα ὁρῶντες ἀ ἔξεστιν. 1. *Qui faciunt quicquid licet, huc cito delabuntur, ut faciant quod non licet.* For prevention of this licentiouſneſſe, I ſhall out of Gods word recommend unto you *ſix reſtraints* to be put upon this part of your Chriſtian liberty in the uſe and exerciſe of it, 1. *By Prudence.* 2. *By Temperance and Sobriety.* 3. *By Conſcience.* 4. *By Religion.* 5. *By Authority.* 6. *By Charity.*

1. *By Prudence*: which in indifferent things is, *firſt*, to compare them with thoſe ends which every Chriſtian ſhould ayme at. 2. To conſider whether there concurre not an obligation to ſome duty, or other.

Firſt then, It is the worke of Chriſtian prudence to compare indifferent actions with thoſe ends, which every Chriſtian ſhould propound

unto himſelfe: the glorifying of God, the ſalvation of his own ſoule, and the edifying of Brethren: And to examine whether they be expedient, or inexpedient, profitable and conducing, or unprofitable and impedient unto theſe ends: And if upon due conſideration it finds them inexpedient, an hinderance unto theſe ends, it then forthwith dictates a forbearance of them: Becauſe whatſoever is an impediment unto theſe ends is oppoſite unto them, and in that regard ſinfull: This reſtraint our Apoſtle layeth downe in way of Doctrine for the inſtruction of all. *All things are lawfull for me, But all things are not expedient*, 1 *Cor.* 6.12. and *Chapt* 9. we have him putting it upon himſelfe in his own practiſe: It was lawfull for him to have received of the Corinthians a competent, and honourable maintenance, for his labour in the Word and Doctrine, as being a matter of due debt from them: But he did not exact it, but wrought with his hands for his livelyhood, becauſe he found it would have obſtructed, and hindered the end of his preaching, which was the ſpreading of the Goſpell, that the word of the Lord might have free courſe, and be glorified in the converſion of ſoules.

A ſecond act of Prudence about indifferent things is to conſider, whether in that nicke of time we are about an indifferent action, there concurre not an obligation unto ſome duty or other; And if there doe, then prudence dictates, that *pro hic & nunc*, we ſhould abſtaine from that indifferent action; becauſe otherwiſe we ſhould preferre it above a neceſſary and commanded duty; And though it be ſimply in it ſelfe lawfull, it would become accidentally ſinfull, to wit, by compariſon; Thus it would be ſinfull for a man to walke in the fields, if there lay upon him at the ſame time an obligation to heare *ſuch* a ſermon: Thus alſo it would be ſinfull for a man to follow recreations in themſelves lawfull, when the neceſſities of his family call upon him to follow his occupation, the workes of his ordinary calling.

A ſecond Reſtraint (that we are to put upon the uſe of our liberty about things indifferent) *is by temperance and ſobriety*, and this reſtraint alſo we have laid downe by the Apoſtle in the place but now quoted. 1. *Cor.* 6. 12. *All things are lawfull for me, But I will not be brought under the power of any*: Now what is it that brings a man under the power of meates, and drinkes, apparell, recreations? but

but an over-vehement affection unto them. This makes man a vaſſall unto thoſe things, over which God hath given him a full Lordſhip, and dominion: *Qui nimis rem aliquam amat (ſaith Aquinas) quodam modo ſervus iſtius efficitur*, He that loves a thing overmuch, renders himſelfe thereby the ſervant thereof: *Know yee not that to whome yee yield your ſelves ſervants to obey, his ſervants yee are, to whom yee obey, Rom.* 6. 16. He that immoderately affects thoſe things, that are in themſelves indifferent, cannot diſobey, or reſiſt the leaſt temptation unto ſinne drawn from them, and therefore is no better then a ſlave unto them, nay an Idolater of them: You may ſee how *Paul* cenſures the falſe Prophets for ſuch an exceſſe, *Rom.* 16.18. *They that are ſuch ſerve not our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, but their owne belly, Their God is their belly Phil.* 3. 19. We may ſay the like of thoſe, that like the rich glutton, *Luke.* 16. 19. *fare ſumptuouſly or deliciouſly every day*, and will have a ſplendid retinue, when the lowneſſe of their ſtate requires a meaner table and ſmaller attendance; of thoſe that are wedded unto ſuch gaiety and bravery of apparell as is above their purſes, or unſuitable unto their age, and ranke; As alſo of thoſe that are ſo mad upon their recreations, ſports and paſtimes, as that in the purſuite of them they forgoe their meales, and ſleepe, they neglect the worſhip of God, and their particular callings, unto their great impoveriſhment, if not finall and totall beggery.

A third limitation upon the exerciſe of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent *is to be by conſcience*: for though a mans conſcience cannot legitimate ſinnes, either of Commiſſion, or Omiſſion; yet it is of force ſufficient to make that ſinfull, which is in it ſelfe indifferent, & lawfull: for this we have the Apoſtles determination, and that touching both *a condemning and doubting conſcience*.

1. *A Condemning Conſcience*, Rom. 14. 14. *I know and am perſwaded by the Lord Ieſus, that their is nothing uncleane of it ſelfe; But unto him that eſteemeth any thing to be uncleane, to him it is unclean.* Unto the authority of *Pauls* Teſtimony I ſhall adde *two reaſons*.

1. Every man takes the voyce of his conſcience to be the voyce of God; And therefore he that doth a thing in it ſelfe indifferent againſt the judgement of his Conſcience, he diſobeyeth and ſlighteth the voyce of God, *as for the manner of* his action, and is a fighter againſt God.

A *ſecond* reaſon I ſhall give you in the words of *Willet* upon the place, *Becauſe the goodneſſe or badneſſe of an action is eſteemed by the will and affection of the doer; Now when he thinketh a thing to be evill, and yet doth it, It ſhewes that ſuch an one hath, deliberatam peccandi voluntatem, a deliberate mind and purpoſe to ſinne.*

The Apoſtle, *ſecondly*, gives us the ſame reſolution touching a *Doubting conſcience*, Rom. 14. 23. *He that doubteth, is damned if he eate, becauſe he eateth not of faith; for whatſoever is not of faith, is ſinne*: that is; he that performeth an indifferent action, and yet doubteth of the lawfulneſſe thereof, deſerveth damnation, becauſe he doth not act out of faith; for whatſoever we performe, though it be *(intrinſecally, in it ſelfe)* matter of indifferency; nay though it be matter of duty, yet if it proceed not from a beliefe of it's lawfulneſſe it becomes *(accidentally and extrinſecally)* ſinfull; It bewrayes a wicked and a wretched heart, that is not afraid of ſinne, but in a great readineſſe to commit it; who, almoſt would doe any thing that he doubteth would anger and grieve a deare friend? God then is not ſo deare as he ſhould be unto ſuch men, as dare adventure upon the practiſe of that, which they are doubtfull is diſpleaſing unto him: Let us therefore hearken unto that exhortation, which the Apoſtle gave unto the Romans concerning thinges indifferent, *Rom.* 14. 5. *Let every man be fully perſwaded in his owne minde:* And this exhortation he backes with a very good reaſon. *ver.* 22. *Happy is he which condemneth not himſelfe in that thing which he alloweth*: that is, he that doth not condemne as ſinnefull, that which he chooſeth and embraceth in his practiſe; ſuch a man is in *that reſpect, and ſo farre forth* happy, as being free from thoſe terrors, which torment thoſe, who do what their conſciences condemne.

Thus you ſee, that not only condemnation, but doubtfulneſſe of Conſcience is a ſufficient warrant to forbeare things that are in themſelves indifferent: *But yet it is no ground for us to aſſume a liberty of condemning the ſame things in others, who are ſufficiently ſatisfied touching their indifferency and lawfulneſſe: Let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth. Rom.* 14. 3. Let not him that is weake in the faith, that out of ignorance cenſureth, or ſuſpecteth divers actions to be ſinnefull, which he cannot prove to be ſo by any convincing argument; Let not ſuch an one condemne for ſuch actions the ſtrong

strong in the faith, those who are as godly and more knowing, then themselves: This exhortation the Apostle enforceth by divers reasons in the following words; *for God hath received him; who art thou, that judgest another mans servant? To his owne master he standeth or falleth, yea, he shall be holden up; for God is able to make him stand, ver.* 3. 4.

The *first* argument is taken from *the relation of the strong unto God, or Gods acceptation of them*; *for God hath received him*; to wit, into his favour, into an intimate union, and communion, into his family, as a servant, as a sonne, as a member of his onely begotten sonne: To condemne him then is to throw a dishonour upon God himselfe.

A *second* reason is, Because for the weake to condemne the indifferent actions of the strong for sinne, of which they cannot prove them guilty, *is a grosse and presumptuous usurpation of Gods prerogative, for which we have no Authority: who art thou that judgest another mans servant?* Thou art but a fellow servant at the most: And God only is the master of the family, the Church: and therefore the unlawfulnesse of what is done in it is to be determined by Gods precepts, and not by thy humour, or fancy, thy ungrounded surmises: If God hath permitted a thing, how darest thou interdict it? *To his own master he standeth, or falleth.* The words are to be understood in a law-sense, and their meaning is that God alone acquits or condemnes the actions of his servants, and none else; They are to be tryed by his word and will, and not by thy jealousies, and suspicions. Others expound the words thus: If a man eat and drink temperately with outward prayer and thanksgiving, who but God can discerne, whether he eat or drink unto the glory of God, or no? It followeth *he shall be holden up*: that is, he shall be justified. This fact of his, his eating of meats forbidden by the Leviticall Law, shall be abetted and maintained: *For God is able to make him stand*: though thou load him with censures, God is able to acquit, and cleare him.

4thly. Our Christian liberty towards things indifferent must admit of a restraint in the outward practise of it. *By Religion*, by the *Religion of a vow, of an oath*, Deut. 23. vers. 21, 22, 23. *When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God, thou shalt not slack to pay it: for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee, and it would*

be ſinne in thee. But if thou ſhalt forbeare to vow, it ſhall be no ſinne in thee. That which is gone out of thy lips, thou ſhalt keep, and performe: even a free-will offering, according as thou haſt vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou haſt promiſed with thy mouth. It was indifferent for *Ananias* to have ſold, or held his poſſeſſion: But when once by ſolemne vow he had devoted it unto God, to keep back any part of the price in his own hand, was no leſſe then ſacriledge: Suppoſe Luſory lots be in themſelves lawfull, yet if a man ſwear, that he will never play more at Cardes, or Tables, &c. By this Oath a man hath bound himſelfe from ſuch games for the future: and if he play at them, he ſhall incurre the guilt of perjury: *Numb.*30.*v.*2. *If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or ſweare an Oath to bind his ſoule with a bond, he ſhall not breake his word, he ſhall doe according unto all that proceedeth out of his mouth. Calviniſt's* about oath's concerning things indifferent have this caſe: Whether they be obligatory in trifles? As if a man ſhould ſweare to lift up a ſtraw, to rub his beard, to give an apple, to lend a pinne unto a Child: This caſe (*k*) Dr *Sanderſon* thus anſwereth. 1. *He premiſeth that ſuch oath's are unlawfull*, Becauſe in them Gods moſt Holy Name is taken in vaine. The Great God of Heaven and Earth is appealed unto, and called upon to witneſſe

(*k*) Caſus poſterior eſt, cum res aut ob ſui levitatem indigna eſt viri prudentis deliberatione, nec caſſâ nuce intereſt

ſeceriſne an non feceris, ut levare feſtucam de terrâ, fricare barbam &c. aut ob parvitatem materiæ non eſt muſtum eſtimabilis; ut dare pomum puero, aciculam commodare &c. Juramentum de re iſto ſenſu adiaphora omnino eſt illicitum. Arguit enim ſancti nominis Dei aut nimiam irreverentiam, & (ut ferè fit) ex quodam habitu jurandi longo uſu contracto imprudenti fortè excideris; aut apertam contemptum, ſiquis id ſciens prudenſque admiſerit, ſcilicet non eſt Deus advocandus teſtis, niſi ubi dignus vindice nodus inciderit: ubi cauſa exigit non juſta modo ſed & gravis. Et in hoc omnes conſentiunt, cæterum de obligatione quid ſtatuendum? Video quidem pleroſque caſuiſtas pontificios in eâ eſſe ſententiâ juramentum de re exiguâ et parvi momenti eſſe ſuâ naturâ nullum, & non obligare: quia ſcilicet res levis non eſt idonea materia juramenti, & lex non curat de miminis. Sed miror potuiſſe eos, qui aliàs videri volunt eſſe tam Lynceï, in re tam apertâ cæcutire: niſi quod putidæ illi diſtinctioni peccati mortalis & venialis, quo velut fermento totam Theologiæ moralis maſſam fædè corruperunt, locum relictum cupiant. Sed obligare juramentum in re vel leviſſimi momenti conſtat; primò, quia in re gravi & levi eadem eſt veritatis & falſitatis ratio. Secundò, quia in aſſertorio juramento, qui aliter dicit quam res eſt, etſi in re leviſſimâ, pejerat, ergo à ſimili & in promiſſorio, qui aliter facit, quam juravit. Tertio, quia ali ter, quamvis in ſe eſſet, Deum falſæ rei teſtem faceret. Quarto, quia omnis jurans tenetur facere totum quod promiſit, quatenus poteſt, & licet: ſed dare pueto pomum, & poſſibile eſt, & licitum, ergò tenetur præſtare, non debuit ergò ſic jurari: ſed ubi juratum eſt, debet impleri. De Jurament: Obligat: prælect: 3, Sect. 15.

neſſe

neſſe unto toyes: But yet notwithſtanding *his reſolution is, that ſuch oath's binde*; and for it he giveth foure reaſons.

1. Truth and falſehood have place in a light, as well as in a ſerious matter.

2. Becauſe in an aſſertory Oath, He that ſaith otherwiſe then the thing is, though it be in a moſt triviall matter, is forſworne: therefore by the like reaſon, he is perjured in a promiſſory oath, that doth otherwiſe, then he hath ſworne.

3. Becauſe Otherwiſe, he that hath taken ſuch an oath, ſhould make God as much as in him lieth the witneſſe of a falſehood.

4. Becauſe every one that ſweareth, is bound to doe all that he hath ſworn, ſo farre forth as he is able, and ſo farre forth as the thing is lawfull to be done: But the matters here ſpoken of are poſſible and lawfull, v. gr. it is poſſible and lawfull to give a child an apple, &c. therefore ſuch oath's are to be performed: Indeed ſuch vaine oath's ſhould not be taken, but being once taken they ought to be fulfilled.

A *firſt* reſtraint upon the exerciſe of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent is by *the juſt commands of authority, unto which we muſt be ſubject for conſcience ſake*, *Rom.* 13. *v.* 5. The Apoſtle *Peter* having, 1 *Pet.* 2. 13. 14. exhorted us to *ſubmit our ſelves unto every ordinance of man for the Lords ſake*; In *verſ.* 16. (by the generall conſent of interpreters) he prevents an obiection, that might be made againſt this ſubmiſſion, from our Chriſtian liberty, *As free, and not uſing your liberty for a Cloake of malicion ſneſſe, but as the ſervants of God*: Upon which words it is well obſerved by *Eſtius* (*out of Oecumenius and Chryſoſtome*) that, *As free* is to be conſtrued with ὑποτάγητε, *ſubmit your ſelves*: And not (as *Bede* would have it) with *well doing*. And from this *connexion* we may learne *two things*.

Firſt, That in ſubmiſſion unto every ordinance of man, wee muſt not infringe our Chriſtian liberty: We muſt not enſlave our ſelves to ſinne, Sathan, and the World.

Secondly, That ſubmiſſion unto every Ordinance of man, and our Chriſtian freedome may very well ſtand together: We may ſubmit our ſelves as free: we may be obedient ſubiects, and yet free Chriſtians: This may alſo be further gathered from what

the Apoſtle hath in the following words touching the abuſe, and uſe of our Chriſtian liberty; *Not uſing your liberty as a cloake for maliciouſneſſe, but as ſervants of God*: Here we have. 1. A *dehortation* from the abuſe of our Chriſtian liberty, *not uſing your liberty as a cloake of maliciouſneſſe*: now to alleadge it as a plea for exemption of us from the yoake of temporall dominion, is to uſe it as a cloake of maliciouſneſſe; for not onely ſcripture, but even nature it ſelfe condemneth diſobedience unto, and rebellion againſt magiſtrates, as a very High point of maliciouſneſſe, that is naughtineſſe, and wickedneſſe.

2. *We* have here a *Direction* unto a right uſe of our liberty, uſing it *as the ſervants of God*: Now the ſervice of God is ſo farre from being a barre, as that it is rather a ſpurre unto this ſubjection; for *Firſt*, it is for the Lords ſake, that *Peter* would have us to *ſubmit our ſelves unto every ordinance of man*, verſ. 13. *Secondly*, How can he cordially ſerve God, that contemnes and diſobeyes his deputy, and miniſters? ſo the Apoſtle ſtiles the magiſtrate, *Rom.* 13.4,6. And *Thirdly*, The ſervants of God are obliged to yeild obedience unto all his commands, and one of them is to *be ſubject unto the higher powers*, *Rom.* 13.1. They then that reſiſt the higher powers doe not uſe their liberty *as the ſervants of God*.

But now, (that we may not runne into another extreame, and with the flatterers of ſtates, and Princes, extoll the power of the magiſtrate beyond all bounds of moderation;) I ſhall deſire you to take notice, that the power of the magiſtrate in things indifferent is not *arbitrary*, but is to be limited by *the end of all Magiſtracy, the publick good*, Rom. 13.4. *He is the Miniſter of God unto thee for good*. Unto this publick good ſome indifferent things carry a tendency, and ſuch the magiſtrate may command; unto it others may be prejudiciall, and ſuch he may forbid: But now he ſhould abuſe his power, and play the tyrant, If he ſhould injoyne things unprofitable, As if he ſhould command men to throw ſtones into the water, to pick ſtrawes, to ſcatter feathers into the aire, or the like. By this you may ſee, that the legiſlative power of the temporall magiſtrate in things indifferent is not unlimited: *But now as for Eccleſiaſticall ſuperiours, They have no commiſſion for to make any lawes properly ſo called*. To make this good *Ames* quotes *Junius* againſt *Bellarmine*, [*cont.* 3. *lib.* 4. *cap.* 16. *n.* 86,87.

and

and *chap.* 17. *n.* 9, 10, 12, 13.] where he ſheweth, that *Chriſt is the onely* law-giver, that *appointeth things in his Church, and that he hath appointed all that are requiſite, and that the Church maketh no lawes* (*properly ſo called*) *to appoint any new things to be uſed, but onely canons, orders, directions, ordering in ſeemly manner theſe things which Chriſt hath appointed: and that if ſhe adde* any *thing of her own,* ſhe *doth decline*: And the reaſon is, *Becauſe unto her is committed no authority of appointing new things, but a miniſtry to obſerve, and doe ſuch things which Chriſt hath appointed.*

[*This argument is proſecuted at large By* Ames *in his Reply unto* Morton *chap.* 1. *Sect.* 16. *and vindicated in his freſh ſuit againſt Ceremonies, pag.* 64, 65, 66. *uſque ad* 71. *from the rejoynder of* Dr John Burgeſſe.]

The *ſixth* and laſt reſtraint, which I ſhall mention, that is to be put upon the outward exerciſe of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent *is by Charity*: and that. 1. *Unto our ſelves.* 2. *Unto others.*

1. *Unto our ſelves*: He that truly loves himſelfe, will deny himſelfe the uſe of things indifferent, if he think it will hazard the health of his better part, his ſpirituall and immortall ſoule; He will forbeare thoſe ſports, and Paſtimes he moſt delights in, if he find that they uſually tempt him to Choler, or covetouſneſſe: He will not ſo much as ſtep into a Taverne, Inne, or Alehouſe, if he find himſelfe prone unto exceſſe: According unto the advice, that *Solomon* gives in the like caſe, *Prov.* 23. 2. *Put a knife unto thy throat, if thou be a man given unto appetite:* Our Saviour exhorts us *to pluck out our right eye, and to cut off our right hand, when they offend us, Matth.* 5. 29, 30. And *Maldonate* ſuppoſeth that he ſpeaks literally of a true eye and hand indeed: neither (ſaith he) is there any abſurdity in ſuch a ſenſe: becauſe the plucking out of the right eye, and the cutting off the right hand is mentioned only in a way of *hyperbolicall exaggeration.* In which there is underſtood ſuch an exception, as is uſuall in the like caſes, *if it might be, if it were lawfull*: He parallels it with a hyperbole of the ſame nature in *Gal.* 4. 15. *I beare you record, that if it had been poſſible, yee would have pluckt out your own eyes, and have given them unto me; If it had been poſſible*: that is, as *Eſtius* gleſſeth it, *ſi natura permitteret*, If nature would give way unto ſuch a mutilation: Our Saviour

viour therefore ſignifieth, that we muſt incurre the greateſt loſſe, rather then expoſe our ſelves unto the danger of ſinne: And from this we may conclude that we muſt caſt away our moſt beloved indifferences, when once they ſcandalize us, that is, when they prove occaſions of, and incentives unto ſinne.

2. *Charity towards others* ſhould put a reſtraint upon the uſe of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent, and make us to forbeare all indifferent things whatſoever, that may deſtroy the ſoules, weaken, or *wound the Conſciences of others*, 1 Cor. 8. 12. *Uſe not liberty for an occaſion to the fleſh, but by love ſerve one another*, *Gal.* 5. 13. Where the *Antitheſis* implied in the particle, *but*, plainly ſheweth, that we uſe our liberty for an occaſion unto the fleſh, if we do not by love ſerve one another, in the exerciſe thereof. *Knowledg puffeth up, but charity edifieth.* 1 Cor. 8. 1. that is, a firme and full knowledg of our liberty in things indifferent, if it be ſeparated from Charity, is apt to ſwell the mind with pride, and make men to deſpiſe, or ſet at naught weak, doubting, and ſcrupulous Brethren; But Charity edifieth, that is it is carefull to build up others, as living ſtones in the ſpirituall houſe of God, the Church; It inclineth to promote their graces, and gracious practiſes, and to avoide whatſoever is of a deſtroying nature unto their ſoules, that is, every thing that may occaſion their fall into ſin: Now that indifferent things may ſometimes be of an unedifying and deſtroying nature, the Apoſtle affirmeth 1 *Cor.* 10. 23. *All things are lawfull for me, but all things edifie not*, do not build up our brethren in truth, faith, and holineſſe, do not farther them in their Religion, charity, and juſtice: for that the Apoſtle ſpeaks of the edification of others is plaine by what followeth in the next verſe, *Let no man ſeek his own* (that is, only) *but every man anothers wealth*, that is, ſpirituall, the edification and ſalvation of anothers ſoule. And therefore indifferent things are to be forborne in caſe of ſcandall, when they prove to be of a deſtructive nature unto the ſoules of men, when they weaken their graces, hinder their duties, and lead them into ſin. This courſe the Apoſtle preſcribes unto the Romanes in the caſe of things legally uncleane before the coming of Chriſt. Thoſe that were ſtrong in the faith among them, well inſtructed in the doctrine of Chriſtian liberty, knew very well, that the legall unclean-

cleaneſſe of meates and drinkes, all Jewiſh feſtivalls and faſts were removed by Chriſts death, and that nothing was now of it ſelfe uncleane, but all things indifferent and lawfull: yet the Apoſtle would have them in the uſe of this point of Chriſtian liberty not to ſcandalize thoſe, that are weak in the faith, that is, ſuch as (being newly wonne from Judaiſme to Chriſtianity) were as yet uninſtructed about the ceſſation of Ceremonialls, *Rom.* 14. 13. *Judge this rather, that no man put a ſtumbling block, or occaſion, to fall in his brothers way*; that is in the uſe of meats and drinkes, that were before the Goſpell Levitically uncleane, and neglect of Jewiſh Feſtivalls and faſts, the obſervation of which was for a while indifferent, untill the interrement of the Ceremoniall law: For however the words run generally, yet if we look to the coherence backwards, the foregoing part of the chapter ſpeaks onely of ſuch things, meates, drinkes, and daies: and if we look to the coherence forwards, it ſpeaks onely of ſuch things, meats and drinks, *verſ.* 15. *Deſtroy not him with thy meate, for whom Chriſt died*, ver. 17. *for the kingdome of God is not meat and drinke.* v. 20. *for meate deſtroyes not the worke of God: it is evill for that man who eateth with offence: It is evill* not *ſimply* in it ſelfe, but *accidentally* by ſcandall. And therefore I ſhall conclude, that the place is in a ſpeciall manner appliable againſt ſcandalizing by abuſe of liberty in things indifferent.

Interpreters gheſſe at *three* things, wherein the practiſe of the ſtrong amongſt the Romanes might ſcandalize the weake.

1. *It might unſettle them in, and diſtaſt them againſt the Chriſtian Religion*: for they might hereupon think it to be contrary unto the Law of Moſes, which they ſo highly reverenced, and ſo at laſt it might occaſion their relapſe unto Judaiſme. 2. *It might imbolden them to ſinne againſt their conſciences*, by eating that which they thought to be uncleane. And 3dly, *it might grievouſly exaſſperate them*, and provoke them to powre out many a bitter, uncharitable, and ſinfull cenſure upon the actions, and ſtate of thoſe that were ſtrong in the faith.

In *verſ.* 21. The Apoſtle proceedeth to inlarge his doctrine touching this particular, beyond the controverſy, that occaſioned this his diſcourſe: for (as *Eſtius* well noteth) He teacheth, that to avoid the ſcandall and offence of our Brethren we are to abſtaine, not onely from things prohibited by the law, but alſo from things

not

not prohibited, from fleſh, wine, and any indifferent thing whatſoever: *It is good neither to eat fleſh, nor to drinke wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother ſtumbleth, or is offended, or is made weake. It is good*, that is, it is *morally* good. 1. Good *in regard of God*, a thing very acceptable, and pleaſing unto him. 2. Good *in regard of our Brethren*, profitable and conducing unto their edification. 3. Good *in regard of our ſelves*, a duty that God requireth of us: And from this we may inferre that the contrary hereof is (by the rule of contraries) morally evill: it is diſpleaſing unto God, hurtfull unto the ſoule of thy Brother, and ſinfull in thy ſelfe.

In *verſ.* 22. The Apoſtle prevents an objection of the ſtrong: *Haſt thou faith, have it to thy ſelfe before God*: He ſpeaks not of a faith (ſaith *Chryſoſtome*) that is περὶ τῶν δογμάτων of doctrines and tenets, to wit, ſuch as are fundamentall, and neceſſary unto ſalvation: but of a faith, περὶ τῆς προκειμένης ὑποθέσεως, concerning the ſubject matter here handled, meats, and dayes, things indifferent, a beliefe touching their lawfulneſſe: the ſtrong amongſt the Romans might be ready to obiect, that their knowledg and perſwaſion of their Chriſtian liberty in the matter controverted amounted unto a Divine faith: for it was built upon a divine Revelation: Each of them might ſay as *Paul* did above verſ. 14. *I know, and am perſwaded by the Lord Jeſus, that nothing is uncleane of it ſelfe.* The Lord Jeſus hath taught me this liberty now is it not fit, that my practiſe ſhould be agreeable unto my beliefe, that I ſhould exerciſe my knowledg, and act according unto my judgment: ſeeing it is ſo well grounded, why ſhould I forbeare the doing of that, which I know to be lawfull? Unto this the Apoſtles anſwer is, that they ſhould not make a vaine oſtentation, or unſeaſonable diſcovery of their faith: that is, knowledg, and perſwaſion, unto the offence of their Brother, the hazard of his ſoule: but rather in ſuch a caſe conceale it, and content themſelves with Gods knowledg, and approbation of it, who *ſeeth in ſecret, and will reward openly*, *Matth.* 6. *Haſt thou faith, have it to thy ſelfe before God:* This prudent and charitable management of Chriſtian liberty, the Apoſtle exhorts the Corinthians unto, in their carriage towards their Brethren touching things offered unto Idols. 1 *Cor.* 8. 9. *take heed leſt, by any meanes this liberty of yours become a ſtumbling block to them that are weake.* In *Chapt.* 10. he determineth, that it was

lawfull

lawfull to eat things consecrated to the Idols, and he instanceth in two cases. 1. *When they were sold in open markets. vers.* 25. 2ly, *When they were made use of at private feasts*: But unto this his determination he subjoyneth the exception of scandall, *vers.* 28.29. *If any man say unto you this is offered in sacrifice unto idols, eat not, for his sake that shewed it*, and for *conscience sake*; *The earth is the Lords and the fulnesse thereof. Conscience*; *I say, not thine own, but of the others: for why is my liberty judged of another mans conscience?* This some understand of the unbelieving Idolater, others of a weake brother: And indeed this practise gives an wound unto both their consciences. 1. *The Idolater triumphes*, because he thinks it an honour unto his Idol, and so he is confirmed, and hardned in his Idolatry: And then, 2ly, *As for the weake Brother, he supposeth, that the meat is so polluted by Consecration and sacrifice unto Idols, as that to eat thereof is a compliance with Idolatry*; and therefore altogether sinfull; and hereupon the eating of these meats by the strong may occasion in the weak *two scandalls*. 1. The example of the strong may *intice them unto imitation*; and so they will sinne against their consciences. 2ly, The practise of the strong may *provoke them unto rash and uncharitable judgment*: both scandals give a great blow unto the Conscience of the weake: But, that the Apostle speaks of the latter scandall, I am induced to think by the words following: *Why is my liberty judged of another mans Conscience?* that is, why doe I needlessely, indiscreetly, and unseasonably expose my Christian liberty unto the rash censures of a weake Brother, who may be ready to traduce it, as a prophane licentiousnesse? why shall I drive him upon a sin, which I may prevent by a prudent and charitable forbearance of the exercise of my liberty? Liberty is a thing, which men out of an excessive selfe love so much overvalue, as that they are very impatient of any restraint to be put upon it at all: But the Restraint, that Charity prompts us unto, is of all others most disregarded; because there is nothing almost, that is so much undervalued, as the precious soules of our poore Brethren, and therefore we make but little conscience how thick we throw scandals in their way: I shall therefore briefly propound such weighty, and pressing arguments, as the Apostle useth to perswade the Romans, and Corinthians to abstaine from a scan-

dalous use of their liberty in things otherwise indifferent, and lawfull: and they are drawn, either, *from the nature of things indifferent, or from the nature of scandall.*

1. *From the nature of things indifferent*: and here, the *first argument* is Rom. 14. 17. *the kingdome of God is not meate and drinke*: It doth not stand in indifferent things; for they are neither the way to the kingdome of Glory, nor our duty under the kingdome of grace: They are no part of Gods worship, and service, no matter of Religion: the weale and safety of Gods people is in no wise wrapt up in them; nay, many times a rigid pressing, and unseasonable practice of them is a great disturbance unto the peace, and a great hinderance unto the edification of the Church, the kingdome of Christ.

A second Argument from the nature of things indifferent, is *the great latitude of them*: Though some of them be scandalous yet there will still remaine an ample field of them besides, 1 *Cor.* 10. 28. *If any man say unto you, this is offered in sacrifice unto idols, eat not for his sake, that shewed it, &c. the earth is the Lords, and the fulnesse thereof*: It is as much as if he had said, though ye abstaine from things offered unto idols, yet there is no doubt of want, no feare of pinching your bellies: for you have the earth, and the fulnesse thereof for your supply: And from the scandall by meats, we may argue in like manner touching the scandall by recreation: If cards, dyce, tables offend thy brother, there is plenty enough of other sports, bowling, chesse, draughts, &c.

A second sort of arguments, that the Apostle insists on, are taken *from the nature of scandall:* It is a sinne against that tender love, which we owe unto our brethren: *And when ye sinne so against the brethren*, 1 Cor. 8. 12. (And that 'tis no small, but a very hainous sinne, the next words evince) *And wound their weake conscience*, The words are τύπτοντες αὐτῶν τὴν συνείδησιν ἀσθενοῦσαν, where (as *Beza* well observeth,) the Antecedent is put for the consequent, beating, striking, or smiting for the effect thereof, wounding: As weapons or whips wound the body; so scandalls the conscience. Unjustly to wound the body, the face, the eye of our Brother is a cruell and inhumane part; but to wound so tender a piece as his conscience, to wound a weake, a sicklie, a diseased conscience is the very height of inhumanity. To wound the

the ſoule of a Brother *with ſorrow*, is a breach of charity; *If thy Brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkeſt thou not charitably*, Rom. 14. 15. And hence we may reaſon in a way of compariſon *à minori ad majus*, that to wound the ſoule of a Brother *with ſinne*, violates Chriſtian love in a farre higher meaſure; for the wound of the leaſt ſinne is in its own nature mortall; and therefore ſcandall is not onely of a wounding, but of a killing and deſtroying nature; it is a ſoule murder, *Deſtroy not him with thy meat*, Rom. 14. 15. Indeed the weak, that were ſcandalized, might by Gods mercy, and Chriſt's merit, eſcape an actuall deſtroying and damning: But the Apoſtles meaning is, that the ſtrongs ſcandalizing of them carried in it's nature a tendency towards their deſtruction: for it drew them into ſinne, and ſinne without repentance will deſtroy the ſoule: This malignant and deſtructive efficacy of ſcandall the Apoſtle urgeth alſo unto the *Corinthians Epiſtle* 1. *chapt.* 8 *v.* 11. *And through thy knowledg ſhall thy weake brother periſh*: that is, through thy ſcandalous abuſe of thy knowledg of thy liberty in eating things offered unto idols, thou ſhalt doe, what lieth in thee, to farther the periſhing of thy weake Brother: This cruelty that is in ſcandall towards the ſoules of our Brethren, is aggravated from *Chriſts Redemption*, *Gods Creation* of their ſoules.

1. *From Chriſts Redemption of their ſoules: Deſtroy not him with thy meat for whom Chriſt died*, Rom. 14. 15. *And through thy knowledg ſhall the weake brother periſh, for whom Chriſt died? But when ye ſin ſo againſt the Brethren, and wound their weak conſcience, ye ſinne againſt Chriſt*: 1 Cor. 8. 11, 12. In the judgment of charity thou art to rank thy weake Brother in the number of thoſe, for whom Chriſt dyed: Chriſt died for his ſalvation, and how dareſt thou oppoſe his worke by doing that, which tends unto his damnation? Chriſt parted with his life to ſave him, and wilt not thou for that end abridg thy ſelfe of thy liberty in a few indifferent things.

2. *From Gods creation of their ſoules: for meat deſtroy not the worke of God*, Rom. 14. 20. that is the ſoule of thy brother: for that is ſtiled Gods worke in a way of *eminency*: becauſe it was one of the choyceſt, chiefeſt, and moſt eminent workes of the Creation, made as it were with the conſultation of the whole Trinity, and

had in it engraven the very Image of God himſelfe: Therefore not only the defacing, but the very attempting to deface this would redound very much unto the diſhonour of the worker God; And he will doubtleſſe accordingly reſent the deſpiſing of his workmanſhip: Some interpreters expound the place of the work of Gods grace in the ſanctification, or regeneration of the ſoule, wherein faith is begotten, and that faith in a peculiar manner is the worke of God, we have Chriſts own teſtimony, *John* 6.29. *Jeſus anſwered, and ſaid unto them, this is the worke of God, that ye believe on him, whom he hath ſent*: But even ſo the words diſplay the horrid malignancy of ſcandall: for they ſhew that he who ſcandalizeth his brother, fighteth againſt God, that he goeth about to demoliſh that, which hath God alone for the builder. It was a part of Chriſts character not to *breake a bruiſed reed, nor quench the ſmoaking flax*, *Mat.*12.20. How unſuitable unto this, is the diſpoſition of thoſe by whom offences come? For they doe what lieth in them to quench the very beginnings of grace, and goodneſſe. Indeed the worke of Gods grace is ſo all-powerfull, as that it will finally prevaile againſt all reſiſtance: If God have *begunne a good worke, he will performe it untill the day of Jeſus Chriſt*, *Phil.* 1.6. *And the gates of hell ſhall never be able to prevaile againſt it*, Matth.16.18. But yet the gates of hell will be ever hindering of it: and in eſpeciall by the ſpreadth of ſcandals: And this very oppoſition is a warre againſt heaven, (in the language of the Scripture) a deſtroying of the worke of God. There is one ſequele more of active ſcandals of this nature, that our Apoſtle mentioneth, *Rom.*14. and *1Cor.*10. which deſerveth alſo our conſideration: and it is the blot of infamy, which they will contract unto our names, and the very Chriſtian liberty, which we abuſe: A ſcandall in this caſe, *tending unto ſinne*, is uſually accompanied with a *ſcandall tending unto diſgrace*, or defamation: And how carefull we ſhould be to decline ſcandall, even in this Engliſh ſenſe of the word, the vehemency of the Apoſtles interrogations will ſufficiently informe us, *1 Cor.* 10. 29, 30. *Conſcience, I ſay, not thine own, but of the others: for why is my liberty judged of another mans conſcience? for, if I by grace be a partaker, why am I evill ſpoken of, for that for which I give thanks?* Unto theſe interrogations adde we the Apoſtles precept alſo, *Rom.* 14. 16. *Let not then your*

good

good be evill spoken of: that is, give none occasion for this great privileg of your Christian liberty to be traduced.

Before I take my leave of this restraint of our liberty by Charity in the case of scandall, I shall examine the restraints, that some have put upon it, without any warrant from scripture: Those in which they most confide, are two. 1. *They limit it unto the scandall of the weake, and*, 2. *Unto matters that are undetermined by Authority.*

1. *They* limit it unto the *scandall of the weake*: for the scandall of the malicious, and presumptuous persons, The scandall of *Pharisees* (say they) may be neglected, Mat. 15.12,14. whether in our Ceremonies there was an active scandall, a scandall given will be largely disputed in the next treatise, for the present therefore we shall only prove that we are to avoid such an active scandall in the malicious, as well as the weake.

For *First*, Such a scandall is of a soule destroying nature: *Destroy not him with thy meate, Rom.* 14.15. And who so wicked, and malicious upon the face of the earth, whose soule a true Christian charity will exclude from it's care, mercy, and compassion.

Secondly, The Apostles motive reacheth unto the wicked and malicious: *Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died, Rom.* 14.15. for they may be in the number of those, for whom Christ died, who for their present state and condition may be most wicked, and malicious; such as oppose themselves, such as are in the snare of the Devill, taken captive by him at his will.

3. The Apostles prohibition, 1 *Cor.* 10.32. extendeth unto the malicious, as well as the weake, *Give none offence neither to the Jewes, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the Church of God*: where Jewes and Gentiles are distinguished from the Church of God, and therefore by them are meant such as were unconverted, and as yet enemies unto the faith of Christ, and Church of God. And the things wherein the Apostle would have their offence to be avoided were matters of indifferency, *Whether ye eat or drinke, v.* 31. But now, lest some should be ready to object unto *Paul* that which our Saviour said of the Scribes and Pharisees, *Matth.* 23.4. *that he did binde a heavy burden and grievous to be borne, and*

lay it upon mens ſhoulders: but he himſelfe would not move it with one of his fingers: the Apoſtle in the next verſe ſheweth, how that his practice was conformable unto his precept, *Even as I pleaſe all men* (good and bad) *in all things* (that is, in all indifferent things) *not ſeeking mine own profit, but the profit of many that they may be ſaved*, 1 *Cor.* 10. 33.

In a *ſecond place*, the Fautors of our Ceremonies limit this reſtraint of our liberty in things indifferent by charity, in the caſe of ſcandall, onely *unto things undetermined by Authority.* Where Authority hath determined our choice, we muſt (ſay they) hold to their determination, any ſcandall to the Contrary notwithſtanding. It ſeems then in caſe the magiſtrate command it, *we may wound the weake conſciences of our Brother, Deſtroy with our indifferencies, the worke of God, him for whom Chriſt died. It is good* (ſaith *Paul*) *neither to eat fleſh, nor to drinke wine, nor any thing whereby thy Brother ſtumbleth, or is offended, or is made weake, Rom.* 14. 22. But our *Prelatiſts* determine quite otherwiſe, if authority enjoyne it, it is good (ſay they) to eat bread, drink wine, weare a ſurplice, uſe the ſigne of the croſſe in Baptiſme, though thereby never ſo many Brethren ſtumble, or are offended, or made weake.

The unreaſonableneſſe of this aſſertion *Ames* in his reply to *Morton* hath proved by many arguments, That are as yet unanſwered, which I ſhall here tranſcribe.

A ſcandall in the nature of it is ſpirituall murder: Now ſuppoſe a ſuperiour ſhould command a thing in it ſelfe indifferent, whereupon murder were like to follow, as to runne a horſe, or a cart, in a certaine way, at a certaine time, when it may be unwitting to the commander, little children were playing in the way, would any mans conſcience ſerve him to doe it?

Avoiding of ſcandall is a maine duty of Charity: May Superiours at their pleaſure appoint how farre I ſhall ſhew my Charity towards my brothers ſoule? Then ſurely an inferiour earthly court may croſſe the determinations of the high court of heaven.

The ſuperiours have no power given them for deſtruction, but onely for edification: If therefore they command ſcandals, they goe beyond their Commiſſion: neither are we tied therein to doe as they bid, but as they ſhould bid.

If

If determination by ſuperiours were ſufficient to take away the ſinne of a ſcandall. Then they doe very ill that they do not (ſo farre as is poſſible) determine all things indifferent, that ſo no danger may be left in giving of offence by the uſe of them. Then the Church of Rome is to be praiſed, in that ſhe hath determined of ſo many indifferents: then Paul *with the other Apoſtles might have ſpared a great deale of labour in admoniſhing the Churches how they ſhould avoid offences about ſome indifferent things: A farre ſhorter way had been either to determine the matter fully: or elſe to have given order, that the Churches ſhould among themſelves determine it at home.*

But ſay that the Archbiſhop of Corinth (for now I ſuppoſe ſuch a one) had called his convocation, and with conſent of his Clergie had determined, that men might, and for teſtifying of liberty ſhould, at a certaine time eat of ſuch and ſuch meats, which men formerly doubted of: would not yet the Apoſtle have given the ſame direction he did? Would not good Chriſtians ſtill have had care of their brothers conſciences? Can the determination of a ſuperiour be a ſufficient plea at the barre of Gods judgment ſeat, for a man that by virtue or force thereof alone, hath done any action, that his conſcience telleth him, will ſcandalize his brother.

Laſtly, I would faine know whether thoſe ſuperiours do not give a great ſcandall, which take upon them determinately to impoſe unneceſſary rites, which they know many good men will be ſcandalized by? Thus farre *Ames.* But this opinion of *Ames*, is I confeſſe to be underſtood *cum gravo ſalis*, with many limitations, which I ſhall lay downe fully in the Tractate that next followeth.

If the Prelates would have ſeriouſly laid to heart that golden ſaying of *Paul* (1 Cor. 8. 13. *If meate make my brother to offend, I will eat no fleſh, while the world ſtandeth, leſt I make my brother to offend*) This would ſuperſede all further diſpute of this argument: for thence it is eaſie to evict, that it is unlawfull for Church governours to command the obſervation of things indifferent, when in all probability they will ſcandalize: how dare they make that the matter of a Church Canon, which *Paul* durſt not adventure upon in his own perſonall practice? He thought it unlawfull to do a thing otherwiſe indifferent, to eat fleſh in the caſe of ſcandall; and therefore doubtleſſe he judged it unlawfull in ſuch a caſe to impoſe any ſuch matter upon others: Greater was the importance

tance of the flesh forborne by *Paul* unto his health, and the comfort of his life; then the profit of the controverted ceremonies can be unto the worship and service of God: And besides, the indifferency of eating flesh was a thing cleare, and evident unto all, that were well instructed in the Doctrine of Christian liberty; whereas the indifferency of our ceremonies will at least be judged a very doubtfull matter, and that by very indifferent men, who shall thoroughly ponder the Arguments of *Didoclave*, *Parker*, *Ames* and others against them, which to this day remaine unanswered. The Prelates will not pretend unto such an ample authority in the Church of God, as *Paul* had: But though they be farre inferiour unto him in point of Authority, they are not yet so humble, as to imitate him in the condescention of his charity. *Pauls* peremptorie resolve was to forbeare a thing indifferent, whē it scandalized. *If meate make my brother to offend, I will* (saith he) *eat no flesh, while the world standeth, least I make my brother to offend*, 1 Cor. 8. 13.

But what a wide difference, nay contrariety was there betwixt this charitable resolution of *Paul*, and the rigid practise of the Prelates. For they were obstinately bent to presse the Ceremonies, with all severity, without any care, or Conscience of the scandals ensuing: nay their endeavour was daily to adde unto the heape of former ceremonies, though they knew that thereby the scandals would be increased: They spake a language quite contrary to that of *Paul*: we will enjoyne (say they) the surplice, crosse, kneeling in the sacrament of the Lords supper, while the world standeth, as long as we have any power, and authority in the Church of God, Let who will be offended: This their rigour brings unto my mind a cruel command of (*l*) *Vedius Pollio*, that was countermanded by *Augustus Cæsar* supping with him: A

(*l*) Cum *Augustus* cœnaret apud Vedium Pollionem. Fregerat unus ex servis ejus crystallinum: rapi eum Vedius jussit, nec vulgari quidem periturum morte: murænis objici jubebatur, quas ingens piscina continebat. Quis non hoc illum putaret luxuriæ causa facere? sævitia erat: evasit è manibus puer, & confugit ad Cæsaris pedes: nihil aliud petiturus, quam ut aliter periret, nec esca fieret. Motus est novitate crudelitatis Cæsar, & illum quidem mitti, crystallina autem omnia coram se frangi jussit, complerique piscinam. Fuit Cæsari sic castigandus amicus: bene usus est viribus suis. E convivio rapi homines imperas, & novi generis pænis lancinari? si calix tuus fractus est, viscera hominis distrahentur: tantum tibi placebis &c. Seneca de ira. Lib. 3.

poore

poore boy his ſlave had caſually broken a Chryſtall glaſſe, and for this *Pollio* moſt inhumanely condemned him to be throwne into a great pond of Lampreys, there to be devoured. The boy eſcaping from thoſe appointed for his execution, proſtrated himſelfe at the feet of Cæſar, who then ſup't with his maſter, and deſired not pardon, but onely commutation of ſo horrid and unnaturall a death: *Auguſtus was extreamly* tranſported with the ſtrangeneſſe and novelty of ſo inhumane a cruelty, and hereupon to prevent the like for the future he forthwith commanded all the Chriſtall glaſſes of *Pollio*, though his friend, to be broken, and the fiſhpond to be filled up: for the breaking of a ſorry glaſſe he thought it a diſproportioned and too ſevere a puniſhment, to have a mans bowels pluck't in pieces, and torne aſunder. This ſpirit of *Vedius* Pollio breathed in many of our late Prelates; The Ceremonies in compariſon of mens ſoules were but as paltry trifles, as glaſſes, and feathers: and yet, by the maintenance of them, they hazarded the ſoules of thouſands (In as much as in them lay) *they deſtroyed the worke of God, they deſtroyed thoſe for whom Chriſt died*; they ſcandalize Papiſts, and ſeparatiſts: people and Paſtours: conformiſts, and non-conformiſts, as Mr *Parker* at large demonſtrates: Dr *John Burgeſſe* (as I have often heard) urged this ſtory in a Sermon before King *James* to perſwade him unto the abolition of the Ceremonies: And King *James* had doubtleſſe expreſſed a Chriſtian, and royall care of his people, if he had broken theſe glaſſes in pieces: if he had caſhered theſe toyes out of the Church, which had broken ſo many in their eſtates, wounded ſo many in their conſciences, and endangered the ſalvation of ſo many ſoules: and hereby have prevented thoſe unſpeakable grieſes, feares, and ſcandalls, which they formerly occaſioned.

I proceed unto the third and laſt concluſion, which is, that *no deliberate actions* of men, which proceeds from *deliberate reaſon*, if they be conſidered in *actu exercito*, in the ſingular or particular, *as cloathed with circumſtances, are indifferent*, but all of them are morally either good, or evill.

For the better underſtanding of this Concluſion, I ſhall out of

(*m*) *Ames* adde *two limitations* of it.

1. Then, this concluſion is to be underſtood only of an *adequate conſideration of the circumſtances* of ſingular actions, for not onely one, but more circumſtances of a humane action in the individuall may be indifferent: In a conference of ſchollers it is many times indifferent, whether they diſcourſe in latine, or Engliſh, whether in the morning, or afternoone: But yet their whole conference conſidered *adequately* with all circumſtances is either good, or evill; And the reaſon is becauſe the determination of an action doth not depend upon one circumſtance apart, but upon all joyntly.

(*m*) Circumſtantia una aut altera actionis alicujus humanæ poteſt eſſe indifferens, ut ſi ſtudioſus unus cum alio ſermonem conferat, indifferens eſt, ſæpenumero, utrum vernaculo utatur ſermone, an Latino: ſed ſæpe ipſe, cum omnibus ſuis circumſtantiis vel bonus eſt, vel malus. Ratio eſt, quia determinatio actionis non pendet ab una circumſtantia ſeorſim, ſed ab omnibus conjunctim.

A *ſecond limitation* of the concluſion is that it is not *to be extended unto every comparative conſideration of humane actions and their circumſtances*: I know, that not onely actions indifferent, but alſo thoſe that are commanded become ſometime to be ſinfull, by *compariſon*; when they are preferred to better actions. God diſlikes thoſe recreations, that otherwiſe he alloweth, when they juſtle out duties: nay he abhorreth ſacrifice when it is inconſiſtent with mercy: but notwithſtanding this, when there is an equality, if not of actions themſelves, yet of their morall motives as to *hic*, and *nunc* this preſent time and place, Then curiouſly to compare and ballance ſuch actions, were needleſſe: for in ſuch a caſe, the prelation of one before the other, would be a thing meerly arbitrary, neither good nor bad: Reading, prayer, meditation are things commanded: but many times that I ſet apart ſuch an houre for reading principally may be a thing indifferent: that I make choice of one Recreation before another, of bowling before Cheſſe, draughts, &c. that I chooſe to walke in the forenoon, ra-

Datur actio aliqua ſingularis, in qua nulla bonitatis ratio reperitur, quæ inalia non poſſit inveniri atque adeo quod hoc tempore, hoc vel illud potius agimus quam aliud, in eo ſæpe nihil boni aut mali occurrit. Opportunitas, aut animi ſuggeſtio, ſine ullo reſpectu bonitatis moralis, ſatis habet ponderis ad ſingularem iſtam determinationem.

Quamvis igitur nulla ſingularis actio humana ſit, quæ neque eſt bona neque mala, ſunt tamen variæ, quæ ſingulariter & in comparatione ad alias, neque ſunt neceſſariæ, neque illicitæ. Sicut enim ſtatuarius certam rationem ſæpe non habet, cur iſtam potius quam aliam ſtatuam facit, ſi tamen aliquam faciat, neceſſe eſt, ut vel regulas artis ſequendo bonam faciat, aut aberrando malam, ſic eſt in multis actionibus hominum ſingularibus, quæ quoad exercitium nullam habent rationem propriam, præter inclinationem animi, ſed cum exercentur vel bonæ ſunt, vel malæ.

De caſ. conſ. Lib. 3. cap. 18.

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ther then in the afternoon, may be of no morall consideration, and so neither good, nor evill, but a matter of indifferency: Looke as an Image carver may have no peculiar reason to make this Image, rather then that; yet if he make any Image at all; either he followeth the rules of his art, and then he makes a good Image; or he swarves from those rules, and then he makes a bad image, and doth not worke like an Artist: So many times it may be to a Christian, a matter meerly indifferent to performe this or that action, he may have no obligation to doe either, or at least to doe one rather then the other, but may be left unto his own mind, and pleasure: but yet he is as a Christian obliged to regard such circumstances in all his actions, and therefore whatsoever he doth, he doth it either well, or ill; for either he observeth these circumstances, and then his action is good, or he neglects them, and then it is bad.

The conclusion being thus explained may be made apparent *from the end, and rule of deliberate actions.*

1. *From their end*, and what ought to be the end of all deliberate actions of man may be evidenced from their *relation unto their Originall*, from *a consideration of them absolutely as they are in themselves.*

1. *From their relation unto their Originall*, the rationall soule, or the soule, as rationall, they flow from man, as man, they proceed from his deliberate reason, and therefore, should have the same end, which man as rationall should propound, the glorifying of his maker; If they have not this end, they are evill: and if they have this end, why then (if there be no fayling otherwise) they are good. This argument is by *(m) Raynaudus* thus urged:

(m) Quærenda igitur sunt firmiora præsidia, sententiæ humanos actus indifferentes inficiantis. Unum duco ex operatione humana prout est germen naturæ rationalis. Homo enim ad suas operationes habet se veluti arbor ad fructus, ut optimè advertit Antonius l. 9 de vita sua, num. 8. & pulchè Guliel. Pallib. de virtut. ca. 12. initio: cum ea tamen differentia, ut scitè notavit Antonius l. 11. num. 1. quod arborum & quarumvis plantarum fructus, alii percipiunt: ipse homo fructus sui percipit, nec alii, sed sibi ipsi laborat. Cum igitur operatio humana se habeat ad naturam rationalem, sicut fructus & germen ejus, necesse est, ut idem sit finis operationis ab humana natura prodeuntis, & ipsius naturæ rationalis. Sic enim videmus, servata proportione, accidere in omnibus aliis naturis. Et ratio est, quia cùm natura sit actus quidam primus, actio vero sit actus ejus secundus, qui est ipsamet tendentia actus primi in objectum & finem suum; necessarium profectò videtur, ut idemmet sit finis ultimus actionis & naturæ actionem principiantis: sicut trunci & germinum & totius arboris, ac fructuum, idem est finis. Debet ergo humanæ naturæ & actionis humanæ esse idem finis. Atqui finis ultimus humanæ naturæ est Deus. Ergo finis quoque ultimus actionis nostræ debet esse Deus. Constat autem, actum indifferentem, si daretur, non habiturum pro fine Deum: nam sic non esset indifferens, sed revera bonus. Ergo careret aliquo, quod habere deberet, nempe relatione illa ad finem ultimum naturæ humanæ; ac proinde esset malus moraliter, non autem indifferens. Moral. disciplin: dist 4 q 1. art. 2. n. 37

man is related unto his operations, as a tree unto it's fruits and branches: and therefore there is the ſame end of the humane operations, and the humane nature, and the reaſon is, becauſe that nature is the firſt act, and it's operation the ſecond act which is a tendencie of the firſt act towards it's object, and end; and therefore it ſeemes neceſſary, that there ſhould be the ſame uttermoſt end of the nature, and the operation; Even as there is the ſame end of the tree, it's ſtock, branches, and fruits: But now the uttermoſt end of the humane nature is God: and therefore God ſhould be the uttermoſt end of every humane action, and conſequently no humane action can be indifferent: for if it have not God for it's end, it is ſinfull: becauſe it wants that relation unto the uttermoſt end of the humane nature, which it ought to have: and if it have God for it's end, then it is morally good, if it want not any other eſſentiall requiſite.

2. *From a conſideration of them* (n) *abſolutely* as they are in themſelves: Every humane rationall action is referred unto ſome chiefe end or other, and that muſt be, either the creature, or the creatour: If it be the creature, then the creature is moſt ſinfully injoyed, as mans ſupreme end, and higheſt happineſſe: whereas it ſhould be only uſed, as a means: and hereby it is at leaſt *virtually*, and *interpretatively* idolized, deified, and placed in the roome of God: If it be the Creator then the action is good, unleſſe it be in ſome other regard defective. And ſo you ſee that

(n) Alterum ſententiæ noſtræ firmamentum profero ex actu humano per ſeipſum conſiderato. Hoc eſt non quatenus eſt germen naturæ, & quatenus tendem cum ea finem ultimum habere debet, ſed ſolitariè, perinde ac ſi non eſſet fructus illius naturæ. Sic igitur argumentor. Actio humana vel ultimo refertur ad Deum, ſive actu, ſive virtualiter, & ſuapte natura, quatenus eſt rationi conformis, & ſic eſt bona: vel nullo modo in Deum tendit: & ſic eo ipſo deflectit ab eo fine, eſtque mala moraliter. Nam eo ipſo quod non ſit ob finem increatum, nec in eum tendit ſaltem virtualiter, ſicut faciunt omnes boni actus, ſiſtit omnino in bono creato, eſtque ejus fruitio. Perverſum autem eſt, frui utendis, ut latè tradit D. Auguſtinus 1. de Doct. Chriſt. à cap. 3. &c. 21. & 22. oſtendens omnia bona creata debere tantum cadere ſub uſum noſtrum, ſub fruitionem autem non niſi Deum. Ergo Actus humani carentes bono fine, vel intrinſeco, vel extrinſeco, ſunt eo ipſo depravati, carentque aliquo quod habere deberent. Eſt enim in omni actione creatâ, debitum ut ſit fruitio fruendorum: id eſt, ut ultimò ad Deum tendat aliquo modo. Nam ſi non haberet hoc ex debito, poſſet eſſe fruitio utendorum, nihilque idcirco haberet indebitum. Quia igitur actus humanus, qui dicitur fore prorſus indifferens, eſſet fruitio puri boni creati, quod uti. tendum fuiſſet non fruendum; meritò convincitur non fuiſſe indifferens, ſed oblitus cœno turpitudinis moralis, ob defectum volitionis ad finem debitam. n. 38. loc. prædict.

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unto whatſoever end it be referred, either created, or uncreated, it cannot be indifferent.

For the further enforcement of this reaſon, I ſhall alleadge, and open ſome few ſcriptures.

The firſt is Matth. 12. 36. *But I ſay unto you, that every idle word that men ſhall ſpeake, they ſhall give account thereof in the day of judgment.* Three things here merit our conſideration. 1. *What is meant by an idle word.* 2. *What by giving account thereof:* and 3dly, *How this makes againſt the indifferency of humane actions, conſidered in their ſingulars, and actuall exiſtence.*

1. *What is meant by an idle word:* that which hath no obliquity in it but this, that it wants a good and honeſt end: That it is unprofitable, and unfruitfull, both unto ſpeaker, and hearer: *quod aut utilitate rectitudinis aut ratione juſtæ neceſſitatis caret, as Gregory, Homily.6.* As for thoſe, who think, that an idle word is extended unto every word, groſſely wicked, falſe, lying, blaſphemous, the very context will diſprove them: The occaſion of our Saviours diſcourſe was that blaſphemy of the Phariſees, *verſ.24. But when the Phariſees heard it, they ſaid, this fellow doth not caſt out Devils, but by Beelzebub, the prince of the Devils:* Now our Saviours drift is to diſcover the ſinfulneſſe, and danger of this blaſphemous ſpeech of theirs: And this he doth, as by ſeverall arguments, ſo particularly, in this verſe, by arguing *a minori ad majus*, from the leſſe to the greater: As if he ſhould have ſaid: *If in the day of judgment ye ſhall give an account for every idle word*, then much more for ſuch a blaſphemous vomit as this of yours, *That I caſt out Devils by the aſſiſtance of Beelzebub:* That our Saviours Argument here ſtands thus *Maldonate* tels us, all are of that opinion that he ever read. And for this coherence take theſe *two Reaſons.*

1. Our Saviour proceeds in *a way of aggravating* the now mentioned Blaſphemy: But if by every idle word you underſtand every groſſely wicked, and blaſphemous word, there will be little aggravation hereof: for to ſay that every wicked lying, blaſphemous word, that men ſhall ſpeake, they ſhall give account thereof in the day of judgment, falls very ſhort of what was ſpoken allready of this blaſphemy *verſ.* 31. 32. That it was a *blaſphemy againſt the Holy Ghoſt, and not to be forgiven, either in this world, or in the world to come.*

2. *Compare* we theſe words with thoſe immediately ſoregoing *verſ.*35. *A good man out of the good treaſure of the heart, bringeth forth good things: and an evill man out of the evill treaſure, bringeth forth evill things*: In the latter part of theſe words, *by evill things* are underſtood ſuch evill words as were notoriouſly ſuch, ſuch as even the Phariſees acknowledged to be ſo; The *Idle words* then in *verſ.*36 are diſtinguiſhed from them, as may very probably be gathered from the Antitheſis inſinuated in the particle [but] *But I ſay unto you every idle word, that men ſhall ſpeake, they ſhall give account thereof in the day of Judgment*: It is apparent, that our Saviour ſpake of ſuch words, whoſe ſinfulneſſe ſeemed ſtrange, and new unto ſuch looſe commentators on the Law, as the Phariſees were: And it is very obſervable, that he uſhereth in this his commination againſt every idle word with the very ſame forme of ſpeech, that he uſeth (*chapt.* 5. *verſ.*12,28,31,34,39,44.) In his correction of their corrupt gloſſes upon the law of God. So then our Saviour ſpeakes of that, which ſounded as very harſh and rigid doctrine in the eares of the Phariſees: *But I ſay unto you that every idle word, that men ſhall ſpeak they ſhall give an account thereof in the day of Judgment*: Notwithſtanding your ſlighting thoughts of your vaine, and unprofitable diſcourſe, I, who am the truth, and know fully the mind of God, as being alwaies in his boſome, doe aſſure you, that every idle word, which men ſhall ſpeak, every word, which is not referred unto a good end, they ſhall give an account thereof in the day of Judgment.

2. Enquire we, *what it is to give an account of every idle word in the day of Judgment.* The phraſe ſometimes ſignifies onely *triall, and examination, Luk.* 16,2. *Heb.*13.17. But that here it importeth condemnation, and puniſhment, (*n*) *Suarez* proveth from the ſcope of the words which was to terrifie the Phariſees for their blaſphemy, and to deterre others from the like, by diſ-

(*n*) Illa verba dixit ad incutiendum hominibus timorem, & ex aggerandam ſeveritatem divini judicii: ergo ſenſus illorum verborum eſt ita homines reddituros rationem otioſi verbi, ut ſi nullam aliam excuſationem, vel rationabilem cauſam habeant, pro illo puniendi ſunt alioquin verba Chriſti nullum fere pondus aut energiam haberent, neque aliquem metum inferent, cum tamen illo ſingulari exemplo voluerit Chriſtus oſtendere, quam ſint graviter puniendi homines: pro verbis præcedentibus. De bonitate & malit. humanorum act: diſp.9 Sect.3.

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playing, and amplifying the ſeverity of Gods judgment againſt it: And unto this the threatning of puniſhment and condemnation for every idle word is more conducing, then a propoſall of a bare tryall and examination of every idle word, which is agreeable unto the beſt words and works of men: *becauſe for them they may give an account with joy, Heb.* 13.17. In the words then, there is plainly *a Metalepſis*, the *Antecedent*, to give an account in the day of Judgment is put for the *conſequent* to be puniſhed in hell-fire, *Every idle word that men ſhall ſpeak, they ſhall give an account thereof in the day of Judgment*: that is they without repentance ſhall be condemned, and everlaſtingly puniſhed for it: And this acception of the phraſe we find elſewhere, as 1 *Pet.* 4.5.

I paſſe on unto the *third* particular *how this makes againſt the indifferency of humane actions* conſidered in their ſingular and actuall exiſtence: I *anſwere*: becauſe it concludes againſt *the indifferency* of any words of men, for thoſe words, which in the generall, and in their own nature are indifferent: yet as drawn into exercise, and putting on circumſtances they are idle, if they have no goodneſſe adjoyned unto them, by reference unto their due, and requiſite ends: And if they be idle they are ſinfull, and conſequently not indifferent: And what is ſaid of idle words of men is applyable unto the idle thoughts, and workes of men: for the thought of man is a more rationall act then his ſpeech, more an act of reaſon: And his rationall works proceed from his thoughts, and are of farre greater moment and importance then his words: and ſo in the upſhot we may inferre that if mens idle words are not indifferent, then neither mens idle thoughts, and works: And the juſtneſſe of this inference, I ſhall confirme by two arguments.

1. Idle words are therefore ſinfull, becauſe (being the birth and product of reaſon, and the free will of man) *there is not in them propounded an end ſuitable unto the reaſonable nature of man*: Now all the vaine thoughts, and idle works of men are the iſſue of reaſon, and freedome of will: and therefore, (becauſe they are not referred unto ſuch an honeſt end, as becomes the dignity of ſuch a rationall creature, as man,) they are faultie and vitious.

2. Idle words are therefore morally evill: becauſe in them, *that pretious treaſure, time, is waſted*, in which a man may be more laviſh,

lavish, then in the most prodigall mispence of money: But now our time is vainly consumed to no good end, and purpose, in our idle thoughts, and works: and therefore they are sinfull, as well as our idle words: and consequently not indifferent.

A second place is, 1*Cor.*10.31. *Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye doe, do all unto the Glory of God:* To eat, and to drinke *abstractively considered*, are indifferent actions, and yet such actions are here commanded to be referred unto the glory of God: and therefore if they be not thus referred, they are sinfull: And we may say the same of all other actions, that are *in specie*, in their own nature indifferent. *Capreolus* (lib. 2. dist. 40. quæst 1. pag. 562.) noteth, that these words of the Apostle [*Let all things be done unto the Glory of God*] may be understood two manner of waies *negatively or affirmatively.*

1. *Negatively*, and then the sense is, do nothing against Gods glory, nothing that may dishonour him: Things offered unto idols were in themselves the good creatures of God, and to eate them an action in it selfe indifferent, but to eate them in the Idols Temple was to countenance Idolatry, and so a high dishonouring of God, To eat them also with the scandall of a weake brother, was to prejudice, and *obstruct the* glorifying of Gods name.

2dly, The words may be understood *affirmatively*, and so there is (as *Capreolus* observeth) a threefold reference unto the glory of God.

1. *Habituall.*
2. *Actuall.*
3. *Virtuall.*

1. *An habituall reference* there is unto the glory of God, wheresoever there is the habit, the grace, or vertue of the love of God, the principle of actually referring all things unto the glory of God. But now *this is not sufficient*: for the habit of love may (for a long time) lie idle, and un-active, and be consistent with very grosse sins: as we see in *David*, *Peter*, and others.

2. An action is *actually referred* unto Gods glory, when there is an actuall cogitation of God, and his glory: And this, (though it ought frequently to be done) is not yet required in every action: well it may be our happinesse in the next life; But it can not be our

our duty in this; becauſe it would leave no roome, or place for other duties: Thus for an Artiſt to be alwaies thinking upon the rules of his Art, would be a diſturbance unto his worke: for a traveller to have perpetually in his thoughts, the end of his journey would retard his progreſſe therein.

In a *third* place therefore, the reference of all our actions unto Gods glory, that is here exhorted to, is onely *virtuall*. And that an action may virtually be referred unto Gods glory *three things* are required. 1. The above mentioned *habituall reference* unto Gods glory muſt be preſuppoſed, as alſo. 2dly, A foregoing *actuall reference of a mans ſelfe, and all that belongs unto him* unto the glory of God, and the more frequent this is, the better, and 3ly, *The Action* it ſelfe. 1. *Muſt not be referred unto any end oppoſite* unto Gods glory. 2. *It muſt be referred unto ſome end ſubordinate* unto Gods glory, that carrieth a tendency unto it, and is naturally referrible thereunto.

Now ſuch an action is ſaid to be *virtually* referred unto Gods glory, becauſe it is done in the virtue, and force of ſome preceding *actuall, and explicite* propoſall of Gods glory as a ſupreame end: for the virtue, and force of the chiefe, and utmoſt end abideth in all inferiour ends ſubordinated unto it; ſo that he, who propounds unto himſelfe thoſe inferiour ends, may be ſaid to propound *implicitly*, and *mediately* Gods glory for his uttermoſt end. Thus thoſe godly perſons who have firſt actually made Gods honour and glory, the maine ayme of their deſires, endeavours, and undertakings, may be ſaid afterwards to referre even their eating, and drinking, their recreations unto Gods glory *virtually*, if they ayme at no diſhoneſt end, though their explicit and immediate intendment be onely the refreſhment of their bodies, by which they are the better fitted, and prepared for the glorifying of God in both their generall, and particular callings. Thus every ſtep in a mans journey, (ſo he goe not out of the way) may be ſaid to be *virtually* deſigned unto the end of his journey, and yet it is neither neceſſary, nor expedient, that in every ſtep a man ſhould have actuall thoughts of the end of his journey.

Unto this ſentence of the Apoſtle here, *Eſtius* makes Parallel two other places.

The firſt, Col. 3. 17. *Whatſoever ye doe in word or deed, doe all in the name of the Lord Jeſus*, that is; for his glory and honour, for his names ſake.

The ſecond is, 1 Pet. 4. 11. *If any man ſpeake, let him ſpeake as the Oracles of God: If any man miniſter, let him doe it as of the ability, which God giveth, that God in all things may be glorified through Jeſus Chriſt*; Not onely in publick ordinances, not onely in acts of worſhip, not onely in neceſſary duties, but even in indifferencies, in all the common actions of this life.

But as for any further expoſition of theſe *two* places in themſelves, or application unto the matter in hand, I ſhall referre the reader unto what I but now ſpake on the 1 *Cor.* 10. 31. which with due change will ſerve here.

I ſhall therefore paſſe on unto a *ſecond argument taken from the rule of humane actions*, *right reaſon*: Unto this rule all rationall actions, proceeding from deliberate reaſon, are either *agreeable*, or *diſagreeable*: If *agreeable*, then they are morally good; for right reaſon is a part of Scripture *materially* conſidered: If *diſagreeable*, then they are vitious and ſinfull; For the will of man is bound to looke to it's rule, and conforme all it's actions thereunto: and therefore if in any thing it neglect, or thwart it, if it *ſwarve* therefrom in the leaſt particulars, it thereby commits a ſinne.

Unto theſe two arguments I ſhall adde *a third, drawn from the relation betwixt morall goodneſſe and illneſſe*: They are privatively oppoſite; *and inter privative oppoſita non datur medium in proprio ſubjecto ſuſceptivo*; betwixt things privatively oppoſite there is no middle, either of *abnegation*, or *participation* in capable ſubjects: Thus every ſenſitive creature either ſeeth, or is blind: but we cannot ſay of a ſtone, that it is blind, although it ſeeth not; becauſe it is not capable of ſight: Now morall goodneſſe and illneſſe are privatively oppoſed, (the formality of ſinne being nothing elſe, but a privation of that morall goodneſſe, which is required unto every rationall action;) Now every rationall action, Every action, that proceeds from deliberate reaſon, and freedome of will, conſidered in its ſingulars, and as drawn into exerciſe is capable of morall goodneſſe; becauſe it is referrible unto a good end: and therefore it is either good, or evill, and ſo not indifferent.

Againſt

Againſt this there are divers objections: unto thoſe of *Scotus* the reader may ſupply himſelfe with anſwers out of what hath been ſaid already: As for the arguments of *Vaſquez*, there is but (*o*) one of them merit's any examination, and yet that hath been alſo anſwered out of *Durand.* (*b*)

In brieſe, it run's thus: As no *Genus*, no *generall* nature can be without one ſpecies, ſo no *ſpecies*, no *ſpeciall* without one ſingular. No ſpecificall nature but hath at leaſt one individuall: and therefore, if there be ſome humane actions, that be in their ſpecies, in their ſpecificall nature indifferent, there muſt needs be an individuall of ſuch an action, that muſt be indifferent: and conſequently all humane actions conſidered in the individuall are not morally good, or evill.

(*o*) Prima ratio eſt deſumpta ex eo, quod Doctores prioris opinionis concedunt, eſſe nimirum actionem indifferentem ex ſuâ ſpecie, & objecto, tametſi in individuo nulla maneat indifferens. Ratio vero eſt huiſmodi. Nulla eſt natura in ſpecie, quæ non habeat aliquod individuum

This hath been ſufficiently anſwered allready, but now I ſhall, *ex abundanti*, adde two things more.

The firſt is out of (*p*) *Raynandus*: An humane action that conſidered ſpecifically is indifferent, in regard of object or matter may in it's individuals and ſingulars be lookt upon *two manner of waies.* 1. *Inadequately* only as touching matter, or object. 2. *Adequately* in regard of all circumſtances.

1. If an humane action be conſidered ſpecifically indifferent

in quo ratio ejus maneat, & non deſtruatur per contrariam: cum igitur ſit actio humana indifferens ſecundum ſuam naturam & ſpeciem, habere debet aliquod individuum, ac proinde eſſe poterit aliqua actio individua, & ſingularis, quæ maneat indifferens. In 1ax tom. diſp. 52. cap. 4. pag. 378.

(*p*) Hunc loquendi modum, fateor eſſe cavillo obnoxium; impugnaturque ab Argentina in 2. d. 40 qu. unica, art. 2. in 2. particuli: quia nulla poteſt eſſe ſpecies cujus non poſſit eſſe aliquid individuum. Ergo ſi dantur actus ſecundum ſpeciem indifferentes, debent quoque dari indifferentes ſecundum individuum. Quod argumentum agendo de ſpecie, & individuo in ſenſu quotidiano, & vulgari, rectè concludit, ſed non contra eos, qui admittunt actus ſecundum ſpeciem indifferentes, negant autem dari indifferentes in individuo. Nam hi Autores fatentur illos ipſos actus, quos admittunt, eſſe ſecundum ſpeciem indifferentes, habere quoque indifferentiam quoad gradum illorum ſpecificum reſtrictum per individuationem. Tantum itaque negant, eos actus, ſi ſpectentur cum omnibus ſibi debitis accidentibus, eſſe moraliter indifferentes. Et hoc appellant, actus non eſſe indifferentes ſecundum individuum: nempe quia individuum, ſecluſo rigore illo Metaphyſico, in quo tantùm importat reſtrictionem gradus ſpecifici, involvit congeriem omnium horum accidentium, aut ut paſſim loquimur, conditionum individuantium, ſecundum quam congeriem actus humanus non eſt indifferens, quatenus vel inter illa accidentia eſt debitus finis extrinſecus, & ſic actus eſt bonus: vel non eſt debitus finis, & ſic eſt malus, Mor. diſc. diſtin. 4. qu. 1. art. 2. Num. 31.

as *touching matter or object*, then all the individuals or ſingulars of that action are indifferent too, *not ſimply and abſolutely, but ſecundum quid*; that is only as touching their object, and matter: But notwithſtanding this, if we conſider them *adequately* in reſpect of all circumſtances, they are either good, or evill: for either they are cloathed with all circumſtances required in a rationall action, and then they are good: or elſe they want ſome, or one of theſe circumſtances, and then they are evill and ſinfull, for *malum fit ex quovis defectu*.

(q) Reſpondeo, poſſe aliquid eſſe indifferens dupliciter. 1. Quod indifferentia ſit de ejus eſſentiâ. 2. Quod ipſi conveniat per accidens, & ab extrinſeco. Si ſit indifferens priori modo, neceſſe in inferioribus ſalvari iſtam indifferentiam, quia tota eſſentia ſuperioris reperitur in inferiori, ſiquidem eſſentia conſiſtit in indiviſibili: ſi ſit indifferens poſteriori modo, non eſt neceſſe ſalvari indifferentiam in inferiori: nam quæ per accidens ſuperiori conveniunt, ſunt ab ipſo ſeparabilis: ergo ſine illis poteſt communicari inferiori. Si talia accidentia repugnent inferiori. V. C. poſſe prædicari de multis numerò differentibus, convenit naturæ humanæ ſecundum ſpeciem conſideratæ, ſed per accidens, & ab extrinſeco, ſcilicet per operationem mentis eam abſtrahentibus à ſingularibus, & cum illis ipſam conferentis; talis autem operatio eſt merè contingens tali naturæ. Ex oppoſito, eſſe animal rationale convenit eidem humanæ naturæ tanquam illius eſſentia. Ex quo fit, ut humana natura nequeat communicari inferioribus, quin ipſis tribuat 7 animal rationale, ſed non ipſis communicat poſſe de multis numero prædicari, alioqui quodlibet individuum eſſet ſpecies. Jam ut ad propoſitum veniam, Indifferentia actui ſecundum ſpeciem conceſſa non eſt ipſi eſſentialis, ſed accidentalis per abſtractionem ab individuis: imo non eſt indifferentia moralis poſitiva: quaſi actus ille ſit moralis, & indifferens: ſed eſt moralis negativa, quatenus actus ille non eſt moralis, ſed caret ordine ad rationem morum regulam, ideoque nec bonus eſt, nec malus moraliter. Unde patet non debere in illo individuo ſalvari talem indifferentiam, niſi forte in actibus indeliberatis, qui ſimiliter non ſint morales; ſed ipſi abſunt à noſtrâ quæſtione, Ethic. cap. 3. Sect. 2.

The *ſecond* is out of a moderne *Thomiſt*, (q) *Irenæus*. A thing may be ſaid to be indifferent two manner of waies. 1. *When indifferency is eſſentiall unto it*. 2. *When indifferency agreeth unto it onely by accident*, and *extrinſecally*, from ſomething that is extra-eſſentiall unto it: If indifferency were eſſentiall unto an humane action, conſidered ſpecifically, then every ſingular, or individuall thereof muſt be indifferent too; becauſe the eſſentials of every thing ſuperiour in point of predication are imparted, and attributed unto every thing, that is under them in point of predication; as every individuall of the humane nature is a ſenſitive creature, a living body, &c. But now indifferency is aſcribed unto ſome humane actions (conſidered ſpecifically) onely *by accident*, *and extrinſecally*, from the operation of our underſtandings, abſtracting, and deveſting them from thoſe circumſtances good, or bad, wherewith in their individualls they are apparel'd: and therefore agre-

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eth not unto their individuals look't upon without ſuch an abſtraction.

By what hath been ſaid, you ſee that our moſt indifferent actions are liable unto ſinne; and therefore afford matter of *humiliation* for the time paſt, matter of *Caution* for the future. *Application.*

1. *Matter of humiliation for the time paſt*: In their ſingular, and actuall exiſtence they were morally either good or evill, ſanctified or ſinnefull; and good they could not be, unleſſe there did concurre all requiſites: And (alas,) how ſeldome hath there occurred in them ſuch a concurrence? ſometimes they have riſen from a wrong principle; other times they have been directed unto bad ends; moſt times they have been faulty in regard of either meaſure, or manner: It is very ſeldome, but there hath been wanting in them ſome circumſtance, or other, that the word of God, or law of nature requireth: And the *totall* want of one of the leaſt of ſuch circumſtances will ſo vitiate indifferent actions, as that it will not onely render them ſinfull, but make them ſinnes, meritorious of all the flames, and torments in hell: and that which deſerves ſo ſevere a puniſhment, calls for a very eminent ſorrow and contrition: God hath ſet bounds unto the uſe of our liberty in things indifferent, (as unto the waves of the ſea,) ſaying, thus farre ſhall ye goe, and no farther: He hath commanded, that it ſhould be reſtrained by *prudence, Temperance, conſcience, Religion, Authority, and charity*; But we have tranſgreſſed theſe limits, and have exceeded all bounds of moderation: We have uſed this part of our Chriſtian liberty very imprudently, and intemperately in regard of our ſelves; irreligiouſly, and profanely in reſpect of God: againſt the dictates of our conſcience, a deputy under him; againſt the obligations of our oathes, and vowes unto him: diſobediently againſt the lawfull commands of our ſuperiours: uncharitably with the ſcandall of many poore brethren. And thus have we moſt ſhamefully, and unthankfully abuſed this great priviledg of Chriſtianity, by uſing it as an *occaſion unto the fleſh*, as a *cloake of maliciouſneſſe*; and ſo have proſtituted it unto the very ſervice of Satan himſelfe: *When* Job's *Sons and Daughters had feaſted together*, Job *offered burnt offerings according unto the number of them all: for he ſaid, it may be that my ſonnes have ſinned*, Job. 1. 5. Their feaſting was a thing indifferent, and very lawfull

in it ſelfe: but, becauſe it was obnoxious unto ſinne, therefore *Iobe* ſacrificed in the behalfe of them all: It may be (ſaith he) *that my ſonnes have ſinned:* The *poſſibility* of ſinne in the indifferent things of *others* (eſpecially ſuch as are neerly related:) ſtirs up in the godly a feare, and a holy jealouſy of them, and rowſeth unto prayers for them: and therefore much more ſhould the *certaine*, and undoubted aſſurance of the adheſion of ſinne unto our *own* indifferent actions provoke us, with contrite hearts to deprecate the wrath of God againſt us: All the indifferencies of unregenerate men are ſinnes: *Unto them that are defiled and unbeliving nothing is pure*, Tit. 1. 15. *the plowing of the wicked is ſinne*, Prov. 21. 4. And however *unto the pure all things are pure*. Tit. 1. 15. that is, all indifferent things in *themſelves* are lawfull, yet they may and doe *accidentally* become ſinne, when they are not in all particulars rightly circumſtanced: And then they preſent us with freſh occaſion for the renewall of our repentance and faith in Chriſt Jeſus: And how often this happeneth, is a matter, that the moſt wakefull and quickſighted conſcience can hardly diſcerne: ſo that the beſt of us may apply unto our indifferencies that of *David*, Pſalm. 19. 12. *Who can underſtand his errours: cleanſe thou me from ſecret faults.*

Secondly, The liableneſſe of our indifferent actions unto ſinne ſhould be a motive unto all poſſible *caution and warineſſe for the future* in them: There is no humane action ſo indifferent, but it is capable of ſinne, nay (if it be not in all particulars rightly circumſtantiated,) it becomes actually ſinfull; and therefore our hearts ſhould be very watchfull againſt ſinne in the uſe of all indifferencies, in our meales, in our feaſtings, and merry meetings, in our journey's, in our ordinary talke, and diſcourſe, in our walkes, in the actions of our ordinary vocations: *Indeed the rule of Gods word doth not at all either command, or forbid the matter of ſuch actions: but the manner of performing them commeth under the rule*: They are all to be done to the glory of God, in the name of Chriſt: every good creature is to be ſanctified by the word, and prayer: That Command, which God gave Abraham (*to walke before him*) is not to be ſtraitned unto the ordinances of God, but to be extended unto all deliberate acts of a mans life, and converſation, *Gen.* 17. 1. *Zechariah* (in his prophecy of the generall call or converſion of Jewes, and Gentiles) gives this for one character

character of ſuch, as ſhall be converted, that they ſhall have a ſacred and ſanctified uſe of things common and indifferent: *In that day ſhall there be upon the bells of their horſes, holineſſe unto the Lord, yea, every pot in Jeruſalem and Judah ſhall be holineſſe unto the Lord of Hoſts, Zech.* 14. 20, 21. Not onely acts of immediate worſhip, but all rationall actions, whatſoever, ſhould be offered up *as ſpirituall ſacrifices acceptable unto God by Jeſus Chriſt*, 1 *Pet.* 2. 5. The Apoſtle exhorts the Romans to *ſalute one another with an holy kiſſe, Rom.* 16. 16. this kiſſe was no religious rite in Gods worſhip, but a ceremony of civility, and therefore in it ſelfe a thing indifferent: And yet the Apoſtle requires holineſſe for the qualification of it: All our civill actions ought to be ſuch, as becommeth ſaints, that is, ſo farre forth holy for manner, that they be free from ſinne, and unto the glory of God: Indeed this is a ſtrictneſſe impoſſible unto lapſed man: But though we cannot *exactly and perfectly* obſerve it, yet we may *ſincerely and cordially* endeavour it: And this ſincere and hearty endeavour is that, which God, for Chriſt's ſake, will accept, reward, and crowne; and therefore it concernes us very much to uſe our utmoſt diligence herein: and the rather, becauſe we are (by farre) more prone and ready to ſlide into ſinne in things indifferent ere we are aware, then in ſuch things, as are for their nature, and matter ſinfull; for in ſuch things the danger is more apparent, and therefore the more feared, and watcht againſt; Whereas, if once we know, and are perſwaded, that actions are indifferent, and lawfull, then we are apt to think that all is ſafe, and that we need not trouble our ſelves with any farther conſiderations touching their expediency, and edification; and that there is no reaſon to perplex our hearts and conſciences with an anxious care of referring them to Gods glory, of walking before God in them, and of putting holyneſſe unto the Lord upon them. Now when once ſuch thoughts as theſe creepe into mens heads, it cannot be imagined, unto what exceſſes, and failings it expoſeth them: Adde unto this: that looke as the conſideration of the lawfulneſſe, and indifferency of actions occaſioneth a ſurprizall many times with hainous ſinnes: ſo alſo it proves (*by accident*) an obſtacle unto repentance for ſuch ſinnes: When the Godly fall into groſſe, and acknowledged ſinnes, either of omiſſion,

miſſion, or commiſſion; why, the checks of their own conſciences, the publick miniſtery, the reproaches of enemies, and the admonition of Chriſtian friends will ſoone awaken them, and informe them of their guilt: But as for the ſinnes, that adhere unto their indifferencies, how quickly are they hardened in them? For it is very ſeldome, that, either their conſciences, or their miniſters, or their Brethren take notice of them; or if they doe, they are apt preſently to hold forth the indifferencie, and lawfulneſſe of ſuch actions in themſelves, as a buckler to ward off all accuſations of Conſcience, all upbraidings of enemies, all reprehenſions, of either miniſters, or private friends: Thoſe, that are moſt laviſh of their time, and purſes, in gaming, will plead; that they follow none, but lawfull ſports: A Gentleman, that murders the greateſt part of his time in hunting, hawking, and the like exercises, and redeems but an inconſiderable portion of it to do God, and his Countrey ſervice, thinks, that he hath enough to ſtopp the mouth of all reproofe, to ſay, that the recreations, which he purſueth are things indifferent: ſuch riotous perſons, as waſt their pretious houres in joviallity, and goodfellowſhip, uſually make this Apology for themſelves: that it is not unlawfull to drinke with a friend in a Taverne or alehouſe. To awaken from this licentiouſneſſe, and to quicken in us a carefull watchfulneſſe over our hearts in the uſe of things indifferent, I ſhall, for concluſion of this diſcourſe, propound ſome examples of the ſeverity of Gods judgments againſt the ſinnes of mens indifferencies: *Davids* numbering of the people was a thing not evill *in it ſelfe*; but his curioſity, pride, and carnall confidence in an arme of fleſh made it ſo; And God was diſpleaſed with this thing, *therefore he ſmote Iſrael*, 1 Chron. 21.7. *with a peſtilence, that devoured* 70000. Doubtleſſe moſt of thoſe feminine ornaments (mentioned, *Eſay* 3.) were in themſelves lawfull; but the haughtineſſe, and wantonneſſe of the daughters of Zion abuſed them unto ſinne; And how ſeverely this ſinfull abuſe of them was threatned, you may read at large from *verſe the* 16 *uſque ad* 25: for Hezekiah to ſhew unto the Babylonian Ambaſſadours *the houſe of his pretious things, the ſilver, and the gold and the ſpices, and the pretious ointment, and all the houſe of his armour, and all that was found in his treaſures*, all that was remarkable

kable in his houſe, and dominion was in it ſelfe, but a civill entertainment, and not unlawfull: but becauſe he did it out of vaine oſtentation, this turned it into ſinne, and this was one of the ſins, which God chaſtiſed with the captivity of the whole nation, *Eſay* 39 2 *Chron.* 32. 2 *Kings* 30. *To be cloathed in Purple, and fine linnen, and to fare ſumptuouſly* were things in themſelves indifferent; but the exceſſe of the rich glutton made it ſinfull unto him: and this ſinne, not being repented of, was unto him a forerunner of hell torments, *Luke* 16. 19, 23. They were the ſinnes of things indifferent that had a great hand in, and influence upon the drowning of the old world, and the burning of Sodome, *Luke* 17. *verſ.* 27,28,29. *In the daies of* Noah, *they did eat, they dranke, they married wives, they were given in marriage, untill the day that* Noah *entred into the arke; and the flood came and deſtroyed them all. Likewiſe alſo as it was in the daies of Lot, they did eat, they dranke, they bought, they ſold, they planted, they builded: But the ſame day that Lot went out of Sodome, it rained fire and brimſtone from Heaven, and deſtroyed them all.*

FINIS.

A TREATISE
Concerning
ABSTINENCE
From all appearance of
EVILL,
In Doctrine and in matters of practiſe, and that both unto our ſelves and unto others.

WHEREIN

Diverſe *Queſtions* and *Caſes* of *Conſcience* belonging unto the difficult matter of ſcandall are briefly reſolved.

By HENRY JEANES Miniſter of Gods word at *Chedzoy* in *Somerſet*.

Bernard: ad Eugenium de Conſideratione. *Lib.* 3. *cap.*4.
Sanè intereſt tuæ perfectionis, & malas res, & malas pariter ſpecies devitare. In altero Conſcientiæ, in altero famæ Conſulis. Puta tibi non licere (etſi alias fortaſſe liceat) quicquid malè fuerit coloratum.

OXFORD,
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UMI

UMI

TO

THOMAS MOORE of *Hauck-Church* in *Dorſet-ſhire.*
ROBERT HUNT of *Compton Paines-Ford* in *Somerſet-ſh.*
} *Eſquires.*

IT is unto your Mediation that I owe in great part that leiſure, and liberty, which I had for the compiling of this Booke, and this hath given you ſuch an intereſt both in it, and in me, as that it would be a high piece of injuſtice, if no part of it ſhould weare your Livery. This account that I have given, touching the reaſon of my prefixing your names unto this worke, may induce ſuch Readers, who ſhall reape any Benefit thereby, to Concurre in their hearty prayers, for the powring downe of Gods Bleſſings, Spirituall and Temporall, Upon your Perſons and Families with the poore Author, who ſhall ever reſt

Your moſt truly devoted Servant

HENRY JEANES.

1 Theſ: 5. 22.

Abſtaine from all appearance of evill.

OUr Apoſtle directs us, in the verſe immediately preceding this Text, concerning *Good*; in this Text concerning *Evill*. Towards *Good* he exacts a *prudent warineſſe*; towards *Evill* a *ſcrupulous fearfulneſſe*. Towards *good*, a prudent warineſſe, *Prove all things*, and then, *hold faſt that which is good*. Nothing, how colourable ſoever, is to be received hand over head, before triall and examination by the ballance of the Sanctuary: for, *Vitia virtutes mentiuntur* (ſaith *Gregory*) vice is maskt under the skin of virtue, falſhood, diſguiſed under the face of truth: ſo that one is often miſtaken for the other. The groſſeſt enormities have been glaſt and coloured over with the name, and face of virtues: the moſt poiſonous hereſies have often gained the eſteeme and applauſe of Orthodox Tenents: and therefore as we muſt ſtedfaſtly *retaine* that which is truely true and good; ſo muſt we prudently *diſcerne*, and carefully diſtinguiſh between that which is ſo *indeed*, *and in truth*, and that which is ſo only in ſhew, and colour; this we muſt reject, that keep, and hold faſt: *Prove all things, hold faſt that which is good*. But he requires now towards evill a farre different carriage: there he looks for a *ſcrupulous fearfulneſſe*. Though we muſt not hold faſt any thing that hath but the appearance of good, yet we muſt abſtaine from but the appearance of evill.

Abſtaine from all appearance of evill: or from every evill appea-

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rance: the Words may be rendred indifferently, either way; both rendrings being equally conſonant to the truth, and Originall.

In the words our Apoſtle meets with a cavill, riſe among the Libertines of our, and former times, who when their ſcandalous courſes are charged upon thē, baffle of all with this plea: that they are not intrinſecally ſinfull. Could I (will the profaneſt Libertine ſay) once ſee ſuch and ſuch things proved to be unlawfull: why I would make no more words of the matter, but ſoone forbeare them. I, but have they the bluſh, the appearance of evill? that ſhould be motive enough to ſhun them.

Abſtaine from all &c.

But are we ſure this is the Apoſtles meaning? are not the words capable of another interpretation? Firſt, ſome miſlike our tranſlation of εἶδος, *ſpecies*, by appearance, and rather think it ſhould be meant logically, for ſort, or kind. That it may be ſo, *Mat. Flac. Illyricus* and *Beza* determine, That it is ſo the *Syriack* Interpreter, and after him *Faber*, and after them our own great and learned (r) Doctor *Hammond* reſolve. But I would faine know upon what ground they are thus ſingular againſt the Current both of Ancient and Moderne Expoſitors. Setting aſide this place the word occurres (as I thinke) in the whole new Teſtament but foure times, In *Luke* 3.22. and 9.29. *John* 5.37. 2 *Cor.* 5.7. And in none of theſe places is it, can it be taken in a Logicall notion. If not elſewhere, why here? eſpecially ſeeing ſuch an acception is not inforced by the ſcope, coherence, any other circumſtance of the Text, or any abſurdity otherwiſe unavoidable.

(r) See his Annotations.

But ſome dreame of a foule abſurdity, that would enſue upon tranſlating εἶδος *ſpecies*, appearance. If every appearance of evill ſhould be abſtained from, then ſhould good things, the beſt things be eſchewed, for they commonly appeare to be evill unto ſenſe, and carnall reaſon, that diſcerne not the things of the ſpirit of God. How eaſily may an acute wit ſet falſe faces upon them and worke a bad conceite of them into either weake or ill apprehenſions.

Unto this we may adde that of Dr *Hammond* in his treatiſe of ſcandall. *pag* 9. 10. *Appearance of evill* (ſaith he) *is ſo uncertaine*

taine and unconſtant a thing, that to abſtaine from it, univerſim, cannot be *the matter of any poſſible Command.* This feare will quickly vaniſh and be diſcovered to be idle, and vaine, when anon we ſhall explaine that diſtinction of appearance of evill, into *reall*, and *imaginary:* for the preſent therefore, leaving theſe men, proceed we, *ſecondly*, to others, who agree with us in interpreting εἶδος, in a *vulgar*, *familiar*, and *common ſenſe*, for appearance: but then their expoſition is not ſo generall, as ours: for they reſtraine the place to matters of Doctrine, and will not allow it to be extended to matters of practiſe: and countenance, they think, the context gives their gloſſe: for the Apoſtle having at the 19 *verſe* exhorted not to quench the ſpirit, in *verſe* 20. preſcribes a meanes for cheriſhing the ſpirit, viz: a reverent demeanour towards the word of God. If ye will not quench the ſpirit, *deſpiſe not propheſying*. And next, leſt that ſome ſhould except: are we thus reverently to receive promiſcuouſly all propheſyings, and doctrines preached unto us, and not to beware of ſome, of falſe propheſyings and doctrines? the Apoſtle, (ſay they) more diſtinctly directs, how we ſhould demeane our ſelves. *Firſt*, towards all propheſyings in generall: how, *ſecondly*, towards true: how, 3*dly*, towards falſe. *Firſt*, all propheſyings, and doctrines whatſoever muſt be diligently examined, *Prove all things*. *Secondly*, all true propheſyings, ſound, and orthodox doctrines are to be imbraced, with a firme, and unremoveable aſſent, *Hold faſt that which is good*. *Laſtly*, as for falſe propheſyings and doctrines even their very appearance is to be ſhunned. Thus they &c.

But *firſt*, I propoſe unto the conſideration of the learned, whether or no an exact and acurate coherence be to be looked for in moſt of thoſe precepts, delivered by the Apoſtle, from *verſ.* 13: *uſque ad verſ.* 23. The looſe and abrupt manner of heaping them together perſwade (me thinks) that there is as little dependance of many of them upon either the foregoing, or following precepts, as is to be expected between *Solomons* Proverbs, or *Bedæ's Axiomes*. Hence is it that (ſ) *Eſtius* holds it not *neceſſary to interprete*

(ſ) Neque neceſſe eſt hanc partem interpretari (ut quidam faciunt) ut connexionem habeat cum iis, quæ proximè præcedunt: nam potius videtur Apoſtolus refricare memoriam ejus, quod præcipit caps ſuperiori: ut honeſti ambulent, ad eos, qui foris ſunt, &c. Eſtius.

the place ſo, as that it ſhould have connexion with thoſe duties that immediately precede: rather (thinks he) *the Apoſtle ſeems to rubbe up the memory of what he commanded in the former chapter, at* verſe *the* 12. *That ye may walke honeſtly towards them that are without.*

Secondly, Suppoſe a coherence of the words with the former, muſt it needs be that which they obtrude? The words may ſit under our interpretation, and yet the Analyſis of the Context run ſmoothly, as thus:

The Apoſtle having at *verſe* 19. dehorted from quenching the ſpirit, next adviſeth uſe of meanes tending to the preſervation of its gracious and glorious reſidence in the ſoule: which meanes are either *negative* or *poſitive*: he aſſignes but one *negative* means, viz: a removall of a maine barre and powerfull obſtacle unto the preſence of the ſpirit, contempt of preaching, *Deſpiſe not prophecying*, verſ. 20. of the poſitive means, *two* concerne good, *one* evill: the *two* concerning good, are *boni diligens examinatio*, *conſtans electio*: *Prove all things, hold faſt that which is good.* *This* reſpecting evill, *eſt univerſaliſſima ejus rejectio*, an abſtinence not onely from all kinds, but even from all appearance of evill.

Laſtly, ſuppoſe the primary ſcope and intention of the Apoſtle be limited unto matters of doctrine: yet becauſe the maine reaſon, for which they themſelves conceive appearances of evill, even in matters of doctrine to be interdicted, is avoidance of ſcandall, the precept of which is *juris naturalis*, and not only doctrines but alſo actions are ſcandalous: juſtly therefore unto theſe, as well as thoſe, is the text appliable, and applied too, by all Schoolmen, or others that ever I met with purpoſely treating on the point of ſcandall. Should we then againſt the more generally received opinion of either former or later times, admit of their narrow and curtaild interpretation for the cleare, and indubitate ſenſe of the Apoſtle? Yet to make the words more inſtructive, their uſe more generall, we might warrantably put an enlargment upon them, and extend them *ad mores*, as well as *ad dogmata*: *ad agenda*, as well as *ad credenda*: to the decalogue, as well as *creed*, not onely to doctrinall truthes, but morall duties alſo.

Uſe

Uſe of a diviſion here is none, but to bewray Logick: and therefore without more adoe we will roundly betake our ſelves to *Limitation, Confirmation*, and *Application* of the plaine point here commended to us: we are to abſtaine not onely from things intrinſecally ſinfull, but from all ſhewes and appearances of ſinne.

For *Limitation*, appearance of evill is either in *poſitions* or *actions*.

Firſt then? tis queſtioned whether or no wee are to abſtaine from all poſitions, which have an appearance of evill: of falſhood.

For reſolution we muſt diſtinguiſh,

1. Concerning appearance of evill in *poſitions*.
2. Concerning abſtinence from ſuch an appearance.

Appearance of evill in *Poſitions* is twofold:

1. Either in regard of their *matter* and *ſubſtance*.
2. Or elſe in the *termes*, and expreſſions uſed in their propoſall.

That which is in regard of their matter and ſubſtance, is, either to *our ſelves* or *others*.

Secondly, to diſtinguiſh concerning abſtinence from the appearance of evill, or falſhood in Poſitions: we may be ſaid to abſtaine from doctrines falſe in appearance, *two* manner of waies: either

1. When we abſtaine from *aſſenting* to them.
2. Or when we abſtaine from *publiſhing* of them.

We abſtaine from aſſenting to them either *poſitively*, or *negatively*.

Poſitively, when by a poſitive, or reall act of the underſtanding we diſſent from, we reject them. Now diſſent from them is twofold,

1 Either *abſolute* and *peremptory*,
2. Or elſe but *conditionall*, *and cautionary*.

Negatively, when we do not diſſent from them, but onely not aſſent unto them: when we ſuſpend our aſſent.

To apply theſe diſtinctions.

Note *firſt*, that though the ſubſtance or matter of Doctrines appeare to be falſe unto our ſelves, our own judgments, yet are we not bound to abſtaine poſitively from aſſenting to them, to

diſſent from them, to reject them; for this appearance may not be true and reall, grounded upon the doctrines themſelves, which perhaps may not ſend forth the leaſt colour or ſhadow for ſuſpicion, but only put and faſtned upon them by means of the errour, ignorance, and darkneſſe of our underſtandings, that perhaps not with due care and circumſpection, but rather with much precipitancy have given their cenſure of them: and therefore however at firſt bluſh they ſeeme falſe, yet when once the light of our reaſon is cleared from miſts, and clouds, they may upon due examination prove true: and to diſſent from, and reject a truth would be a ſoule errour of, and blemiſh to our underſtanding. Obliged we are then, to abſtaine, not *poſitively* but *negatively* from aſſenting to them: that is, not to *diſſent* from them, but only not to *aſſent* unto them, to *ſtay* our *aſſent*, to demurre a while, before we give in our judgment, leſt we receive any thing with a doubtfull, entangled, and perplexed Conſcience.

Of this *Calvin* gives us an hint in his expoſition on this place, *Speciem mali interpretor, cùm nondum ita comperta eſt doctrinæ falſitas, ut merito rejici queat, ſed tamen aliqua hæret ſiniſtra ſuſpicio, & timetur, ne quid veneni lateat: ergò ab eo genere doctrina, quod malum, etiamſi non ſit, apparet, abſtinere præcipit, non quod in totum rejici permittat, ſed quia recipi, aut fidem obtinere non debet. Cur enim priùs quod bonum eſt teneri juſſit, nunc abſtinere vult, non ſimpliciter à malo, ſed à mali ſpecie? quia ubi dijudicatione in lucem producta fuerit veritas, tunc demum ei fidem haberi decet: ubi autem ſubeſt falſi metus, aut mens dubitatione eſt implicita, pedem referre, vel gradum ſuſpendere convenit, nè quid dubiâ perplexáque conſcientiâ amplectamur.* By the appearance of evill I underſtand (ſaith he) *when as the falſhood of a doctrine is not yet ſo throughly detected, that it may be deſervedly rejected, but yet there ſticks ſome bad ſuſpicion of it, and 'tis feared, leſt poiſon lurke under it: therefore he commands us to abſtaine from that kind of doctrine, which though it be not evill, yet appeares ſo: not as though it ought altogether to be rejected, but becauſe it ought not to be received, to be believed. For why doth he before command* us to hold faſt onely *that which is good, and here he wills us to abſtaine not barely from evill, but from its appearance? Becauſe when after a thorough ſifting a truth is cleared, 'tis fitting*

fitting it ſhould forthwith be believed: but when as the falſhood of it is feared, or the mind with doubting is intangled, we muſt for a while withdraw our aſſent, leſt we embrace any thing with a doubting, and perplexed conſcience.

But ſuppoſe I for mine own part am firmely perſwaded of the truth of ſuch, or ſuch a Tenet, or at leaſt unconvinced, unperſwaded of it's falſhood, and yet it appeare generally unto others to be falſe unto the judgments of the godly learned, of moſt of the ancient Fathers, unto either generall or provinciall Councils: in ſuch a caſe, what courſe muſt I take, becauſe it hath appearance of falſhood unto others underſtandings, muſt I therefore diſſent from it, or ſtop mine aſſent unto it?

For anſwer, take theſe foure following rules.

First, we owe ſo reverend and humble an eſteeme of, and ſubmiſſion unto the Spirits of the Prophets, to the judgment of learned, ſober, and pious Divines, unto the writings of the ancient godly Fathers, unto the Canons, and decrees of Oecumenicall, and Provinciall Councils, as that whatſoever Tenents the whole Church repreſentative, to wit, a generall Councill, or the greateſt and chiefeſt part of the Church moſt of the Fathers and Divines too, of later and preſent times, have rejected and condemned for falſe, and erroneous, we ſhould abſtaine *negatively* from aſſenting to, that is, though not change, yet ſuſpend our beliefe of them, and not fully paſſe over our full and abſolute aſſent unto them, untill by diligent inquiſition, fervent prayer, imploring the guidance of Gods holy ſpirit, and uſe of all other good means, either their conſonancy with, or diſſonancy from the truth, be cleerly diſcerned, fully confirmed, and manifeſted unto our Conſciences.

But Chriſtian modeſty ſtayeth not here, but goeth one ſtep further, and in a *ſecond* exacts of us a *conditionall*, *probable*, *and* (t) *cautionary diſſent* from all doctrines thus generally ſuſpected, and cenſured: for upon generall diſlike of a doctrine, as upon a *prudentiall motive*, we may ground a ſtrong preſumption, an high and probable conjecture of the falſhood of it: ſo that hereupon wee may reject it, though not in an abſolute and irrevocable way, yet with this limitation and caution: ſo the apparent verity therein of it ſelfe do not force us to embrace it. So ſottiſh I am not,

t Dr Jackſon.

as to measure truth by multitude of voices: for errours I know that have grated upon the foundation, nay heresies, that have raised the foundation, have had their cloud of witnesses: yet I should so farre honour a publick testimony, as to suspect mine own, and others private bare opinions, not back't by plain scripture, with evident sense, or a full demonstrative argument, rather than a generall suffrage: for, *nemo omnes, neminem omnes, fefellere,** improbable as for one to deceive all, so for all to deceive one, Rivet (*u*) makes no doubt; but *cæteris paribus*, that is, if parts, prayer, diligence of study after the truth, be equall, that then a greater and fuller measure of the gift of expounding the Scripture, and deciding controversies thereabouts, is communicated to the publick ministers of the Church, (whether they execute their function severally, and apart in some one particular Church, or else jointly conferre and discourse among themselves concerning the true and genuine sense of the Scriptures in some assemblies call'd lawfully, and in the name of Christ) than unto severall private men, who are neither endowed with so many gifts, nor see with so many eyes, nor by their private and single meditation can equall the united consultations and enquiries after truth of many. And thus you see how farre Christian modesty requireth us to abstaine from assenting to doctrines upon the appearance of evill, or falshood, which they carry unto those, who in interpeting scripture, and deciding controversies, have committed to them the publick office *of direction and* instruction of others: but yet it taketh not from us the *judgment of private discretion*; for Christian liberty alloweth us such a freedome of dissenting from, or assenting unto, what the Church, and her ministers say, as is to be specified in the next two following rules.

In a *third* place therefore, although the Church, or the greatest and cheifest part of her, charge errour and falshood upon such a doctrine; yet this bare and single testimony, not seconded by any scripture or reason, is not to gaine so farre upon our beliefe, as that thereupon we should presently reject, and dissent from the doctrine thus generally censured with an absolute and peremptory

* Pliny. (*u*) Nec dubitamus cæteris quidem paribus, majorem & pleniorem mensuram communicari publicis Ecclesiæ administris sive in una aliqua particulari Ecclesia munus suum obeant; sive in cœtu aliquo legitimè & in Christinomine congregati de vero scripturæ sensu inter se conferant quam singulis & privatis qui neque tot donis instructi sunt, neque tot oculis vident, neque privatâ & simplici meditatione æquare possunt multorum collationem & disquisitionem. Isag. ad Scrip: Sac. cap. 19. Pag: 272.

remptory diſſent. This were to give unto the Churches deciſions as high and over-ruling a ſuffrage in our hearts, as is onely due to divine revelations to receive them, not as they are indeed the word of men, but as if they were the word of God: to yeild unto them an abſolute divine faith, and credence. This were a meere *Vaſſallage* of our ſoules, underſtandings, faiths, unto the authority of an humane teſtimony: a thing utterly unworthy the generoſity and freedome of Chriſtian Spirits. If God hath indulged to any the exerciſe of ſuch dominion over mens faiths, and conſciences: alas! then to what purpoſe hath he placed that glorious lamp of reaſon in our boſomes? of what uſe are our *intellectualls*? What place is there left for St *Pauls proving of all things*? St *John's tryall of the Spirits*? but the truth is, that God is ſo farre from enſlaving our underſtandings, or captivating our beliefe unto the judgment of any mortall, as that he approves not onely of a forbearance from a flat, and abſolute *diſſent* from doubtfull doctrines thus publickly, and generally diſliked, but alſo of a full and peremptory aſſent unto doctrines manifeſtly true, though condemned in a generall Councill, as is apparent from the fourth and *laſt rule*, which is: 1 *Joh.*4.1.

If a doctrine be, as true in it ſelfe, ſo alſo clearly, and evidently by me apprehended to be ſo, and yet appeare generally to be falſe unto others, of what degree, order, or condition ſoever; nevertheleſſe it Commands abſolute ſubſcription, and aſſent of the mind without *contradiction*, without *heſitancy*, nay without ſo much as *ſuſpenſe* of judgment. If the verity then of a doctrine be apparent, it muſt over-rule the aſſent of the underſtanding againſt the teſtimony of the whole world. For the teſtimony of men, of the wiſeſt, holieſt men, conſidered either apart, or aſſembled in a councill, admits, as allwaies of *examination*, and tryall by the ballance of the Sanctuary, and rules of right reaſon, ſo likewiſe of *contradiction* and denyall, when in it there is an expreſſe, and evident variation from either reaſon, or divine authority. In ſuch a cauſe we may lawfully, and ſafely diſſent from it; allwaies provided, that it be not in an inſolent manner, but with a reverend, child-like, and reſpectfull baſhfulneſſe.

But to goe on, if I am not to abſtaine from aſſenting to a doctrine manifeſtly true, becauſe it appeares generally to others to be

be falſe, muſt I not yet abſtaine from *publiſhing*, from *ſpreading* of it, either by writing or preaching?

For anſwer, thou muſt conſider the generall nature and qualitie of the doctrine, thus wrongly either *accuſed*, or *ſuſpected* of *falſhood*, and alſo of what uſe, and importance it is in regard of the preſent times, and places, wherein thou liveſt, and if it prove to be a doctrine either fundamentall, or at leaſt of ſuch weight and moment that from the publiſhing of it, will ſpring a greater good, more glory to God, and benefits to the Church then the trouble and diſquiet it brings can be an evill, thou art then at no hand to conceale it, ſo ſhould'ſt thou be unfaithfull both to God and his Church, and become acceſſary to the betraying, nay murther of the truth. *Si de veritate ſcandalum ſumatur* (ſaith Gregory) *melius eſt ut ſcandalum oriatur, quàm ut veritas relinquatur.* If ſcandall or offence be taken at a truth which the eſtate and exigence of thoſe ſoules committed to a mans charge requireth him to publiſh, better ſuffer the whole world to be ſcandalized, than ſuch a truth diſadvantaged, either by deniall, or but a cowardly ſmothering, and diſſembling, thereof. *Quemadmodum enim* (ſaith *Calvin*) "Charitati ſubjicienda eſt noſtra "libertas, ita ſub fidei puritate ſubſidere viciſſim charitas ipſa debet: As our liberty is to be ſubjected to charity, ſo alſo our Charity it ſelfe to faith's puritie.

Cal. lib. 3. Juſt. c. 12. Sect. 13.

But now if it be a *doctrine*, either not *fundamentall*, but of a lower *rank* and *quality*, wherein both orthodox writers, and preachers may vary and abound in their owne ſenſe, without prejudice to the foundation: or if it be of ſo ſmall uſe, that upon its divulgement, it is not probable there will ariſe ſo much honour to God, and edification of the Church, as may *prepondrate* thoſe *miſchiefes*, that hurly-burly, thoſe tumults, and contentions in the Church, which in all likelyhood will enſue thereby, thou muſt then forbeare to vent it, either from preſſe, or pulpit; ſo ſhalt thou beſt conſult for thine own private quiet, and publick peace. And we muſt follow after things that make for *peace*, and *edification*: *Rom.* 14.19. About ſuch matters to be contentious, we have no cuſtome, nor the Churches of God: and indeed about them to be contentious were the right pranke of a *Schiſmatick*: for not only

only he is a Schismatick (saith *(r) Cameron*) who maintaines a perverse Tenet: a man may hold a very true opinion, and yet play the Schismatick, and give scandall unto the people of God by delivering it in a rash, unpeaceable, and unseasonable manner, neither in fit place, nor due time, no necessity urging thereunto: for seeing in determining of his opinion the glory of God, and weale of the Church lye not at the stake, he plainly shewes, that he hath troubled the Church, lead with desire of not Christ's glory, but his own Credit. I confesse indeed, that a controverted, and suspected truth even of this low quality may be peaceably, and modestly professed, and debated too in private, but a publick promulgation thereof is at any hand to be forborne, *non sub intuitu mali, sed minoris boni*, not under the apprehension of any evill in the truth, but only as a lesser good, which will not consist with a greater, the tranquility of the Church, or if you will, the publick promulgation of such a truth is to be forborne, *sub intuitu mali, etsi non simpliciter, tamen per accidens talis:* under the apprehension of evill, not in the controverted truth, but in the promulgation thereof, which though it be not *simply* evill, yet becomes *accidentally* so, to wit, by *comparison*, in respect of a *greater good* then required, preservation of the generall quiet; with which for the present it cannot stand, unto the care of which it is opposed, though not *primo & per se*, yet *ex consequenti connexione virtutum*, as *Suarez* upon another occasion phraseth it. But I digresse.

(r) Non enim Schismaticus eò agnoscitur, quod fovet perversum dogma, si nó contingit aliquando, ut sententia schismatici hominis veritissima sit, tamen quia eam neque loco neque tempore debitis, nullâque necessitate urger, Schismaticus est, & scandalum objecit Dei populo: cum enim non agatur salus Ecclesiæ, ostendit se non adductum studio gloriæ Christi, sed suæ potius existimationis Ecclesiam turbâsse. Cameron in selectiora quædam N.T. loca. Tom. 2. in Mat. c. 18. v. 7.

To goe on to that appearance of evill in doctrines, which is in the *expressions* used in their proposall, a thing I could wish it were not to rise amongst many, who like no truth, unlesse delivered in *heretical terms*; men wonderfully taken with the language of *Ashdod*, the *Romish dialect*. But let it be our care to refraine all words, and phrases, which carry an appearance of either heresie or schisme, for though they may, and are by us meant in an orthodox sense, yet carry they a shrewd shew of evill, make others jealous, and suspicious of our soundnesse, and therefore (x) *Canus* although he will by no meanes assent, absolutely to that usuall saying;

(x) In rebus fidei verba debent esse casta, & exacta, & quæ rem ipsam propriè exprimant, & hæreticis non præstent occasionem calumniandi. Per. Martinez. lib. 12. de locis cap. 9. ad tertium.

ſaying, *ex verbis inordinatè prolatis ſit hæreſis*: yet he is content to approve of it, if it be moderated with this caution, *ſecundum præſumptionem audientium, & judicum, qui per exteriora ſigna debent judicare de hæreſi*: if it be underſtood according to the ſuppoſall of hearers, and judges, who ought and indeed can judge of hereſie onely by outward ſignes. Between a miniſter and Popery let there be a great Chaſma, a diſtance as wide as between heaven, and earth, nay heaven, and hell: yet if his phraſe do but ſmell of Popery, if his words, though not his meaning, trench neer upon it, men will preſently exclaime that he hath a Pope in his belly, at leaſt that he ſounds for a *Parley*, and thinks upon conditions of peace with the Romiſh harlot. And beſides as this ſuſpicious complying in phraſe, and language with the known errours of Popelings, or other novellers, and corrupt teachers grieves the ſetled and judicious, ſo farther it ſtaggers weaklings, confirmes and hardens aliens, and Apoſtates: rather opens than ſtops the mouthes of gain-ſaying carpers, and ſooner diſadvantageth the truth, than converts an adverſary. So farre is it from effecting the uſually pretended end, reconciliation; as that to uſe the ſimilitude of our Saviour, *Mat.ch.9.v.16.* like the putting of a new peece of cloth unto an old garment, it maketh the rent worſe, and wider. There goeth a manuſcript from hand to hand, ſaid to be penned by a learned (*y*) Doctor of this Church, wherein (that amidſt notwithſtanding all the variety of opinions there *may be yet preſerved in the Church the unity both of faith, and charity*) *private men are adviſed in their own writings to obſerve* formam, ſanorum verborum, *and to abſtaine not onely from ſuſpected opinions, but as much as may be alſo from phraſes and ſpeeches obnoxious to miſconſtruction and exception.*

(*y*) Dr *Sanderſon.*

For firſt, it is not enough, much leſſe a thing to be gloried in, for a man to be able by ſubtilty of wit, to find loop-holes, how to evade, and by colourable pretences, to make that, which through heat of paſſion, or violence of oppoſition hath falne from him unadviſedly, to ſeeme howſoever defenſible. But he ſhould have a care to ſuffer nothing to paſſe from him, whereat an ingenious and diſpaſſionate adverſary (though diſſenting from him in opinion,) might yet have cauſe to take diſtaſt, or exception.

And beſides, it were a thing of dangerous conſequence in the Church,

if

if every man ſhould be ſuffered to publiſh freely whatſoever might by ſome ſtraine of wit be made capable of a good conſtruction, if of it ſelfe it ſounded ill, or ſuſpiciouſly. For ſo many erroneous, unhappy notions implicitly and virtually ſerving to the patronage and protection of Schiſme or hereſie, might be cunningly conveighed into the minds of men, and impreſſions thereof inſenſibly wrought in their hearts, to the great damage and diſtraction of the Church.

This laſt reaſon for the ſubſtance you may meet with in *Aquinas* 2. 2dæ.q.11.a.2. where (having told us out of *Hierome*, *ex verbis inordinatè prolatis fit hæreſis*: that by unwary irregular expreſſions, by words diſorderly ſpoken, the moſt dangerous hereſies have often taken their firſt riſe, and originall) he afterwards gives us the reaſon hereof: *Similiter enim per verba quæ quis loquitur, ſuam fidem profitetur: eſt enim confeſſio actus fidei: & ideo ſi ſit inordinata locutio circa ea quæ ſunt fidei, ſequi poteſt ex hoc corruptio fidei: Unde Leo Papa quâdam Epiſtolâ ad Proterium Epiſcopum Alexandrinum dicit, quod inimici crucis Chriſti, omnibus & verbis noſtris inſidiantur & ſyllabis, ſi ullam illis vel tenuem occaſionem demus, quâ Neſtoriano ſenſui nos congruere mentiantur.* Likewiſe a man profeſſeth his faith by words, which he ſpeaketh; for confeſſion is an outward act of faith, and therefore, if there be but an inordinate ſpeech about matters of faith, the corruption of faith may hereupon enſue.

Whence *Leo* the Pope, in a certaine Epiſtle unto *Proterius* Biſhop of *Alexandria* ſaith, that the enemies of Chriſt's Croſſe lye in waite for all our *words*, and ſyllables, if in them we give any the leaſt occaſion, upon which they may faine that we comply with *Neſtorianiſme*. Hence is it that *Aquinas* himſelfe having propoſed this queſtion, whether or no this propoſition be true, Chriſt is a creature, in his anſwer thereunto tells us, firſt in generall, *cum hæreticis nec nomina debemus habere communia, ne eorum errori favere videamur*, then more particularly, unto the queſtion; that the Arrian hereticks have ſaid that Chriſt is a creature, and leſſe than the Father, in regard not onely of the humane nature, but alſo divine perſon, and therefore reſolves, that leſt we ſhould ſeeme to countenance their errour, we muſt not ſay abſolutely that Chriſt is a Creature, and leſſe than his Father, but onely with *this limitation*, according to *the humane nature*.

Ariani autem heretici Chriſtum dixerunt eſſe creaturam, & minorem Patre, non ſolùm ratione humanæ naturæ, ſed etiam ratione divinæ perſonæ, & ideò non eſt abſolutè dicendum, quod Chriſtus ſit Creatura, vel minor Patre, ſed cum determinatione, ſcilicet ſecundum humanam naturam. Nay not only *Aquinas*, but generally all the Schoolmen, and Civilians too, are ſo preciſe in this particular, as that among the *degrees* of damnable propoſitions are ranked by them not only propoſitions down rightly *hereticall*, or *erroneous*, but alſo (z) *propoſitio ſapiens hæreſin, propoſitio male ſonans*, every propoſition, that doth but ſmell, that hath but a ſmack of hereſie, that ſounds but ill or ſuſpiciouſly; and ſuch are all propoſitions, that in the firſt ſignification, which their words at firſt bluſh ſeeme *to import*, have an hereticall ſenſe; all propoſitions, that of themſelves, that is, uttered *abſolutely* without any *explanation*, or *qualification*, ſeeme to favour or countenance hereticall propoſitions, allthough they be capable of a good conſtruction, and with many *cautions, limitations, and reſtrictions* might paſſe for currant. And therefore was it, that the Councill of *Baſil* condemned this propoſition, *Chriſt ſins daily*, becauſe taken *properly* tis falſe and againſt the faith, although perhaps it may be freed from errour, if expounded in a *unproper* ſenſe, thus; Chriſt ſinneth daily, not in himſelfe, but his members. (a) *Suarez* ſaith, that if an equivocall

(z) Propoſitio ſcandaloſa, quæ etiam malè ſonans, ſeu piarum aurium offenſiva, appellatur, quæ præbet occaſionem ruinæ auditoribus, hoc eſt facilitatem cadendi in hæreſin, ut ſunt multæ propoſitiones, quæ licet cum modificatione adjuncta, ſunt veræ, per ſe tamen & abſolutè ſine modificatione prolatæ videntur favere propoſitionibus hæreticalibus. Ut ſi quis aſſereret ſimpliciter Patrem majorem Filio, & Deum in incarnatione factum creaturam, & ſimiles, quæ magis ſunt exponendæ, quàm extendendæ. *Arnoldus Albertinus* de agnoſcendis aſſertionibus Catholicis & hereticis. quæſt. 60. Propoſitio hæreſin ſapiens, aut malè circa ea, quæ ad fidem pertinent, ſonans, eſt illa quæ in prima ſignificatione, quam verba prima facie oſtendunt, ſenſum habet hæreticum, quamvis piè intellecta ſenſum aliquem habet verum. Alphonſus à Caſtro de juſta hæreticorum punitione cap. 3.

(a) Explicatur optimè, modo ſuprà tacto de propoſitione æquivocâ, quæ in proprio aliquo ſenſu, poteſt eſſe hæretica, & in alio etiam propriè Catholica, nam illa abſolutè, & ſine diſtinctione, vel declaratione prolata merito dicitur male ſonans, in quo diſtinctio alia adhiberi poteſt. Nam quædam propoſitio dicitur ab extrinſeco malè ſonans, alia ab intrinſeco. Ab extrinſeco vocatur, quando ſuſpicio, vel malus ſonus, non ex propoſitione nude ſumpta, ſed cum circumſtantiis perſonæ, loci, aut temporis oritur. *Suarez* de triplici virtute Theologica tract. de fide diſp. 19. Sect. 7. Dicendum igitur eſt, quod propoſitio ſapiens hæreſin illa eſt, quæ quamvis non appareat hæreſis manifeſta, quin potius aliquando poterit habere aliquem bonum ſenſum, tamen ex quibuſdam circumſtantiis, vel ex parte aſſerentis, vel ex temporum calamitate, ſaporem quendam habet hæreſis, & ſuſpicionis judicio prudentum & ſapientum, id eſt, ſuſpicionem quandam majorem vel minorem pro qualitate circumſtantiarum. Banner.

propoſition

propoſition having two proper ſenſes, one *Catholick*, another *hereticall* be delivered abſolutely without any *diſtinction*, or *declaration*, in which ſenſe 'tis meant, it is then deſervedly ſaid to be *propoſitio malè ſonans*. The ſame author goeth on and tels us, that a propoſition is ſaid to be *malè ſonans*, not onely *ab intrinſeco*, but alſo *ab extrinſeco* when the ſuſpicion or ill ſound thereof ariſeth not *from the propoſition taken nakedly, as it is in it ſelfe, but conſidered jointly with the circumſtances either of the perſon delivering, or of the time and place, in which it is delivered.* Omitting his inſtance, I will give you others more true, and favory. The word *Sacrament* with the ancients founded no other, than an holy ſignificant rite; in thoſe times then to have called matrimony, orders, &c. Sacraments, had been (it may be) without all manner of offence. But now, ſince the Church of Rome hath peremptorily determined, that there be *Seaven Sacraments properly* and *ſtrictly* ſo called, ſeaven outward and ſenſible ſignes, which by divine inſtitution, have annexed unto them the promiſe of juſtifying grace. He that ſhall now terme any thing a Sacrament, beſides *Baptiſme*, and the *Lords Supper*, renders himſelfe thereby juſtly ſuſpected.

In the writings of the Fathers, the words of ſatisfaction, and merit have been of large uſe. Satisfaction ſignified every bitter afflictive acknowledgment, or penitentiall mortification of our ſins, whereby we prevent, and turne away God's hand, and puniſhments for them. *Merit*, denoted onely *obtaining, procurement, impetration*, and according to this acception of the words, a man might ſafely have heretofore affirmed, that our prayers, almes, and other good works are ſatisfactory and meritorious. But now ſince ſome of the Romaniſts have wreſted theſe ſayings of the Fathers unto a worſe ſenſe, than they were uttered in: and hereupon taught that works are properly *ſatisfactory*, juſt *compenſations* for our ſins, wherein we make recompence unto Gods wronged juſtice, and redeeme our ſelves at leaſt from *temporall* puniſhments; that works are *ſtrictly* and *properly* meritorious of eternall life, deſerving and earning it *ex condigno*, in the way of condigne wages; as if there were an equality or due proportion between it and them, without all regard unto Gods gracious acceptance of them; he that ſhall now averre theſe propoſitions, may without breach of charity be juſtly thought to embrace

them in that falſe, and erroneous ſenſe, which our adverſaries the Papiſts take them in.

Hitherto concerning *doctrinall appearance* of evill, in *Doctrines*. *Practicall appearance* of evill in *manners* or matters of practiſe next followes, (*b*) and that may againe be divided into *Reall* or *Imaginary*. The diſtinction is the ſame with that of others. *Aliquid habet ſpeciem mali, vel per ſe ex conditione operis, vel per accidens ex aliorum interpretatione.*

(*b*) Dr *Sclater* in locum.

The difference between theſe muſt be well weighed, elſe we may as fouly be miſtaken, as once the *Pontickes* were, who, as *Florus* tells us, fighting in a night with the Romans, *per errorem longius cadentes umbras ſuas quaſi hoſtium corpora petebant*: miſtaking their own *ſhadowes* projected long as at the going downe of the Moone, laid at them as at the very bodies of their enemies: or as the Romans themſelves, were, unto whom when *Tiberius Gracchus* touched his head with his hand to exhort the people, as by a ſigne, to ſtand upon their guard for their lives, it ſeemed as if he demanded a diademe. *Cùm plebem ad defenſionem ſalutis ſuæ manu caput tangens, præbuit ſpeciem regni ſibi, & diadema poſcentis, Flor. lib. 3. cap. 14.* To diſtinguiſh them then, a *reall appearance* of evill flowes *per ſe ex natura operis*, from the nature, and condition of the fact it ſelfe: when that of it ſelfe, and in it's own nature, is a very probable ſigne of evill: and ſo it is, when it is *ordinarily done for an evill* end, when it is *per ſe* an occaſion *of Sin* in our ſelves, and *of ſcandall* unto others: it muſt be *occaſio data, non accepta.*

Firſt, when *naturally, and not onely caſually*, it may prove, and ordinarily doth prove an occaſion of an incentive to ſinne in our ſelves.

Secondly, when it becomes an *occaſion of ſcandall or offence*, of *ſcandall* tending *unto ſinne* in the *weake*, of *ſcandall* tending unto *ſorrow* and *vexation* in the *ſtrong* and *diſcreet*:

* Talis ſc. materialis uſus circumciſionis ſemper habet ſpeciem mali, non ex accidentia tantum, ſed quaſi per ſe ſuppoſito Eccleſiæ ſtatu. Suarez. de legibus lib 9. cap 14.

Such an appearance is there of adultery, in a mans lying in bed with another mans wife, though he hath no carnall knowledg of her.

* Such an appearance of Judaiſme, (than which few greater evills is there in the (*c*) circumciſion of thoſe Æthiopian Chriſtians, that live under *Preſter John*. Such was the appearance of evill in Chriſtians ſitting at meat in the Temples of Paganiſh Idols, in

Naaman

Naamans bowing himselfe in the house of *Rimmon*, however *Cajetan* excuse him with a pretty distinction, *inter genu flexionem imitativam, & genu flexionem obsequii.* And such also is that appearance of evill in a *good mans intimate fellowship* with *badones*, in a true and formall compliancy with aliens in the signes of profession. As in a Protestants presence at the superstitious, and *Idolatrous* worship of Papists, or in any other complementings with them in the expression of that *worship.*

Now no actions that have this reall appearance of evill are upon any pretext whatsoever to be ventured upon, and for this I shall give *two Reasons.*

First, because in them there is allwaies a scandall given, an active scandall, as is plaine from *Aquinas* his definition of scandall, 2. 2dæ. qu. 43. art. 1. *Scandalum* (saith he) understand it of an *active scandall*) *est dictum vel factum minùs rectum præbens alteri occasionem ruinæ.* For a word or fact is (*d*) *minus rectum* some way or other irregular, not onely when tis a sin in it selfe, but also when it hath a manifest shew of sin; for the bare and naked shew of sin may (*præbere alteri occasionem ruinæ*) *morally lead* another to sin, may be the morall cause of anothers sin, as well as sin it selfe; the actions, in which there is onely an appearance of sinne, may yet provoke another unto the practise of sin, as the performance of the sinfull action it selfe: To see a Christian sitting at meat in an Idols Temple, at an Idols feast, may tempt a raw convert unto Idolatry, as well as to behold him kneeling before an Idoll. For this I could muster up the *suffrages* of all the schoolmen, a generation yet of divines, that are none of the preciseſt either in positions, or practise. But I will not trouble my Reader with the testimonies of above two of them. *Opus malum* (saith *Suarez*) *vel habens speciem mali, quod de se inductivum est ad peccandum, vitandum est; nam illud est verè scandalum activum, ut patet ex*

(*d*) Dicitur autem minùs rectum, & non absolutè malum, aut non rectum, ad denotandum, posse etiam scandali rationem esse in actu, qui non sit undequaque pravus, sed tantum habeat ipsiem mali; aut qui duntaxat ratione effectus sc. ruinæ alterius, malus sit,

definitione ejus, moraliter enim inducit hominem ad malum. Quod vero non oporteat eſſe verè malum, ſed ſatis ſit apparere, patet, 2 Theſ. 5.22. 1 Cor. 12. *Ratio eſt, quia tenemur rectè operari, non ſolum coram Deo, ſed etiam coram hominibus. Secundo, quia cum opus habet ſpeciem mali, inducitur proximus ad malum opus, non ſolum ſuâ malitiâ, ſed etiam ex vi mei operis, & ex quadam fragilitate. Suarez, op. de triplici virtute tract. 2 diſp* 10. *ſect.* 3. *Quotieſcunque datur occaſio ſcandali* (ſaith *Vaſquez*) *malo opere, aut habente ſpeciem mali, ſemper imputatur ſcandalum tribuenti occaſionem, ſive ſcandalum ſequatur ex malitiâ, ſive infirmitate, aut ignorantiâ. Tunc enim qui præbet occaſionem ſcandali, peccat peccato ſcandali activi, quod nullâ ratione licet. Ratio vero eſt, quia nullâ juſtâ aut rationabili cauſâ excuſari poteſt aliquis à peccato, qui coram alio peccat, vel exercet opus habens ſpeciem mali: & ideo jure optimo dicitur tribuere occaſionem peccandi, quia tale opus ex ſe occaſio eſt peccandi. Vaſquez opuſculis Moralibus. tract. de ſcandalo.*

But now (to proceed unto a *ſecond reaſon*) beſides the evill of ſcandall in actions, that carry a reall appearance of evill, there is alſo *reductivè* the guilt of that evill of which they have an appearance; for that command, which forbids ſuch a ſin, forbids all the ſhewes and occaſions of it, all the preparatives unto it; as is uſually obſerved by Commentators upon the Decalogue. Thus the prohibition of adultery takes in all the cauſes, and ſignes thereof: by this rule to ſit at meat in the Idols Temple, at the Idols feaſt, was not onely a ſin of ſcandall, as being a provocation unto, and ſo a participation of the ſin of Idolatry in weake and ignorant ſpectators; but alſo a ſin of Idolatry by way *of reduction*, a ſinne againſt religion, a tranſgreſſion againſt that worſhip, which God requireth. *Suarez* expreſſeth this, though ſomewhat obſcurely, yet more fully: firſt he layeth down this concluſion; *Quando aliquis indirectè inducit alium ad peccandum per actionem malam, vel habentem ſpeciem mali, etiam incurrit ſpecialem malitiam ſcandali:* againſt this concluſion he propounds amongſt others this objection; *Sequitur eum &c. per actionem non malam, ſed habentem ſpeciem mali contrahere duas malitias. Unam ſcandali contra charitatem: aliam illius ſpecici peccati, ad quam proximus inducitur. Conſequens eſt contra divum Thomam hic, et ſumitur ex Paulo primo ad* Corinth. 8 & 12. *Ubi manducantem ſcandaloſe ſacrificata Idolis, non reprehendit*

hend reprehendit, ut Idolatram, ſed ut ſcandaloſum. Sequela autem patet, quia ille eſt causa talis malitiæ, ergo incurrit illam. Unto this his anſwer is: that an action onely evill in appearance may have a *double obliquity in it*, to wit, that of *ſcandall*, and that of which it *is an appearance*, unto which it induceth *Concedo, inquit, ibi eſſe duas malitias. Eſt tamen advertendum, dupliciter contra aliquam virtutem peccari. Uno modo per ſe primo, quia directe agitur contra objectum ejus, vel circumſtantias illi ex ſe debitas, & hoc modo actio ſolum mala in apparentia, nullam virtutem offendit. Alio modo peccari poteſt tantum ex conſequenti connexione virtutum. Nam ut dictum eſt 1.2 quia actus virtutum ſunt undique boni, quando hic, & nunc actus alicujus virtutis poteſt eſſe contrarius alteri virtuti, (quamvis in ſuo objecto, vel circumſtantiis quaſi intrinſecis non habeat defectum) non poteſt prudenter fieri, atque adeo neque eſt actus virtutis ſimpliciter, & ideo participat malitiam contrariam utrique virtuti, ſed alteram per ſe, alteram quaſi per accidens, & conſequenter. Sic etiam propria malitia ſcandali ferè ſemper fundatur in alia malitiâ, tamen ex conſequenti, & per accidens, ſemper habet aliquo modo illam conjunctam ex defectu circumſtantiæ debitæ, ſaltem propter aliam virtutem, propter quam non laedendam prudenter ceſſandum eſſet ab opere hic, & nunc, habente ſpeciem mali, quamvis ex ſe eſſet alias honeſtum. Suar: de triplici virtute Theolog. tract. de charitat: diſp. 10. Sect. 2.* 'Tis of this reall appearance I believe that the Apoſtle is here onely to be underſtood. But yet to make this our diſcourſe compleate I ſhall alſo take in conſideration that appearance of evill in an action which is but *imaginary*; and this is aſcribed thereunto from *our own*, or others *miſconceits and cenſures thereupon.*

Firſt, from *our own.* And here, if a man be in his own Conſcience ſtedfaſtly, fully and firmely perſwaded, that ſuch an action is *evill* and unlawfull, which yet in truth is not ſo, but lawfull: what ought he to doe?

Theſe times afford many inſtances by which we may exemplify this caſe: There are many Sectaries that profeſſe they thinke it unlawfull to frequent the publique Ordinances, to pay tithes unto the Miniſter, Contribution unto the Magiſtrate, and there be ſome, that thinke it unlawfull to ſweare in any cauſe, though called thereunto by a Magiſtrate, and yet all theſe particulars are not onely things lawfull, but bounden duties.

For *reſolution* we muſt premiſe *two things*.

Firſt, we muſt take into our conſideration, the *nature* of the action, and the *condition of the* perſon that harbours this miſperſwaſion of the action: the *action* in its nature may be either *neceſſary*, *or indifferent* and arbitrary: and the *perſon* miſjudging it may be, in reſpect thereof, *either ſui juris*, or *determined therein* by the lawfull command of ſome ſuperiour power.

Secondly, we muſt with *Durand* diſtinguiſh betwixt *ligare*, and *obligare*, to *bind*, and to *bind unto*. *Sciendum* (ſaith he) *lib. 2. diſt. 39. qu. 5. quod aliud eſt ligari, aliud obligari, qui in. obligatur debet, vel tenetur, id facere ad quod obligatur, nec quantum eſt ex parte ſuâ aliter abſolvitur ab obligatione. Ligari autem dicitur moraliter, qui ſic diſpoſitus eſt circa aliquod agibile, quod non poteſt licitè procedere, prout exigit natura illius agibilis, ad modum illius qui ligatur corporaliter, nec poteſt procedere etiam in rectâ & planâ via.* Conſcience is ſaid *obligare* to *bind unto*, when 'tis a bounden duty to doe or not doe what it dictates, when tis not onely a ſin to do any thing againſt it, but alſo not to doe according to it: Conſcience is ſaid *ligare* meerly to *bind*, when tis a ſin as to act againſt it, ſo alſo to act according to it.

Capreolus and others that follow him quarrell with this diſtinction that *Durand* puts between *ligare* and *obligare*: But *Capreolus* himſelfe laith down a diſtinction of obligation, that will come unto all one: *Obligatio (inquit) poteſt referri ad duo. Primo ad conformandum ſe tali conſcientiæ, & ad nullo modo diſcordandum illi, & ad non deponendum eam, ſecundò ad non diſcordandum ei, ſed non ad conformandum, nec ad non deponendum. Primò ſtrictiſſimè ſumitur, & illo modo Conſcientia erronea non obligat. Secundò ſumitur largè, & illo modo intelligitur concluſio noſtra, quod conſcientia erronea obligat, quia habens eam tenetur non diſcordare illi, ita quod illa ſtante faciat oppoſitum, quod illa dictat. Nec tamen tenetur ſe conformare illi, nec tenetur eam conſervare, immo poteſt, & tenetur eam deponere.* Here his *obligation largely ſo* called differs nothing from *Durand's ligation*; The Controverſy then is but a ſtrife of words; and therefore not worthy the heeding.

Theſe things thus premiſed I ſhall lay downe *foure Concluſions*.

First Concluſion. *Firſt*, if the action in its nature be not *neceſſary*, but *indifferent*, and

and *arbitrary*, and the perſon miſ judging it, be in reſpect thereof *ſui juris*, not determined therein by the command of any *ſuperiour power*. Why then he is bound in Conſcience during this his opinion, to abſtaine from the action. (For we ſuppoſe it *indifferent*, and a man may lawfully forbeare action where there is no neceſſity of doing, *à licitis poteſt abſque peccato abſtineri.*) We ſuppoſe it, although indifferent, yet againſt *Conſcience*: and whatſoever is done *repugnante conſcientiâ*, with a ſetled *reluctancy* of a mans own judgment, and conſcience againſt it, cannot be of faith, and *whatſoever is not of faith is ſinne* (e) *Rom.* 14.23. That is whatſoever action is done without a firme perſwaſion of the lawfulneſſe thereof, let it be *quoad rem*, and *eſſentially*, in it ſelfe lawfull, nay neceſſary, yet it becomes *quoad hominem* and *accidentally* evill, unto him it is ſin. Now that action may lawfully, muſt neceſſarily be forborne, that can be omitted, but cannot be committed without ſinne.

(e) See *Dr Sanderſon* in locum.

But now on the contrary (to come to a *ſecond Concluſion*) if either the action be in its nature neceſſary, or the perſon entertaining this miſpriſion thereof be juſtly enjoined performance of it by ſome ſuperiour power, that can herein lawfully challenge obedience from him by a law, not *meerly penall*; and ſo the action too, though indifferent for its *nature*, be yet in its *uſe*, and unto him become *neceſſary*. Why then this miſperſwaſion of its unlawfulneſſe cannot bind to abſtaine from it; for ſo it ſhould oblige unto either omiſſion of a neceſſary duty, or elſe diſobedience unto lawfull authority, both great ſinnes. And *nulla eſt obligatio ad illicita*. There is no obligation unto things unlawfull can lye upon us.

Second Concluſion.

For, *firſt*, obligation is onely to that which is a morall good; now nothing unlawfull can be a morall good; and therefore an erroneous Conſcience cannot oblige unto it.

Secondly, no command of an inferiour power can oblige, if it be contrary to the command of a ſuperiour power; But if an erroneous Conſcience ſhould bind unto things unlawfull, it ſhould oblige againſt the commandement of God, whoſe *Vicerey* Conſcience is, Indeed Conſcience is the next rule of voluntary actions: But

Firſt, it is a well-*informed conſcience* that ought to be this rule,

the will is not bound to follow a blind guide: for then being of it ſelfe *cœca potentia*, it muſt needs fall into the ditch.

And *ſecondly*, conſcience is but a ſubordinate rule unto the *Law*, and *Word of God*; and therefore its power to oblige is derived there from: it obligeth not therefore, but by vertue of ſome command of *Gods Law*, or *word*; and *Gods Law* cannot command things unlawfull, for then it ſhould claſh with it ſelfe.

(f) Diverſimodè tamen ligat Conſcientia recta & erronea, recti ſimpliciter ligat & per ſe, erronea autem ſecundum quid & peraccidens. Dico autem rectam ligare ſimpliciter, quia ligat abſolutè & in omnem eventum. Sienim aliquis conſcientiam habet de vitando adulterio iſtam conſcientiam ſine peccato non poteſt deponere, quia in hoc ipſo quòd eam deponeret errando graviter peccaret. Ea autem manente non poteſt præteriri in actu ſine peccato. Unde abſolute ligat & in omnem eventum: ſed conſcientia erronea non ligat niſi ſecundum quid, & ſub conditione. Ille enim cui dictat conſcientia, quod tenetur fornicari, non eſt obligatus ut fornicationem ſine peccato dimittere non poſſit, niſi ſub hac conditione, ſi talis conſcientia duret. Hæc autem conſcientia removeri poteſt abſque peccato, undè talis conſcientia non obligat in omnem eventum. Poteſt enim aliquid contingere, ſcilicet *Depoſitio* conſcientiæ, quo contingente aliquis ulteriùs non ligatur. Quod autem ſub conditione tantum eſt, ſecundum quid eſſe dicitur. Dico etiam quod conſcientia recta per ſe ligat erronea vero per accidens. Quod ex hoc patet, qui enim vult vel amat unum propter alterum, illud quidem propter quod amat, reliquum per ſe amat, quod verò propter aliud, quaſi per accidens, ſicut qui vinum amat propter dulce, amat dulce per ſe, vinum autem per accidens. Ille autem qui conſcientiam erroneam habet credens eſſe rectam, aliàs non erraret niſi inhæreret conſcientiæ erroneæ propter rectitudinem, quam in ea credit eſſe, inhæret quidem per ſe loquendo rectæ conſcientiæ, ſed erroneæ quaſi per accidens: in quantum hanc conſcientiam quam credit eſſe rectam, contingit, eſſe erroneam. Et exinde eſt quod per ſe loquendo ligatur à conſtientiâ rectâ, per accidens vero ab erroneâ. Capreol: Ex Aquinate Lib. 2. ſent. Diſt. 39. Queſt. 1. Ar. 1.

Nemo poteſt obligari ad malum ſub rationem mali, ſed benè ad malum, quod invincibiliter judicatur eſſe bonum, & quod proponitur ſub ratione boni. Nec conſcientia obligat contra legem Dei per ſe formaliter, ſed ſolum per accidens, & materialiter. Becanus Sum: Theol: Scholaſt: T. 2. Tract. 1. chap. 4. Q. 7.

(f) *Capreolus, Becanus, Raynaudus* with many others reſolve that however a right and well informed Conſcience onely binds unto a thing *per ſe formaliter & in omnem eventum*; yet an erroneous conſcience, denominated ſuch from an invincible and involuntary errour, may oblige unto a thing *materially*, *per accidens*, *ſub conditione*, and *ſecundum quid*. It obligeth *per accidens* as it is apprehended and believed to be right, and well informed; ſo that an erroneous Conſcience is adhered unto, for the rectitude ſuppoſed to be in it. It obligeth *ſub conditione* upon condition that ſuch errour of Conſcience laſteth: for it may be removed without ſin: and when it is removed the obligation ceaſeth; & then, that which obligeth *conditionally*, obligeth onely *ſecundum quid*, and not *abſolutely*.

Unto

Unto this I have *three exceptions*.

Firſt, they limit themſelves to errour invincible and involuntary, which is not imputable or blameworthy.

This errour may be conceived to be, either in *matter of fact*, or in *matter of rule*.

Errour in *matter of fact*, as when *Jacob* miſtooke *Leah* for *Rachell*; as when a poore ſubject, that cannot judge of the titles of primes, thinks a uſurper to be his lawfull Soveraigne, or as when a man takes goods left unto him by his Parents to be truly his own, though perhaps a great part of them were gotten by fraud or oppreſſion, without any knowledg of his: Theſe and the like particulars are all impertinent unto our preſent purpoſe; and therefore I ſhall not ſtay upon the conſideration of them.

Errour in *matter of Law, right*, or *rule* is againe twofold, either in regard of *law naturall*, or *law poſitive*. Now unto all that have actuall uſe of reaſon, The errour of the law of nature is vincible, and voluntary; becauſe the law of nature is ſufficiently promulgated unto them, it is written in their hearts, *Rom*: 2.15.

And we may ſay the ſame of Chriſtians, that enjoy the plenary promulgation of the Goſpell, and are capable of underſtanding it: for the Goſpell ſufficiently reveales all divine poſitives; ſo that a rationall man may know them, and is bound to know them; and *Aquinas ſtates it rightly*. 1.2dæ. q. 19. *art* 6. *voluntas concordans rationi erranti circa ea, quæ quis ſcire tenetur, ſemper eſt mala*: If a man erre concerning ſuch things, as he may know, and is bound to know, ſuch an errour is (at leaſt *indirectè*) voluntary, and ſinfull, and cannot oblige.

A *Second exception*: Conſcience hath no power to oblige, but what it deriveth from God: and therefore what it obligeth unto, God alſo obligeth unto: and God is the *morall cauſe*, and conſequently the Authour of whatſoever he obligeth to: but he cannot be the morall cauſe, and authour of that which is ſinne, and unlawfull, either *per ſe*, or *per accidens* and therefore neither he, nor his deputy Conſcience can oblige ſo much as *per accidens* unto that which is unlawfull.

A *Third exception* ſhall be the objection of *Durand* in the place above quoted: *Sola vera notitia de re obligationem non tollit, ed magis confirmat: ſed vera notitia de eo quod erronea conſcientia*

dictat, tollit obligationem, ergo obligatio nulla fuit. To be well informed, and to have a true knowledg of a thing cannot take away any obligation to it; But to be well informed, and to have a true knowledg concerning that, which an erroneous Conſcience dictates, takes away all obligation to it; Therefore there was never any ſuch thing as an obligation to it.

The moſt conſiderable objection is that of *Becanus* [Sum: Theol. 2. part. p. 1. tom. 2. tract. 1. cap. 4.] *Durandus concedit illum peccare, qui operatur contra hanc conſcientiam: Ergo debet etiam concedere, hanc conſcientiam obligare. Nam ubi non eſt obligatio, ibi nec peccatum. Durand* grants, that he ſinneth who acts againſt an erroneous Conſcience: therefore he ought alſo to grant, that an erroneous conſcience obligeth: for where there is no obligation there can be no ſin.

But the *anſwer* hereunto is very eaſy by diſtinguiſhing concerning *obligation*, which is twofold either as touching the *matter*, or *manner* of actions. Though there be no obligation, as touching the *matter of ſuch* actions, concerning which an erroneous Conſcience dictates: yet there is a generall obligation as touching *the manner* of all actions, that they be done without the Contempt of conſcience: and therefore in every action where conſcience is contemned, ſin is committed: *Quævis voluntas* (ſaith *Aquinas*, 2dæ. q. 19 *art.* 5.) *à ratione ſive rectâ ſive errante diſcordans ſemper eſt mala.*

Third Concluſion.

Which brings me unto my *third concluſion.* Allthough this erroneous conceit of the unlawfullneſſe of this action, ſuppoſed to be neceſſary either in its nature, or at leaſt in its uſe, becauſe lawfully commanded by authority, doth not *obligare*, that is, ſo bind, as that I muſt follow it, yet it doth *ligare*, ſo *intangle* and *perplex*, as that I cannot without ſin oppoſe it, and for this I ſhall alledge theſe following reaſons.

Firſt, becauſe whoſoever goeth againſt his Conſcience, (whether ill or well informed it matters not) goes againſt the *will* of *God*, although not for the *thing* he doth, yet for the *manner* of doing it, although not *materially*, yet *formally*, and *interpretatively*: becauſe whatſoever the Conſcience dictates, a man takes for the will of God: each mans Conſcience being a *Deputy God* to informe, and direct him. Looke as he who reviles, wounds, kills a private

vate man, miſtaking him for the King, is guilty of high treaſon againſt the King himſelfe: ſo, he that thwarts the judgment of even an erroneous Conſcience, fights againſt God, warres againſt Heaven: becauſe what his conſcience ſaies, he thinks to be the voice of Heaven.

Thus you ſee, that he, who acts againſt an erroneous Conſcience in ſuch an action, carrieth himſelfe as diſaffected towards God: for he knowingly adventureth upon that, which he thinketh will infinitely diſpleaſe him.

And in a *ſecond place*: ſuch an action is an argument of diſaffection towards that rule of our morall actions, which God hath appointed: he that hath an erroneous Conſcience, ſuppoſeth it to be right and well informed: and therefore, if he act againſt it, he ſlights that, which he takes to be the rule of his working: and therefore his action is, for the *manner* of it, lawleſſe, and irregular. (g)

Thirdly, in ſuch an action there is a depraved affection towards ſin: and that in Morals is the fountaine of all ilneſſe: If a mans conſcience be right, and well informed, and he act againſt it, every one will grant, that ſuch an action proceeds from the love of that which is ſinne: and there is the ſame reaſon to ſay as much, of that action, which is againſt the dictate of an erring Conſcience.

Beſides theſe reaſons I ſhall alledge Scriptures (to omit *Rom.* 14.23. allready ſpoken of) *Becanus* quotes alſo *Rom.* 14.14. *To*

(g) Velle aliquid contrà Synteresin naturalem rationis, id eſt, contra primum ali. quod principium morale à synteresi dictatum, omnino eſt malum & peccatum. Sed qui vult id, quod ratio judicat eſſe malum & fugiendum, ſive id verè, ſive falſò judicet, vult aliquid contra synteresin: Ergò omnino peccat. Major eſt evidens. Adverſatur namque id imprimis legi naturali, quæ poſtiſſimum lucet in principiis primis moralibus. Minor probatur. Nam principium illud primum, ſcilicet, malum non eſt proſequendum, ſed vitandum: inprimis vetat, ne quis, quantum in ipſo eſt malum conſectetur. Ut enim præcepta naturalia affirmativa jubent inprimis ut homo, quantum in ipſo eſt, bonum proſequatur; ſic etiam præcepta negativa prohibent imprimis, nè homo quantum in ipſo ſitum eſt, ſectetur malum. Qui autem ſeu verè ſeu falſè judicat aliquid eſſe malum, & nihilominus illud proſequi vult, is hoc ipſo, quantum in ſe eſt, ſectatur malum. Nam quod objectum ipſum per ſe ſit revera bonum aut malum; hoc quidem non eſt in hominis voluntate ſitum, ſed illud ſolùm, ut quod ipſe malum judicat vel bonum, id vitare, aut proſequi velit. quocirca qui judicans aliquid eſſe malum ſive verè, ſive falſè, illud nihilominus vult, is quantum in ipſo ſitum eſt, vult malum, & proindè directè violat legem illam naturalem ſynteresis, quæ id ipſum inprimis vetat. Greg. de Valentiâ tom. 2. diſp. 2. q. 14 punct. 4.

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him that esteemeth any thing to be uncleane, to him it is uncleane. The learned Dr *Hammond* alledgeth for the same purpose the 1 *Cor.* 8. 7. *For some with* (h) *Conscience of the Idoll, i. e. being resolved in mind that it is not lawfull to eat or taste of any μέρος or τομὴ, part or portion of the Idol-feast, (whether ἐν εἰδωλείῳ, at the idol table, or having bought it at the shambles (as it seems was the fashion of those πρίατα, to be sold there at second hand,* chap. 10. 25.) *accounting it unlawfull to eat any meat consecrated to that use, do yet eat that which is of this nature, and by so doing, their weake i. e. uninstructed Conscience, is polluted, i. e. they sin against their Conscience, do that which they are perswaded they may not doe, which although it be never so innocent and harmlesse thing in it selfe (an Idoll being simply nothing) yet to them which do it, when they thinke it unlawfull (and all have not knowledge, saith he in the beginning of the verse, i. e. are not sufficiently instructed in their duty) it is pollution or sin.*

(h) Conscientiam Idoli vocat Apostolus non scientiam-qua quis rectè de simulacris sentiat: ut malè interpretatur & malè probat Cajetanus, ea in re singularis: sed judicium quo quis existimet Idolum esse aliquid, id est alicujus virtutis: ac proinde cibos immolatitios ab idolo pati mutationem aliquam, sicque afficere & coinquinare posse edentes. Quod quidem judicium erroneum est: atque ex eo sequitur ut talem habens conscientiam, si edat idolothytum, edat illud quasi idolothytum: id est quasi immutatum aliquo modo per hoc quod idolis sacrificatum sit ut eius opinione tam idolum quàm idolothytum sit aliquid.

I shall proceed unto the *fourth, and last conclusion.* The only way then for a man to rescue himselfe out of these difficulties is to *rectify* his *Conscience*, to depose, and correct the errour thereof, so he shall escape contempt of the judgment of his own Conscience on the one hand, and breach of either Gods or mans lawes on the other.

This *Rayunandus* (from whom I know none do dissent) expresseth as followeth [*Moral. disc. dist. 4. q. 3. art. 1. n. 247.*] *Unum igitur illud subsidium supereſt, ut judicium de malitiâ vincibiliter errans, abjiciatur: Si enim neque adhærere ei licet, ut primo loco monstravimus: neque illi obsistere, ut nunc diximus; non aliud supereſſe potest, quàm ut homo errorem depellat, quod posse supponitur, aliumque de malitiâ sensum induat: alioqui quocunque se vertat, in culpâ erit.*

An imaginary appearance of evill issues, Secondly, from the sup-

Et conscientia ipsorum, cum sit infirma, polluitur. Illativè pars hæc exponenda est: ut sensus sit: atque ita animus eorum erronea hujusmodi conscientia imbutus, cum sit infirmus, eo quod scientia, qua fidem unius Dei quam habe, tapplicet ad particulares conclusiones, ut suprà dictum est, polluitur peccato: dum videlicet contra conscientiam quam idolothyto habent, existimantes edentes contaminari, de illo edunt. Estius in locum.

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poſals of, not only our ſelves, but others that cenſure it, whoſe judgments are either *miſled* by ignorance, and weakneſſe, or elſe *blinded* through *pride* and *prejudice*: ſuch was that in the moving of *Hannah's* lips, not afforded by her *fact*, but only faſtned on it by old *Eli* his haſty cenſoriouſneſſe: no other appearance of evill was there in our Saviours healing the diſeaſed, his Diſciples plucking and eating of the eares of corne on the Sabbath day; 'twas not grounded on their *actions*; but onely fancied by the *Phariſees ſwelling* uncharitableneſſe. What other was that appearance of evill, with which the Gentiles charged the primitive Chriſtians, lifting up of their hands in prayer, when they accuſed them for adoration of the Clouds? as appeareth *by Tertullian*, and by a *Poet of their own, qui puras nubes & cœli numen adorant.* (i)

This imaginary appearance of evill proceeds, from either ſuppoſals *of willfull, or weake ones*: The cenſures and ſuppoſals of wilfull, proud, and wicked ones, and the ſcandals thence ariſing, *ſcandala Phariſæorum*, I determined (*in my firſt Edition of this booke*) that we might ſlight our warrant (ſaid I) *is our Saviour's preſident. When his Diſciples told him, that the Phariſees tooke offence at his ſpeech, he made no reckoning thereof, but anſwered, let them alone*, Matth. 12.13,14. *and we, warranted by his example, may then be ſecure and regardleſſe of many calumnies, and groundleſſe exceptions againſt the government, diſcipline, and ceremonies of our Church: for there hath been ſo much ſpoken and written concerning theſe ſubjects, as that the pretence of weakneſſe is quite taken away from thoſe that are capable of information.* (i) *Parker* part 2. pag 63.

Firſt, here my cenſure of the non-conformiſts to be wilfull, proud, and Phariſaicall was very raſh, and uncharitable: all that I can ſay in excuſe for my ſelfe is: that when I wrote this, I was a very young man, and conformity vnto the Ceremonies eſtabliſhed by Law was then generally embraced, without any of the leaſt contradiction, for ought I knew; nay ſtoutly and zealouſly pleaded for by men, whom I admired for the generall report that went of their ſanctity, and Learning v.g. Dr *John Burgeſſe*, Dr *Sclater*, Dr *Anderſon* and others: And then I had read but one ſide, being an utter ſtranger unto what the Inconformitants could ſay for themſelves: and their adverſaries repreſented their objections, and anſwer, to be ſo weake: and ridiculous: as that 'tis no

great wonder, that I was prejudiced againſt them: But, about the beginning of the long Parliament, being awakened with the generall complaint of the Godly againſt the Ceremonies, I began to thinke a new of the controverſy, and out of my former prejudice intended a full vindication of the diſcipline, and Ceremonies of the then Church of England: and in order hereunto I read all ſuch books of the non-conformiſt's as I could procure: for I knew well by experience, that a controverſy can never be well handled, unleſſe all diſſenting opinions thereabouts be weighed: but upon peruſall of the non-conformiſts I ſoone found: that their adverſaries moſt diſingeniouſly miſrepreſented all that they ſaid: that they refuſed to joine iſſue with them in the ſtate of the Queſtion: that they came not up to an orderly grapple with their arguments: and that they ſeldome regularly replyed unto the ſolutions, which were given unto their objections: and this quickly produced an alteration in my judgment, and I believe it will do ſo too in all, that will make ſuch an impartiall ſearch into the matter, as I have done.

But *Secondly*, to come unto the examination of that aſperſion: that the ſcandals of the malitious, of Phariſaicall, and willfull ſpirits are not to be regarded, ſo as to forbear that, by which they are ſcandalized.

Gregory de Valentia: though he lay downe the affirmative in the generall, yet afterwards he delivers it to be his opinion: that we are to doe what lyeth in us to prevent the ſcandals of even Phariſees, ſo it may be done without any great loſſe, or notable damage unto our ſelves. *Exiſtimo etiam, ſi quis cum nullo ſuo, vel ferè nullo detrimento poſſet impedire ſcandalum proximi Phariſaicum, aliquid faciendo vel omittendo, debere ipſum facere. Nam ut tradidimus ſuprà in quæſt. de correctione fraternâ, etiam is qui ex malitiâ peccaturus alioqui eſt, eſt in aliquali neceſſitate ſpirituali, ac proinde ut (illic vidimus) debet ex charitate corrigi, vel aliter à peccatu ſcandalo impediri, quando id ſine detrimento proprio fieri poteſt.* tom. 3. diſp. 3. q. 18. punct. 4.

For the better ſtating of this Queſtion, I ſhall premiſe ſome diſtinctions of ſcandall: a ſcandall *is either active* or *paſſive*.

An active ſcandall is in all ſuch words, or deeds, as culpably occaſion the fall of another *into* ſin: and this is againe by *Gregory*

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de Valentia [tom. 3. diſp. 3. q. 18. punct. 1.] rightly *ſubdivided into that which is* per ſe, *and into that which is* per accidens.

An active ſcandall *per ſe* is in ſuch publique acts, as either by the expreſſe intent of the agent, or from their nature, and in themſelves, are *inductive* unto ſinne: and they are againe *twofold*:

Firſt, all publick ſinnes, or ſinnes committed before another:

Secondly, all ſuch publick actions, as carry a reall and manifeſt appearance of ſin.

An active ſcandall *per accidens* is in ſuch things, as are not in themſelves, and in their own nature occaſions of ſin unto another: and this is, either in an *unſeaſonable performance of poſitive duties*, commanded by affirmative precepts, which are not neceſſary *hic & nunc*: or elſe by an *unſeaſonable* uſe *of our liberty in things indifferent*.

A Paſſive ſcandall is the fall of another into ſinne: and this (by the author but now mentioned) is ſubdivided into *given*, and *taken*.

Scandalum datum, a paſſive ſcandall given, is that which ariſeth truly from the active ſcandall of another, as from its *morall cauſe*.

Scandalum acceptum, a paſſive ſcandall that is onely *taken*, is that which is onely the fault of the party ſcandalized, and cannot be imputed to any other, as a morall cauſe: the words or deeds of another may be an *occaſion* of it, but not a *culpable occaſion*.

I deſire that theſe diſtinctions of ſcandall may be well heeded: for the want of Conſideration of them hath occaſioned a great deale of confuſion in mens diſcourſes about ſcandall.

Firſt, many exclude from active ſcandall all things that ſcandalize *per accidens*: and then, what will become of thoſe ſcandals *Paul* ſpeaks againſt? *Rom.* 14. 1 *Cor.* ch. 8. ch. 10.

Secondly, moſt confound a paſſive ſcandall with *ſcandalum acceptum*, a ſcandall that is onely taken, and make them to be of an equall extent: whereas a paſſive ſcandall may de diſtributed into both given, and taken: if it be culpably both given, and taken: then it is *ſcandalum datum*: if it be culpably taken, and not culpably given, then it is *ſcandalum acceptum*.

Well, theſe diſtinctions being thus premiſed: I ſuppoſe it will be agreed upon by all ſides: that the queſtion is to be underſtood: *Firſt* of active ſcandals, our ſcandalizing of the wicked: or *Secondly*,

(which comes all to one) of ſuch paſſive ſcandals of them, as are given by us, as well as taken by them: Not, *thirdly*, of ſuch paſſive ſcandals, as are onely taken by them, not given by us: for from the guilt of theſe we may waſh our hands, ſo that there is no obligation upon us to forbeare thoſe things, by which they are in this manner ſcandalized.

My *Concluſion* ſhall be: that we are to eſchew the active ſcandals, and conſequently *ſcandala paſſiva data*, of the wicked, and malitious, thoſe that are Phariſaicall and willfull ſpirits: this is apparent: *Firſt* from *Paul's* prohibition of ſcandall, 1*Cor.*10. 32. *Give none offence neither to the Jewes, nor to the Gentiles, &c.* he ſpake of unconverted Jewes, and Gentiles, ſuch as were enemies unto the Chriſtian faith: and the Jewes were of all men the moſt malitious enemies thereof.

Secondly, from our Saviours denunciation of a woe unto the world by meanes of ſcandall, *Matth.* 18.7. *Woe unto the world becauſe of offences*; which undeniably is to be extended unto all ſorts of men.

Unto theſe two *arguments* we may adde *foure other*, taken from, *Firſt*, the *diſtribution*; Secondly, *relation*; Thirdly, *effect*; Fourthly, *oppoſite of an active* ſcandall.

Firſt, *from the diſtribution of an active ſcandall*, and peruſall of the members thereof: An active ſcandall (as I ſhewed but now) is diſtributed into *ſcandalum per ſe*, and *per accidens*: now there is no doubt, but that we are carefully to avoid ſuch things as ſcandalize the wicked, and malicious *per ſe*, of themſelves, and in their own natnre, *publick ſins, or ſuch words, and deeds as have a reall appearance of ſin*: all the queſtion will be concerning ſuch things as ſcandalize them onely *per accidens*, *our duties, and our indifferencies*: and by theſe they are frequently ſcandalized, and that out of an erroneous opinion concerning their unlawfulneſſe: in which regard the reſolution will be pertinent unto the matter in hand.

Firſt then: *duties*, that are commanded by affirmative precepts, may be forborne, *hic & nunc*, ſometimes, and in ſome places, to avoide the ſcandall of the wicked, and malitious. The uſuall inſtances are in reproofe, admonition, puniſhment of ſin, and the like: and this is warranted

Firſt, by the precept of our *Saviour*, *Matth.* 7. 6. *Give not that which*

which is holy unto the dogs: neither caſt ye your pearles before ſwine: leſt they trample them under their feet, and turne againe and rent you.

Secondly, by the example of *David*, *Pſal.*39. 1,2. *I will keep my tongue with a bridle, while the wicked is before me: I was dumb with ſilence, I held my peace even from good.*

Thirdly, by that rule in Divinity; *affirmativa præcepta obligant ſemper, non ad ſemper*; they alwaies bind, but not to alwayes: they do not oblige to doe the things required at all times, but only, when they are expedient for the glory of God, and the good of others: To reprove, and admoniſh ſinners is a duty commanded by God, *Lev.*19.17. *Thou ſhalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: thou ſhalt in anywiſe rebuke thy neighbour, and not ſuffer ſin upon him.* But now this duty is not to be performed unſeaſonably, when tis likely to bring no glory to *God*, nor good unto others, but rather likely to ſcandalize them. Thus every private man is not bound to runne into an ale-houſe, or taverne, there to reprehend a company of deſperate drunkards, who would looke upon his reprehenſion as an act of pragmaticalneſſe, and inſolency, and for it be ready to quoite him downe the Staires, or run him through with their ſwords: and as imprudent an act would it be, *in Spaine*, to run into their Churches, and there to cry againſt the Idolatry of the Maſſe; and in the Streets of *Conſtantinople* to declame againſt the impoſtures of *Mahomet*; for hereby we ſhould ſcandalize them indiſcreetly, and fooliſhly occaſion them, as to blaſpheme our religion, ſo to cut us in peices.

Unto the forementioned rule in *Divinity* I ſhall adde another out of *Logick*; *finis dat mediis amabilitatem*: *'tis the end onely makes the meanes deſireable:* Now reproofe, admonition, puniſhment, and the like duties are enjoined as meanes, in order to the reformation, and bettering of others: when therefore they are not likely to conduce unto this end, but rather to oppoſe and hinder it, prudence in ſuch a caſe dictates an abſtinence from them. But let us take two exemplifications of this out of *Aquinas* 2. 2*dæ.q.*43. *art.*7. The firſt is concerning the puniſhment of ſin: *dicendum, quòd pœnarum inflictio non eſt propter ſe expetenda: ſed pœna infliguntur, ut medicinæ quædam ad cohibenda pecc. ta, & ideò in tantum habent rationem juſtitiæ, in quantum per eas peccata cohibentur. Si*

autem per inflictionem pœnarum manifestum sit plura & majora peccata sequi, tunc pœnarum inflictio non continebitur sub justitia. Et in hoc casu loquitur (k) *Augustinus quando scilicet ex excommunicatione aliquorum imminet periculum schismatis: tunc enim excommunicationem ferre non pertinet ad veritatem justitiæ.*

(k) Augustin. in libro contra epistolam Parmeniani docet, quod ubi schismatis periculum timetur, a punitione peccatorum cessandum est.

The second is concerning brotherly reproofe: *dicendum quod correptio fraterna ordinatur ad emendationem fratris: & ideò in tantum computanda est inter spiritualia bona, in quantum hoc consequi potest. Quod non contingit si ex correptione frater scandalizetur, & ideo si propter scandalum correptio dimittatur, non dimittitur spirituale bonum.*

But to proceed next to the scandall of the wicked by our *indifferencies:* That we are to forbear things indifferent when they scandalize the wicked, and malitious. *Parker* [in his treatise of *the Crosse part.2. pag. 57.*] proves by many instances: when *the thing was indifferent, doth not our Saviour foregoe his liberty, to please the malicious? as when he paid tribute lest he should offend them? Matth.17.27.* They *were malicious at Corinth, and seekers of occasion against* Paul, *that were likely to be offended by his taking of wages there: yet the thing, being no necessary duty, he thinketh it his duty to forbeare his power therein, 1 Cor.9.* The *Heathens are malicious to take offence, when Christians go to Law for their own: yet, because going to law is not a duty necessary, it must be forborne, and Christians rather must loose their own, then give occasion of scandall to them, 1 Cor. 6.v.6,7.* Unto these examples let me adde another (quoted by the same authour elsewhere) out of *Ezra* 8. 22. *I was ashamed* (saith *Ezra*) *to require of the King a band of Souldiers and horsemen, to help us against the enemies in the way: because we had spoken unto the King, saying, the hand of our God is upon all them for good, that seeke him, but his power and his wrath is against all them that forsake him.* Here for *Ezra* to have asked of the King of Persia, a Heathen, a band of souldiers, and horsemen for his safe conduct, was a thing lawfull: and yet he forbore it, lest he should scandalize him by begetting in him a suspicion, that that was false, which he had told him concerning Gods power, and justice.

A *second* argument is drawn from the *relation* of an active scandall: it is the morall cause of a passive scandall; so that he who scandalizeth another, partaketh of, and is accessary unto the sin of the

the party ſcandalized, and we are not to *partake of*, or be acceſſary unto the *ſins of any*, 1 *Tim.* 5. 22. *We muſt have no fellowſhip with unfruitfull works of darkneſſe* in any whomſoever, *Epheſ.* 5. 11.

A *third* argument is fetcht from the *effect* of an active ſcandall: 'tis of a ſoule deſtroying nature, & ſo a kind of ſpirituall murther: *deſtroy not him with thy meat for whom Chriſt died*, *Rom.* 14. 15. *for meat deſtroy not the worke of God*, *verſ.* 20. and who ſhould not tremble at the guilt of the murther of any ſoul whatſoever? for there is no ſoule ſo wicked, but may (for ought thou knoweſt) be one *of thoſe, for whom* Chriſt ſhed his moſt divine, and precious blood.

The *laſt* argument is taken from the *Oppoſite* of ſcandall, *Charity*, and its act *beneficence*: We are *to love all*, even our moſt malitious, and perſecuting enemies, *Matth.* 5. 44. We are to do *good unto all*, though *eſpecially to the houſhold of faith*, *Gal.* 6. 10. We are to exercife *patience, and meekneſſe*, towards even thoſe that oppoſe themſelves, 2 *Tim.* 2. 14, 15. And from this it will inevitably follow, that we are to ſcandalize none.

Here we have uſually objected the example of our Saviour, who ſlighted the ſcandall of the Phariſees, *Matth.* 15. 12, 13, 14. *Then came his Diſciples and ſaid unto him: knoweſt thou that the Phariſees were offended* after they heard this ſaying? but he anſwered and ſaid &c. let them alone they be blind leaders of the blind &c.

The objection concernes onely the ſcandalizing of them in things indifferent; and unto it I ſhall give an anſwer in the words of *Parker* part. 2. part. 57. *If this be all the warrant we have, not to forbeare in a thing indifferent for the malicious, then have we no warrant at all, becauſe the ſcandall (there) not cared for, is when the Phariſees are offended, at his abſtaining from their waſhings, and his preaching of a true doctrine: both of which were neceſſary duties for him to doe. And when he defendeth his healing on ſabbaths, and his Diſciples plucking eares, upon this reaſon they are duties of neceſſity and charity, he plainly inſinuateth, there is no defence for deeds unneceſſary, when the malitious are ſcandalized.*

In a *ſecond* place I ſhall alleadge the Objection of the Schoolemen which by *Gregory de Valentia* is thus urged [*Tom.* 3. *diſp.* 3. *q.* 18. *punct.* 4.] *Nam qui non ex ignorantiâ, aut infirmitate, ſed ex malitiâ ſcandalizatur, non laborat tali aliquâ neceſſitate ſpirituali, cui*

non

non poſſit ipſe ſine ope alterius proximi facile proſpicere mutando pravam ſuam voluntatem. Ergo alter non tenetur tunc cum aliquo ſuo detrimento proſpicere. Phariſees, the wicked, that are ſcandalized out of meere malice, and not out of ignorance, or weakneſſe are not in any ſuch ſpirituall neceſſity, or danger, but that they can eaſily provide for the ſafety, and indemnity of their ſoules, without the help or aſſiſtance of others, by changing their depraved will: and therefore others are not bound to incurre any detriment for the prevention of their ſcandall.

The anſwer unto this may eaſily be foreſeen, for here is nothing but Jeſuiticall dictates, that are alltogether prooſeleſſe.

Firſt, Phariſees, the wicked, that are ſcandalized out of malice, are in a greater ſpirituall neceſſity, and danger, then thoſe, that are ſcandalized out of ignorance, or weakneſſe: for, they are in the *ſnare of the devill, taken captive by him at his will.* 2*Tim.*2.16.

And therefore, *Secondly*, they are more unable to help themſelves, and prevent their own falling into ſin; for their hearts are altogether deſtitute of any gracious habits: there is not in them the ſpirit, a renewed principle, to make head, or reſiſtance againſt the fleſh, the ſinfull corruption of their natures: there is need then of all help poſſible to keepe them from falling: and all will be uneffectuall, unleſſe God alſo put in his helping hand.

Whereas he talkes: that 'tis an eaſy matter for a wicked, and malitious man to provide againſt all danger, and need of his ſoule, by changing his perverſe, and naughty will: this is a very groſſe Pelagian conceite: for it aſcribes that, unto the power of mans corrupt will, which can be wrought only by the omnipotent grace of God.

By this time (I hope) the Reader is ſufficiently ſatisfyed that the active ſcandals of the moſt wicked, and malitious are not to be contemned.

But yet there remaineth a great difficulty in the point to be cleared; and that is, when an active ſcandall is committed towards them, in our duties, and indifferencies?

Firſt, we actively ſcandalize them by our *duties*, when they are not rightly circumſtanced, ſeaſonably performed, in due time, and place: when they are not expedient unto thoſe ends, for which God enjoyned them: now when this is, cannot be determined by any

any generall rule, but every one muſt be left to be guided by his ſpirituall prudence, and wiſdome. [But for this hereafter I ſhall allot a peculiar digreſſion by it ſelfe.]

Secondly, we actively ſcandalize them by our *indifferencies*, when 'tis probable they will occaſion their paſſive ſcandall, their falling into ſin; But now this generall rule is to be limited, and I ſhall give you *three limitations* of it.

The firſt limitation: this rule is to be underſtood, when the uſe of our indifferencies is likely to prejudice, and obſtruct the propagation of the Goſpell, and the forbearance of them will in all probability conduce unto the advancement of the Credit of the Goſpell, and not otherwiſe, ordinarily: upon this account, it would have been ſcandalous in *Paul* to have received maintenance from the Corinthians: but tis now unſcandalous in Miniſters, to accept, and challenge that maintenance, which is due unto them by the lawes of the land; for a generall forbearance thereof now would ſoone be followed with the utter ruine of the Goſpell.

A ſecond limitation: the forementioned rule is to be underſtood, when the forbearance of our indifferencies is likely to win upon the wicked, and malitious, ſo as to further their converſion, and not otherwiſe, when it onely expoſeth unto their contempt, ſcorne, and deriſion, 1 *Cor.* 9. 19, 20, 21, 22. *Though I be free from all men* (ſaith *Paul*) *yet have I made my ſelfe ſervant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jewes: to them that are under the law, as under the law, that I might gaine them that are under the Law. To them that are without Law, as without Law (being not without Law to God, but under the Law to Chriſt) that I might gaine them, that are without Law. To the weake became I as weake, that I might gaine the weake: I am made all things to all men, that I might by all meanes ſave ſome.* Here tis very remarkable, that *Paul* was made, in things indifferent, all things unto all men, only in order to their ſalvation, to gaine their ſoules unto Chriſt; and why ſhould we abridge our ſelves in the uſe of our liberty, in things that are of great expediency and conveniency unto us, when ſuch a reſtraint of our liberty, is not a probable means of reaching the ſaid end? what reaſon can be given, why we ſhould incommodate our ſelves, by forbearing all ſuch indifferencies, that wicked men are ſcanda-

lized at, when ſuch forbearance is unprofitable unto their ſpirituall good, and unlikely to bring them any jot the nearer unto God and Heaven?

A third limitation: the forementioned rule hath not place, when by the forbearance of our indifferencies, at which ſome wicked men are ſcandalized, there is incurred as great, if not a greater ſcandall, then that by their uſe: as when they are hereby confirmed, and hardned in their errour, and ſinne; and others are hereby drawn into the like: *prudenter advertendum eſt* (ſaith *Bernard*) *ſcandalum ſcandalo non emendari, qualis emendatio erit, ſi ut aliis ſcandalum tollas, alios ſcandalizas.*

Thus you ſee how the rule is to be limited; and without ſuch, or the like limitations, rigidly to preſſe it, would make againſt both the *liberty*, and *peace* of *conſcience*.

Firſt, againſt the liberty of Conſcience: for it would in great part evacuate, and annull the grand charter of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent, it would (as *Peter* ſaith in another caſe) *put a yoke upon the neck of the diſciples, which neither our Fathers were, nor we are able to beare*, Acts 15.10. *All things are lawfull for me* (ſaith *Paul*) *But I will not be brought under the power of any*, 1 *Cor.* 6.12. But now if we muſt forbeare all our lawfull conveniences, at which wicked men perhaps will be purpoſely ſcandalized, we ſhould be brought under the power of them, we ſhould be little better then their ſlaves; and what an unſpeakeable, and intollerable vaſſalage would that bee? (*l*)

Secondly it would make againſt the peace of Conſcience; for it would ſo perplex mens conſciences with doubts, and uncertainties; as that they would hardly know when, and how to act in the uſe of things indifferent, for wicked men are very prone to be ſcandalized at the lawfull conveniencies of the Godly: and there is no doubt, but many are ſo wicked, as that they would of ſet purpoſe nouriſh, and cheriſh ſuch ſcandals in themſelves, if they thought that the Godly would hereupon forbeare ſuch their conveniencies: there be ſome people of ſuch malevolent ſpirits againſt

(*l*) Quoties ſcandalum paſſivum alterius futurum eſt, ex malitia nullus debet omittere opus, quod nec eſt malum, nec habet ſpeciem mali propter malitiam alterius, quando opus illud utile eſt temporaliter, vel ſpiritualiter operanti, quia non poſtulat ratio, ut malitiæ alterius cum damno noſtro ſuccurramus, alias quilibet malitia ſua poſſit nobis vocete, ut omitteremus opus nobis utile: malicia autem alterius nobis vocere non debet Lucſſius Turrianus.

Miniſters

Miniſters, as that they are ſcandalized at the decent apparell of them,& their wives,at their competent fare, and moderate houſe-keeping: and, if they muſt make the humor, and opinion of ſuch men the rule of their walking in all things indifferent, it will be a very difficult matter for them to know how herein to carry themſelves. But this doctrine, *that we are to forbeare all indifferencies, at which wicked men are ſcandalized*, if it be unlimited would create perplexities, not only unto Miniſters, but unto all ſorts of men, eſpecially ſuch as have any thing due unto them from others: for grant this, and how often will a Landlord be at a loſſe to demand his rent? a Creditor his debts? and the magiſtrate his tribute or contribution?

Adde unto this,*thirdly*,that this doctrine, without limitation, will tend unto the overthrow of *publick peace, and order*, and brings in nothing but anarchy and confuſion: for publique peace and order depends much upon the preſervation of propriety: and upon what a tickliſh point would propriety ſtand,if we muſt forbeare to exact,or receive all ſuch temporals, at which wicked men are ſcandalized, that can be forborne without ſin? unto what wrongs, and injuries would this expoſe ſuch, as are well affected? for there be ſome men ſo wicked and malitious, as that they would be ſcandalized at their temporals for the nonce to deprive them of them. I ſhall conclude this particular with the reſolution of *Aquinas* 2. 2dæ.q.43.art.8. *Propter eos,qui ſic ſcandala concitant,non ſunt temporalia dimittenda: quia hoc & noceret bono communi: daretur enim malis rapiendi occaſio, & noceret ipſis rapientibus, qui retinendo aliena, in peccato remanerent. Unde Greg. dicit in Moral. Quidam dum temporalia à nobis rapiunt, ſolummodo ſunt tolerandi: quidam verò æquitate ſervata prohibendi: non ſola cura,nè noſtra ſubtrahantur, ſed ne rapientes non ſua, ſemet ipſos perdant.*

But what if this *imaginary* appearance of evill flow from the ſuppoſall of a *weak one*,yet an *holy one*.

Why then it muſt be omitted, but with this caution, ſo it may be without *ſin*, or as the *ordinary gloſſe* upon that 15 of *Matth.* v. 12,13,14. reſolves it, *Salvâ triplici veritate,vitæ,Juſtitiæ,Doctrinæ*,ſo the threefold verity of *life*, *juſtice*, and *doctrine* be preſerved ſafe: *Nam per hanc triplicem veritatem*(ſaith *Gregory de Valentia*) *intelligitur omnis rectitudo, & immunitas à peccato in actionibus humanis.*

nis. Veritas namque vitæ continetur in actionibus rectis, quas quis in seipso exercet convenienter rectæ rationi, & appetitui recto, atque adeo verè veritate quadam practicâ: Veritas autem justitiæ rectis actionibus quæ exercentur erga alterum similiter, convenienter rectæ rationi, prout verè & absque peccato oportet: veritas denique doctrinæ continetur fide verâ, & minimè erroneâ: By this triple verity is understood all the rectitude and freedome from sinne, that is in humane actions, for the verity of life is contained in those regular actions, which any one exerciseth in, and towards himselfe agreeably to right reason, and a well governed appetite, &c. The verity of justice consists in those regular actions, which are performed towards another, likewise suitably to right reason, as it behoveth, truely and without sinne.

And to conclude, the verity of doctrine consists in a true, regular, and unerring faith: if these three verities be kept inviolate, every thing must be abstained from, upon which followes *scandalum pusillorum*, a scandall springing from either the ignorance, or weakness of our brother: but, because this resolution may be thought both too generall, and obscure (the Schoole-men themselves fumbling much about its explication,) we will therefore goe to worke more distinctly, and particularly.

Consider whether or no the action, in which this appearance of evill is imagined to be, *is necessary*, or *indifferent*.

If it be *necessary*, and commanded by God, it must not be omitted, though all the world be offended: For evill must not be done, that good may come thereof.

(*m*) *Calvin*, telling us, regard ought to be had of charity, limits how farre, *usque ad aras*, that is, so for our brothers sake we offend not God: I may adde, so for our brothers sake we endanger not our own soules. (*n*) To prevent scandall and sin in our brethren,

(*m*) *Calvin.* l. 3. Inst. c. 19. Sect. 13. (n) Scandalum quod oritur ex rebus per se bonis, & necessariis non licet evitare: quia non est faciendum malum, ut eveniat bonum. Bonum enim est expetendum, quatenus bonum est, non expetitur autem quatenus bonum est, si malum simul expetitur. Nam qui expetit bonum, abhorret à malo: qui autem abhorret à malo, quia malum est, is nullo malo quodcunque sit, non potest allici. Jam vero nullæ sunt res planè necessariæ præter eas quæ sunt in se bonæ, atque eiusmodi, ut nisi voluntàs illas expetat, à suo vero, & proprio obiecto abhorret: itaque ut maximè tumultuetur mundus, tamen omnia, etiam extrema quæque subeunda sunt, ut fiet illibata Dei gloria. Cameron, in electiora quædam N. Test. loca, Tom. 2. in Math 18.7.

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we may not runne upon ſin our ſelves: for a well ordered charity, as *Aquinas* gives the reaſon 2. 2dæ. q. 43. a. 7. beginneth ever at home, making a man cheifly deſire and endeavour the ſalvation of his own ſoule, and conſequently more ſollicitous to avoid ſinne in himſelfe then to prevent it in other: I may not then omit or neglect neceſſary duties, becauſe to ſome they ſeem but needleſſe niceties; I muſt not fly true holineſſe, and the *power of Godlineſſe*, becauſe unto the world it appeares but braine ſick peeviſhneſſe, and an irrationall preciſeneſſe: others errour ſhould not be ſeconded, and countenanced with mine impiety, and diſobedience.

Scandalum, niſi fallor, non bonæ rei, ſed malæ exemplum eſt, ædificans ad delictum, Bonæ res neminem ſcandalizant, niſi malam mentem. Si bonum eſt modeſtia, verecundia, faſtidium gloriæ, ſoli Deo captans placere, agnoſcant malum ſuum, qui de tali bono ſcandalizantur. Quod enim ſi & incontinentes dicant ſe à continentibus ſcandalizari, continentia revocanda eſt? Tertullian.

Here it will not be an unprofitable, nor much impertinent digreſſion, to give you the ſumme of what *Thomas* and his Interpreters ſay upon this Queſtion, *An bona ſpiritualia ſint propter ſcandalum dimittenda?* *A Digreſſion.*

Not to mention their rotten diſtinction between matters of *counſell*, and matters of *precept*, we will only out of them take notice, that there is a difference between *tranſgreſſion* of a *precept*, and a *temporary, partiall*, or *occaſionall forbearance* of the matter commanded by a precept.

No precept whatſoever, whether of the Law of *Nature*, or elſe but *poſitive*, is, for eſchewing the ſcandall of any whether weake, or malitious, to be truly *broken* or *tranſgreſſed*. And a precept is tranſgreſſed whenſoever what is enjoyned in it is omitted at ſuch a time, and in ſuch a caſe, when all the particular circumſtances, which we ought to regard, being conſidered, we are tyed to all performance of it.

But yet however upon emergency of ſcandall, that which is commanded by ſome precepts (*p*) may *pro hic & nunc*, in ſome

(*p*) Opera divini præcepti affirmativi, quod non pro ſemper obligat, debent aliquando deſerri pro aliquo tempore, quando cauſarent puſillis ſcandalum, donec illi ſint melius inſtructi, ſed circumſtantiæ illius ſcandali ſint mutatæ, ita ut contingat præceptum affirmativum etiam iuris quaſi naturalis, aliquando hic & nunc non obligare propter concurſum negativi præcepti de non ponendo offendiculo puſillis. *Joannes Wiggers.*

times,and at ſome places,be omitted, may for a while be forborne, untill the ſcandall taken thereby can be removed by *information, or inſtruction*, or untill *the circumſtances* of the ſcandals be ſome way or other changed. Promulgation of a truth,and Chriſtian reproofe,are duties commanded by God, and yet are to be ſometimes abſtained from, for ſcandals taken by, not onely the weake, but all malitious. *Reprove not a ſcorner leſt he hate thee*, Prov. 9.8. *Speake not in the eares of a foole, for he will deſpiſe the wiſdome of thy words*, *Prov.*23.9. *Give not that which is holy unto the dogges, neither caſt ye your pearles before ſwine, leſt they trample them under their feet, and turne againe and rent you*, *Matth.*7.6.

To explaine this farther, recourſe muſt be had unto that old and golden rule. *Affirmativa præcepta ſemper obligant non ad ſemper.* Affirmative precepts do alwaies bind, but not to alwaies: ſo that we are not bound to performe alwaies what they enjoine, but only *loco & tempore debitis*, when we have due time and place. Now as by the *intercurrency* of other *circumſtances*, ſo eſpecially by *occurrence* of the *ſcandall* of weake brethren there may not be opportunity,and ſeaſonableneſſe of doing what we are urged unto by ſome affirmative precepts;and ſo thoſe precepts may *pro hic & nunc* ceaſe to be obligatory: For when the obligations of two precepts ſeeme to meete together at the very ſame time, that which is of greater obligation tieth us, and ſo conſequently we are for the preſent freed from the obligation of the other. Now the *negative precept* of eſchewing the ſcandall of the weake is more *obligatory* than many affirmative precepts; and therefore (to uſe the words of *Malderus,*) *contingit aliquando præceptum naturale affirmativum, hic & nunc non obligare, propter concurſum negativi præcepti naturalis de vitando ſcandalo puſillorum:* For example, vindicative juſtice binds a magiſtrate to execute wrath upon him that doth evill: Charity on the other ſide obligeth him to hinder, as much as he can, the ſcandall of the weake: now Charity is a virtue,of an higher note and nature, than vindicative juſtice: the precept belonging unto charity (hinder as much as you can the ſcandall of the weake) doth more ſtrictly tie us, than that pertaining unto vindicative juſtice, (puniſh the guilty). And therefore, if it be probable, that a great and ſpreading ſcandall will be taken at the puniſhing of delinquents; a Magiſtrate may not tranſgreſſe

tranſgreſſe againſt juſtice, and yet deferre the execution thereof.

But ſo manifold and different are the degrees of obligation in affirmative precepts: ſuch is the variety of circumſtances appertaining unto the matters commanded by thoſe precepts, and conſtancy of alterations about thoſe circũſtances, as that I do not ſee, how any unvariable rules, or conſtant directions can be given for Chriſtian carriage in this caſe. For particulars then, every man is to be left unto the guidance of his *ſpirituall prudence* and *wiſdome*, which is to direct him in a right apprehenſion, and diſcretion of circumſtances: to define the opportunity, and ſeaſonableneſſe of practiſing what is commanded by affirmative precepts: and to compare them and the precept of eſchewing the ſcandall of the weake together: and thereupon to determine, which is *hic & nunc*, moſt *obligatory*, or doth moſt ſtrictly tye us to the obedience of it, as being of greater moment. Only in the generall wee may ſafely ſay thus much: that whereas wee have ſaid, that for ſhunning the ſcandall of the weake, we may forbeare the practiſe of things commanded by affirmative precepts, *Hic & nunc*, in ſome places, and at ſome times, it muſt allwayes be taken with this proviſo, that there be not incurred a *greater*, and more *perilous ſcandall*, by *forbearance*, then would probably be *occaſioned* by *practiſe* of *the thing commanded*; which is done, when either *firſt*, *more* are *ſcandalized* by the *forbearance*, than in all likely-hood would be at the *practiſe*: or elſe, *ſecondly*, when the *body* in generall, the *Church* and *Common wealth*, or the greateſt, and cheifeſt part of either is *ſcandalized* at the forbeareance, and onely ſome *few particular private perſons ſtumble* at the *practiſe*: or elſe, *thirdly*, when others take occaſion by this *partiall* and *temporary* forbearance of what is commanded by *affirmative precepts*, to contemne the *precepts themſelves*, as being by this our carriage induced to beleive that we verily *deſpiſe them*, and do not ſo much, *for a while forbeare*, as utterly *diſclaime* the practiſe of what they command.

Thus you ſee, that, according to the common opinion of the ſchoolemen, things commanded may in caſe of ſcandall for a while be omitted or forborne; but *Vaſquez* and *Becanus* diſſent from them in this particular: the explication and confirmation of their opinion I will propound, and then breifely paſſe my cenſure thereon.

*Sum. Theol. Schol. 3. par ca. 27. q. 5.

on. *Becanus*, to make way for his opinion premiſeth, that there is a *difference* between *naturall precepts*, for *ſome* ſaith he bind *ſimply*, and alwaies whatſoever circumſtances intervene, and their obligation never ceaſeth, ſuch like are thoſe that forbid lying, perjury, hatred of God, Idolatry &c: for theſe facts are ſo intrinſecally ſinfull, as that they cannot by any circumſtances be made lawfull: *others now* bind not *ſimply*, and abſolutely, but with certaine circumſtances, and therefore they bind as long as thoſe circumſtances remaine, they ceaſe to bind when thoſe circumſtances are changed: Such is the precept forbidding to kill: for that bir ds with theſe circumſtances, that we kill not by our private authority, except in caſe of neceſſary defence. Take away theſe circumſtances, and it binds not, for it is lawfull to kill upon the command of authority, or in our neceſſary defence: ſuch alſo is the precept of eſchewing ſcandall: for, however it be dictated by the law of nature, yet it obligeth not *abſolutè & quomodocunque*: but with *certaine circumſtances*: and one circumſtance neceſſarily requiſite to make it bind us is, that there occurre not any other precept, either naturall, or poſitive. The reaſon is, becauſe every one is bound to have a greater care of his own, than others ſalvation, and conſequently, rather to avoid ſin in himſelfe, than to prevent it in his brethren. And therefore that precept which is given us for the prevention of ſin in others, is but of a *ſecondary obligation*. Now the precept of eſchewing ſcandall is impoſed, onely for the hindring of ſin in others, and therefore doth not tie us, when there occurreth any other precept, which is given for the avoiding of ſinne in our ſelves. But it may be objected, that the precept of ſhunning ſcandall is of the *Law of nature*, and therefore is more obligatory than thoſe precepts that are but *poſitive*. Unto this *Becanus* anſwereth, that a naturall precept is more obligatory, than that which is poſitive, *cæteris paribus*, that is, if each precept, both that which is naturall, and that which is poſitive, *be primarily referred unto the* furthering of our *own* ſalvation, unto the preventing of ſin in *our ſelves*: But now if on the other ſide the *primary ſcope of* the naturall precept be to hinder ſin in others, as it is in the precept of ſcandall, and the *principall end* of the poſitive precept be to ſhun ſin in our ſelves, then that precept which is poſitive doth more deeply bind us, than that which is naturall.

Againe

Againe, *ſecondly*, it may be objected: that if the obligation of the naturall precept of eſchewing ſcandall ceaſeth upon occurrence of but a poſitive precept; why, then it ſeems, this poſitive precept detracts or derogates from the naturall precept of avoiding ſcandall: as being of greater force, and validity? In no wiſe, onely it takes away a circumſtance requiſite to make the precept of avoiding ſcandall obligatory, *quare cum dicimus* (ſaith *Vaſquez*) *non eſſe omittendum præceptum poſitivum propter vitandum ſcandalum proximi, non dicimus præceptum naturale derogari præcepto poſitivo tanquam fortiori; ſed dicimus occurſu præcepti poſitivi ceſſare quandam circumſtantiam neceſſariam, ut obliget præceptum de vitando ſcandalo etiamſi naturale ſit.*

But all this labour would have been ſaved, if the queſtion had been rightly ſtated: for, whereas it is ſaid, that one circumſtance neceſſarily requiſite to make the precept of eſchewing ſcandall bind us, is, that there occurre not any other precept either naturall or poſitive: this is to be underſtood *cum grano ſalis*, with this limitation, in caſe ſuch precepts bind (all circumſtances conſidered to the performance of what they enjoyne) *hic & nunc*, at ſuch a particular time and place; for then omiſſion of what they enjoine would be ſinfull, and we are not ſinfully to omit any thing, for prevention of ſcandall in our brother: Unto the proofe of which the reaſon of *Vaſquez* and *Becanus* may be applyed.

But, the obligation of affirmative precepts is not univerſall *ad ſemper*, but only *loco & tempore debitis*: and therefore what they enjoyne may ſometimes, in the caſe of ſcandall, be prudently omitted; but perhaps this which I ſay is all that *Vaſquez* and *Becanus* aime at; and then they have no adverſary that I know of; Every one will grant unto them, that one circumſtance neceſſarily requiſite to make the precept of eſchewing ſcandall bind us, *hic & nunc*, in ſuch a time and place, is, that there occurre not any other precept binding us to what it enjoyneth at that very inſtant time, and place: for it is evident unto all, that upon occurrencie of ſuch obligations, though ſcandall enſue, it would not be on our parts a culpable ſcandall, an active ſcandall. But it may be thought that I have ſtaied too long upon this digreſſion: to returne therefore where we left.

Secondly, if the action in which this appearance of evill is ſup-

poſed to be, be but indifferent: why then, the beſt direction that we can have will be from what the Apoſtle *Paul* writes unto the *Romans chap.*14. and *unto the Corinthians*, 1 *Cor.* 8. *and chap.* 10. of converts amongſt the Romans there were ſome ſtrong, and knowing ones, that were well principled, and ſo knew very well their deliverance from the yoake of the moſaicall Law: and hereupon, without any ſcruple, did eat ſuch meats as were prohibited thereby, perhaps Swines fleſh, or the like: Now at this their practiſe, ſeverall weak Chriſtians, who were as yet ignorant and uninſtructed touching the latitude of their Chriſtian liberty, were in ſeverall regards ſcandalized, as I have ſhewen in a foregoing treatiſe: But yet here the practiſe of the ſtrong was a thing indifferent in it ſelfe *verſ.* 14. 20. and the appearance of evill (to wit, a prophane, and irreligious contempt of the Law of *Moſes*) was only imaginary, ariſing from the ignorance, and errour of the weak, who thought that Law of Moſes to be ſtill in force, and unabrogated; and the ſcandall conſequent hereupon was *only per accidens*, flowing not from the nature of the action in it ſelfe, but from the miſapprehenſion of the weake: and yet the Apoſtle blames the ſtrong for ſcandalizing the weake: and therefore in this their action, though indifferent in it ſelfe, there was an active ſcandall, a ſcandall culpably given, as well as taken. The Apoſtle gives the ſame reſolution unto the *Corinthians* concerning things offered unto Idols; to eat them at the Pagan religious feaſt, and in the temple of an Idoll, carrieth a reall appearance of communion with, and approbation of an Idolatrous worſhip of the Idoll, and ſo is ſcandalous *per ſe*, of it ſelfe, and in its own nature, 1 *Cor.* 8. 10. *cap.* 10. *verſ.* 20, 21. But now to eat theſe ſame meats when ſold, and bought in the ſhambles, or ſet before them in private meetings, the Apoſtle reſolves to be a thing lawfull, and indifferent, 1 *Cor.* 10. *v.* 25, 26, 27. And indeed it could not carry a reall, but only an imaginary appearance of evill; for they were the good creatures of God, and ſo uncapable of any morall pollution; and they had no religious uſe, and ſo did not reflect any glance of the leaſt honour, credit, or countenance to the Idoll. The ſcandall then, accrewing by them, was only *per accidens*; and yet they were by the Apoſtles adviſe to be forborne, if ſuch ſcandall were likely to enſue upon the uſe of them. *But if any man*

ſay

ſay unto thee, this is offered in ſacrifice unto Idols, eat not for his ſake that ſhewed it, and for conſcience ſake, 1 *Cor.*10.28. Here we have a *generall rule*, together with *three limitations* thereof.

Firſt, a generall *rule*: if any man imagine evill, and ſin to be in an indifferent action, and hereupon be ſcandalized, that action is to be abſtained from; *if any man ſay unto thee, this is offered in ſacrifice unto Idols, eat not, for his ſake that ſhewed it.*

But now here are couched three *exceptions*.

Firſt, we are not bound to abſtaine from things indifferent, unleſſe the ſcandall conſequent be probable; *if any man ſay unto you, this is offered in ſacrifice unto Idols &c.* if he ſay nothing, but ſmother his opinion, and diſlike in his owne breſt, we may be guiltleſſe and blameleſſe. And indeed, if we are to forbeare all indifferent things, in which there is only a meer poſſibility of ſcandall, we ſhould be at an utter loſſe, and uncertainty in our actings in things indifferent, and never know what to doe, we are obliged then to abſtain from things indifferent, only in the caſe of(*q*)ſcandall *probable*, and not in the caſe of ſcandall *meerely poſſible*, and ſo much is obſerved by *Calvin* upon the 1 *Cor.* 8. 13. *Deinde non jubet nos Paulus divinare nunquid offendiculo futurum ſit quod facimus, niſi cum eſt præſens periculum.*

A ſecond exception is; that we are not required to abſtaine from things indifferent, in which our weake brethren imagine that there is evill and ſin, and thereupon are ſcandalized, unleſſe they have ſome probable ground for their imagination: for though the eating of the Idolothytes at a private feaſt was not an action in it ſelfe ſcandalous, or *inductive* unto ſin; as being free from both ſin, and all reall appearance of it, yet the Corinthians ſcandalized hereat had a probable ground why they conceived it to be unlawfull and ſinfull, the late *morall or religious relation* that the Idolothytes had unto an Idoll: *this is offered in ſacrifice unto Idols*; *Mr Rutherford* [in his treatiſe of ſcandall pag. 53, 54.] expreſſeth this limitation as followeth; *we read not of ſcandals culpable in Gods word, but there be ſome morall reaſons in them*; and he apply eth it unto the offence, that is taken, at tolling of bells, at a miniſters gowne, when he preacheth: there is no apparent morall reaſon why the tolling of a Bell, or a miniſters gowne ſhould ſcandalize; for they are of meere civill uſe, and have no morall

(*q*) Quando attentis etiam omnibus circumſtantiis actus inordinatus unius non eſt talis, ut probabiliter putari poſſit aſteri futurus occaſio ruinæ, non erit peccatum ſcandali, nec diſtinctum, nec non diſtinctum, ut ſentit etiam Bannes hic art 4. in fine. Nam tunc non poteſt quis cenſeri cauſa moralis ruinæ alterius. Gregor. de Valentia tom. 3. q. 18. punct. 2.

influence in the worſhip; for the ſame tolling of bells is, and may be uſed to convocate the people to a Baron Court to heare a declamation, to convocate ſouldiers. This exception, that I have laied downe, is, I conceive, grounded, as upon what the Apoſtle ſaith, ſo alſo upon the reality, and truth of our Chriſtian liberty in things indifferent, which otherwiſe would ſignifie nothing; for if we are to abſtaine from all indifferent things, in which another without probable ground imagineth that there is ſin; the ſervitude of Chriſtians under the Goſpell would be farre greater, and more intolerable, then that of the Iewes under the moſaicall adminiſtration.

A *third exception*, which we may gather hence, is, in great part, coincident with the firſt, and 'tis; that the abſtinence unto which we are obliged, in things indifferent, in the caſe of ſcandall, is not *univerſall, and totall*, but limited *ad hic & nunc*, thoſe times, and places in which there is danger, or likelyhood of ſcandall: the Corinthians were, in their private feaſts, to forbeare eating Idolothytes, only in the preſence of perſons apt to be ſcandalized, and might elſewhere uſe their liberty without regret of Conſcience.

Unto theſe exceptions inſinuated here by the Apoſtle we may adde divers others; of which, ſome may be collected from what we above ſaid touching the ſcandall of the wicked in things indifferent *mutatis mutandis*, and by and by I ſhall adde others; but firſt I ſhall examine ſome reſtrictions, which I gave in a former edition of this booke.

Former Edition.

But now, if the action in which this appearance of evill is ſuppoſed to be, be but indifferent, then theſe two following things muſt be pondered. Firſt, whether, or no it be annexed with a neceſſary duty, or not? Secondly, whether or no it be undetermined, left to our owne liberty and choice, or elſe by authority either Oeconomicall, Politicall, or Eccleſiaſticall?

If it be annexed to a neceſſary duty, we muſt not omit this, to abſtaine from that: So to fly the ſhadow of ſin, we ſhould embrace the body of ſin, a ſinne really ſo, a ſinne of omiſſion; for what is not good, if to omit a duty be not bad? Good muſt not be left undone, though evill per accidens *come from it, much leſſe, when only an appearance of evill*

evill is joined to it. We muſt not then ſhun the Lords table, becauſe ſome weaker judgments have imagined in the act of kneeling, a ſhew of Idolatry. So to avoid but an imaginary appearance of evill unto men, we ſhall appeare indeed unto God to be evill. A Miniſter muſt not neglect the diſcharge of his duty, becauſe ſome have ſuppoſed a ſhew of ſuperſtition in ſome harmeleſſe Ceremonies annexed to its performance. So, to avoid unjuſt cenſures, he ſhould incurre a juſt woe and curſe from God: woe be to me (ſaith the Apoſtle) *if I preach not the Goſpell.*

Anſwer.

This firſt limitation I borrowed from Dr *Sclater* upon the text: for the examination of it we muſt diſtinguiſh of humane Ceremonies, they are of two ſorts, *Circumſtantiall*, or *Doctrinall*.

Firſt, *circumſtantiall*, ſuch are the Circumſtances of time or place, matters of order, decency, and the like. Now theſe are neceſſary in the *generall*, and the *particulars* may be determined by the Magiſtrate, or Church-officers v. g. that the publique aſſemblies be at ſuch a convenient time of the day, in ſuch a place, and that they be convocated by tolling of bells; that the Miniſter officiate in a grave habit, gowne, cloake, or coate, &c. Now though ſome of theſe may be by ſome cauſeleſly imagined to be evill; yet they are not therefore to be forborne, if they be by lawfull command of the Magiſtrate, or Church, to be annexed with neceſſary duties; for neceſſary duties are not to be omitted for meere circumſtances connexed with their performance.

Thus we are not to forſake, or refraine our publick aſſemblies, becauſe ſome think there is ſome ſuperſtition in the places of them, our Churches, and the Convocation of them by bells, upon this ground, that both our Churches and bells have been abuſed by Papiſts. Dr *Heylin* [in a former edition of his Geography] relates this following ſtory of *Peter Du Moulin*; that hearing how diverſe Engliſh Miniſters ſcrupled to officiate in a Surplice, he ſaid, that he would willingly preach at *Paris* in a fooles coate, if leave could not be gotten of the King, upon any other condition. If this great light of France ever dropped ſuch words, he had in them doubtleſſe a very good, devout, and zealous meaning; but yet (under correction) I cannot ſee how his reſolution can be accorded with that rule of the Apoſtle; *Let all things be done decently*,

for it cannot as yet ſink into my fooliſh head, how that a fooles coat is a decent garment to preach in. But this on the bie.

To proceed unto a *ſecond ſort* of Ceremonies, which we may call, for diſtinction ſake, *humane, Doctrinall, Ceremonies*; ſuch as men inſtitute, by their morall ſignification, to teach, v.g. the Croſſe, Surplice &c: if theſe might lawfully, by any humane authority whatſoever, be unavoidably annexed with neceſſary duties, we ſhould then ſoon reſolve, that we are not then to abſtaine from them: but the non-conformiſts ever held that no mortall wight whatſoever could lawfully urge, or preſſe the unavoidable connexion of ſuch Ceremonies with neceſſary duties: and indeed they have very good reaſon againſt the Command of ſuch a connexion, becauſe it would have been againſt *religion, and againſt charity*.

Firſt, *againſt religion*: they never granted them (as is ſtill ſuppoſed) to be indifferent, but alwaies arraigned them as guilty of ſuperſtition, and will-worſhip; and ſo, manifeſt tranſgreſſions againſt the ſecond commandement, preſumptuous additions unto the word, and ordinances of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, *a ſetting of mans threſhold by Gods threſhold, and their poſts by Gods poſts*, Ezek. 43.8. and the juſtice of their accuſation will be ſoon confeſſed by all learned, and unprejudiced men, that will with patience, and impartiality reade the reenforcement of their arguments by *Parker*, *Didoclave*, and *Ames* againſt all anſwers and replies whatſoever. The Prelates connexing of humane ſymbolicall ceremonies with duties and ordinances that are neceſſary, and commanded by the word of God, brings into my mind an artifice of *Julian* the Apoſtate: *in the market places of Cities, he ſet up his own image, with the Effigies of the gods of the Heathen pictured round about, to the end, that whoſoever ſhould do civill reverence to the Emperours Image, might alſo ſeem to worſhip the gods of the Gentiles: and by the contrary, they who would not bow to the Gods of the Gentiles, might ſeeme alſo to refuſe all due reverence to the Emperour.* Thus the Prelates, of their own heads, moſt preſumptuouſly have ſet up in Gods worſhip, and ſervice, their own inventions, and have commanded them to be joined with the ordinances of Chriſt: ſo that hereby they drave many conſcientious Miniſters into a great ſtrait, if, out of a lothneſſe to looſe the exerciſe of their Miniſtry, they conformed unto their Ceremonies, this they interpreted to be an approbation

probation of them; and, if to avoid their Ceremonies, they did forbeare to baptize, to administer the Lords supper &c. then they accused them for neglect, and contempt of Gods Ordinances.

Secondly, it was against charity for the Prelates, so rigidly, and peremptorily to presse their paultry Ceremonies, as that unlesse men observed them they would not suffer them, by their good wills, to enjoy the precious Ordinances of Christ Jesus; and this can reasonably be denied by none, who think, that the soules of men may be damnified by the want of such ordinances: But to proceed unto a second restriction in the former edition.

Former Edition.

If we are not, secondly, nostri juris, *but restrained, and determined by authority, we must not disobey that, to satisfie a Brother*; transgresse duty, *to* expresse charity: *So to* please men, *we should* displease God. *So we should doe evill, that good might come thereof. When the Obligation of two precepts seemingly lyeth upon us at the same time, and impossible for both to be at once obeyed, in such a case, because there is no clashing between Gods precepts, neither doth God by them impose upon his creatures any necessity of sinning, therefore one of these precepts must give place unto the other; to wit, that which enjoyneth a* lesse *duty, unto that which prescribes a more weighty and* pressing one. *Now the duties of Justice (as a learned Inconformitant, even Amesius himselfe, med: Theol. lib. 2. cap. 16. §. 62, 63, will tell us) are of stricter obligation then those of charity. We are more bound to pay our debts then to distribute Almes. He that hath trespassed against another, is more strictly tyed to sue for reconciliation, then the party who hath received the injury. Now to hinder the scandall of the weake, is a duty of Charity; to obey the lawfull commands of authority, a duty of justice; and therefore of the greater obligation and moment, unto it then the other must give place. I would have travelled farther in this argument, but that I am anticipated by the learned, and reverend Professors of Aberdene in their Duplies to the second answers of the Covenanting ministers, who from* pag. 65. *unto* 75. *have purposely discussed this very question, whether the precept of obedience to Superiors, or the precept of eschewing scandall be more obligatory, and have there proved by many unanswerable arguments, that the former precept, that of obedience to Superiours is of the twaine more Obligatory. Those then that desire larger satisfaction concerning this matter, I shall referre unto the perusall of them. How ever in the meane while let it not be*

thought

thought troubleſome, if I inſert, what I judge in them, if not moſt, yet very remarkeable. 'Tis this, Debitum obedientiæ, *the* debt *of obedience, which we owe unto ſuperiours, is (ſay they pa: 74) not only* debitum morale, *a* debt *or* duty *unto which we are tyed* by morall honeſty, *and Gods Commandment: but alſo* debitum legale, *or* debitum juſtitiæ, (quod *viz:* fundatur in proprio jure alterius) *a debt grounded upon the true and proper right which our Superiours have to exact this duty of us, ſo that they may accuſe us of injury, and cenſure us, if we performe it not. There is a great difference betwixt theſe two ſorts of debts, & the laſt is farr more obligatory than the firſt, as for example: A man oweth money to the poore by a* morall debt, *but to his Creditour he oweth them by* legall debt, *or debt of juſtice: and therefore he is more ſtrictly obliged to pay his creditor, than to give almes. So by morall honeſty, and Gods precepts alſo, a man oweth to his neighbour a pious carefulneſſe to hinder ſinne in him, by admonition, inſtruction, good example, and by omiſſion, even of things lawfull, when he foreſeeth that his neighbour, in reſpect of his weakneſſe will be ſcandalized by them. But his neighbour hath not ſuch a right to exact theſe things of him, neither can he have action againſt him for not performing of them, as our lawfull ſuperiours have, for our due obedience. Thus they.*

Hence then may we ſhape an anſwer unto that ſame frequent clamour of ſome tumultuous ſpirits, that our conformity forſooth, is wondrous offenſive to many of our weake brethren.

Firſt, ſuppoſe it be ſo, better they without thy fault be offended, ſcandalized at thee, than that the Magiſtrate be with thy fault diſobeyed by thee. It is no ſafe courſe to provide for the peace of thy brothers conſcience, by wounding thine own with the ſinne of diſobedience againſt authority, to which for conſcience ſake thou art to yeild ſubjection: we muſt not, to comply with mens humours, reſiſt the ordinance of God, deſpiſe the voice of the Church, rather than a weake brother ſhould be offended, ſcandalized: we may, and ſometimes muſt part with our own right, but we ought not to rob the Church of hers, by bereaving her of her power, by denying her our obedience. Nay farther, I confeſſe that rather than a weake brother ſhould be ſcandalized, we may pro hic & nunc *in ſome particular times and places, pretermit what ſuperiours preſcribe, provided they take no diſtaſt thereat, and others by our example be not encouraged to contemn their perſons, callings, commands:*

for

for ſo a greater and more pernicious ſcandall will be incurred, than was declined. But we are not upon occurrence of any ſcandall whatſoever, taken by whomſoever, either abſolutely to deny, and utterly refuſe obedience to the lawfull injunctions of our publique gevernours, whether temporall, or eccleſiaſticall: or ſo much as contemptuouſly and ſcandalouſly for a while omit the practiſe of what they enjoine. And omiſſion of what they require, is than contemptuous, when they peremptorily urge the practiſe of it, then ſcandalous when it heartens others to a contempt of their authority. To grant any of theſe lawfull, what were it, alaſſe! but to licence confuſion both in Church and Common-wealth?

Secondly, I demand whether or no the offence given to, or taken by a Magiſtrate, who is a brother, and withall a magiſtrate, be not greater than that which is given to, or taken by one, who is only a brother? An impartiall Judg will ſoone determine, that the double relation of brother and magiſtrate, weigheth down the ſingle and naked relation of a brother. Howſoever I am ſure, that the whole exceeds the parts ſeverally conſidered: the relation of mother exacts more at our hands than that of brother, and therefore, in warding a blow from my brother, I am to take care, that thereby the ſame ſtroake light not upon the head of my mother the Church. Whereupon, as Paul *exhorts to give none offence, neither to Jew, nor Gentile, ſo he* (r) *adds in a further ſpecialty nor to the Church of God,* 1 Cor. 10. 37. *The Jewes and Gentiles were but parts, the Church of God the whole, they but brethren, ſhe the mother.* (ſ) *If then it were better to be thrown into the bottome of the ſea, with a mill-ſtone about ones neck than to offend a little one, a poore and illiterate artizan, what expreſſion ſhall we then find anſwerable to the hainouſneſſe of a ſcandall given to a pious Magiſtrate, to a religious Prince, to a Parliament, and Convocation, to a whole Church and Common-wealth?*

(r) *Biſhop Morton.*

(ſ) Si nefas ſit vel puſillum quempiam ſcandalizare, & præſtiterit alligare collo mola aſinaria demergi quempiam in profundum, maris quam ſcandalizare unum ex puſillis Chriſtianis: quam eſt horrendum flagitium & quam atroci ſupplicio vindicandum ſcandalizare eos, quorum unius offenſio magis periculoſa quàm aliorum multorum, &c. Fortheſius Icenic. pag 405.

Examination.

Firſt, it cannot be denied, but that divers indifferent things may be *hic & nunc* of ſuch weight, and moment, of ſuch neceſſity, or at leaſt expediency, and conveniency, as that the juſt commands of our lawfull ſuperiours may render them our *duty*, and omiſſion of them would be ſinfull: of ſubjection unto ſuch commands the Apoſtle ſpeaks, Rom. 13. 5 *Wherefore ye muſt needs be ſubject, not only for wrath, but alſo for conſcience ſake.* Where by wrath

wrath is understood *Metonymically* punishment: we are therefore to obey the Commands of the Magistrate, not onely for feare of punishment, but also for feare of sin: lest we wound the Conscience with transgression of the fifth Commandement. To assert the contrary, (that 'tis not a sinfull disobedience to violate the Commands of Superiours concerning some things indifferent in their generall nature,) tends apertly to the dissolving of all government, and stocks up the authority of Magistrates, and masters of families by the very roots.

Secondly, 'tis as unquestionable, that all omissions of what is commanded by humane lawes are not sins, unlesse they be out of contempt of authority: for

First, otherwise (as (t) *Ames* rightly saies) as many lawes as there were, so many snares for soules there were, and they that live under lawes, should be subject to many more sins, then they who live among barbarous people, either quite without lawes, or with but a few.

(t) Aliæ leges humanæ, quia possunt esse vel justæ vel injustæ, idque ratione efficientis, materiæ, formæ, finis, & hujus aut illius subjecti, vel adjuncti; idcirco non ità simpliciter alligant, ut earum quælibet violatio culpam lethalem inducat. Si enim sic esset, tum quot sunt leges, tot essent laquei animarum, & qui sub legibus vivunt, plurimis multo peccatis essent obnoxii, quam qui in barbaris gentibus, vel absque legibus, vel cum paucissimis transigunt vitam. Amesius de Consc. cas. lib. 5. cap. 24. Num. 22.

Secondly, there be divers lawes, that be (u) *purely penall*, and the intent of such lawes is satisfied, when one patiently submits unto the punishment inflicted for the breach of them; such are severall lawes of our Land putting restraints upon some men in fouling, fishing, hunting, and the like: as also that statute, which prohibited the eating of flesh, at such times upon politick respects, for the breed, and increase of cattle, as also for the encouragement of fishing. Now no man can reasonably hold, that every breach of such lawes is a sin, especially when tis not contemptuous, and scandalous: I *put in that limitation*, because *contempt of authority*, and *scandall unto others* will make a very small, and otherwise inconsiderable violation of a meer penall law, to be a very heinous sinne.

(u) Mulctæ leges sunt purè pœnales, ita ut ipsis plane satisfiat, si pœna solvatur. Rat. 1. Quia legis finis est deterrere homines à communi & frequenti usu hujus aut illius rei, ad quem finem sufficit constitutio pœnæ. 2. In talibus etiam legibus est tacita conventio & pactum, de pœna ferenda si contra fiat: Contra leges autem conventionales, aut sub conditione latas, venire quis potest absque peccato. 3. De talibus legibus, intelligentes homines nunquam faciunt scrupulum conscientiæ, si absit contemptus, scandalum, & notabile damnum. Tales sunt leges de non venando, de non piscando, de volucribus aut feris non capiendis, de non utendo hoc aut illo genere vestium, ciborum &c. num. 28.

Thirdly

Thirdly, the omiſſion of what is commanded by humane lawes is in many caſes (*w*) agreeable unto the *preſumptive will* of a juſt magiſtrate. It is to be preſumed, that if he knew the caſes, he would tolerate the omiſſion, and therefore ſuch a bare omiſſion would not be a ſin: Of this *Ames* ſpeakes very well: the obligation, ſaith he, of a Law, muſt not be ſtretched beyond the juſt intention, and mind of the lawgiver, but it is to be preſumed, that no man would oblige his Subjects to a mortall guilt, and utter damnation, for every neglect of his will and pleaſure. Nay if in ſome caſe, the Law cannot poſſibly be obſerved, but ſome great damage, ſcandall, or inconvenience, muſt needs follow, it is to be preſumed, that the Law-giver never intended that the Law in ſuch a caſe ſhould be obſerved. We would reckon him a very cruell Magiſtrate that ſhould be implacably angry at a ſicke man for eating fleſh in a time of Lent, and can we thinke then, that there was any ſuch thing as Chriſtian pity and commiſeration in the breaſts of thoſe men whom nothing could attone for the omiſſion of the Croſſe, Surplice, &c? while they ſcandalized, that is deſtroyed, the immortall ſoules of many for whome Chriſt dyed. Suppoſe the greateſt *Monarch* upon the face of the earth ſhould command the meaneſt, and loweſt of his ſlaves upon ſome important affaire to ride poſt through ſuch a City, without any of the leaſt ſtay or diverſion, and then it ſhould happen, that a company of litle children ſhould be playing in the ſtreets, can this ſlave think, that he is obliged to ride over them? Nay, unleſſe we imagine his Maſter to be a moſt bloudy Tyrant, we muſt needs think, that he will be highly diſpleaſed at ſo horrid a cruelty; and can any man then make any tolerable apology for the tyranny of our late Prelates, who commanded all to drive on with a furious career in the courſe of conformity, without any the leaſt ſtop, though hereby were hazarded a world of ſoules, purchaſed at no lower a rate than the divine bloud of our bleſſed Saviour?

It is the will and pleaſure of the *King* of *Kings*, and *Lord* of *Lords*, that matters commanded by his *affirmative precepts* ſhould be, for a while, forborne, in caſe of the *likelihood* of *ſcandall conſequent*; but theſe men (in imitation of him that exalted himſelfe above all that is *called God* 2 *Theſ.* 2.4.) could not be perſwaded

(*w*) Obligatio legis non poteſt extendi ultra intentionem, & mentem legiſlatoris, eamque juſtam. Præſumendum autem eſt nullum hominem velle ſuos ſubditos ad lethalem reatum & damnationem obligare, propter quemlibet ſuæ voluntatis negiectum. Imo ſi in aliquo caſu magnum damnum, ſcandalum, aut incommodum ex obſervatione quarundam legum ſequuturum eſſet, præſumitur non intendiſſe legiſlatorem, ut in illo caſu obſervaretur. Ames. de Con. lib. 5. cap. 24. n. 22.

to diſpenſe with a *temporary forbearance* of any ceremonies they enjoined: though they well foreſaw, that the ſequele of them was likely to be a very great,and ſpreading ſcandall.

But now the non-conformiſts might ſpare all this diſcourſe touching the obligation of humane lawes in generall: becauſe they hold that *humane,religious, Doctrinall Ceremonies* the matter in queſtion, cannot be lawfully determined by the authority of either Politicall, or Eccleſiaſticall ſuperiours: and for this they have *two*,as I take it,very *convincing arguments*.

Firſt,becauſe all ſuch Ceremonies are Sawcy additions unto the word,and ordinances of God, *Deut*. 4. 2. and cap. 12.32. *ſtrange fire which the Lord commanded not*, *Lev*. 10.8.

Secondly, becauſe ſuppoſe they be indifferent (which was a thing *never granted*) yet they are unneceſſary toyes, and trifles: and therefore it is not lawfull for our ſuperiours to command them,when, from the practiſe of them, it is very probable, that ſcandall will ariſe. For

Firſt,every power is the *Miniſter of God to thee for good*, Rom. 13.4 the power of the Magiſtrate is like that of the Miniſter, only for *edification,and not deſtruction*, 2 *Cor*. 10.8.*and cap*. 13.10. but now if he ſhould have power to command humane ſymbolicall Ceremonies (that may be well ſpared in Gods worſhip and ſervice)whenthere is likelihood of the conſecution of Scandall:then he ſhould have power to do miſchiefe, to enjoine things hurtfull, and deſtructive unto the ſoules of men.

Secondly,our Saviours commination againſt ſcandall,Matth. 18. 7. *(Woe to that man by whom the offence cometh,)* reacheth Magiſtrates, as well as private perſons:and we may ſay the ſame of the Apoſtolicall prohibitions of ſcandall both to the Romans, and the Corinthians,*Rom*.14.13,15,20,21.1*Cor*.8.9.*and chap*.10,32.

Unto theſe *prohibitions* adde we *Pauls reſolution* to avoid ſcandall ariſing from the uſe of things indifferent: *if meat make my brother to offend (ſaith he) I will eat no fleſh while the world ſtandeth, leſt I make my brother to offend*,1 *Cor*.8.13. For

From this reſolution the unlawfulneſſe of the injunction of ſuch ceremonies as ours will undeniably follow.

To cleare this I ſhall *preſuppoſe* that,which cannot (with any colour of reaſon) be denied: to wit, that,that, which *Paul* held unlawfull

lawfull for himſelfe to practiſe in his own perſon upon a generall account belonging to all Chriſtians, could not by him be lawfully impoſed upon others by an Eccleſiaſticall Canon; but now *Paul* held it unlawfull to eat fleſh in caſe of ſcandall probably conſequent, and this was upon a generall reaſon belonging to all Chriſtians: and therefore he thought it utterly unlawfull to impoſe any ſuch matter upon others when ſcandall was likely to follow.

From this thus premiſed, I ſhall hence thus argue *Syllogiſtically*, againſt our Prelates impoſition of our Ceremonies.

If it were unlawfull for *Paul* to impoſe upon the *Corinthians* ſuch ceremonies as ours, then it was unlawfull for our Prelates to impoſe ſuch upon us.

But it was unlawfull for *Paul* to impoſe ſuch Ceremonies as ours upon the Corinthians.

Therefore it was unlawfull for the Prelates to impoſe ſuch Ceremonies upon us.

The *ſequele* of the *major* is evident: becauſe the Prelates could not pretend unto ſo much authority in matters Eccleſiaſticall as *Paul* had: for in each of the Apoſtles there was a greater *fulneſſe of juriſdiction* then in any that ſucceeded them.

As for the *Minor* that may be confirmed by this following Syllogiſme.

If it were unlawfull for *Paul* to impoſe upon the Corinthians the eating of fleſh when ſcandall was likely to enſue, then it was unlawfull for him to impoſe upon them the uſe of ſuch Ceremonies as ours.

But the former appeareth to be unlawfull by the 1*Cor*.8.13.

Therefore the latter was unlawfull alſo.

There is nothing here can be queſtioned but the *Major*, and that is eaſily confirmed from a juſt *compariſon* of *fleſh with ſuch Ceremonies as ours*.

Firſt, the eating of fleſh was undoubtedly a thing more cleerly indifferent, then the practiſe of ſuch Ceremonies of ours.

Secondly, fleſh was neceſſary unto the maintenance of the life of man by *diſjunction*: that is, fleſh, or ſome other meat: but now ſuch Ceremonies as ours are not neceſſary unto the worſhip and ſervice of God by *diſjunction*: for God may be worſhipped without them, or any others in their ſtead: a ſurplice (ſaith *Rutherford*)

ford) is not neceſſary by way of diſjunction, for neither is ſurplice neceſſary, nor any other white or red habit, that hath ſome myſticall ſignification, like unto Surplice: So kneeling to the elements is neither neceſſary, nor any the like religious honouring of them by proſtration before them, or kiſſing them.

But againſt this accuſation of our Ceremonies for ſcandall there are objected *two Compariſons.*

Firſt, of the duties of juſtice and Charity together: the duties of juſtice are more obligatory then the duties of charity, as being not only a *morall, but a legall debt*: Now to hinder the ſcandall of the weak is a duty of charity, *only a morall debt*, to obey the lawfull command of authority in things indifferent a *duty of juſtice, a legall debt*; and therefore of the greater obligation, and moment: I ſhall the rather inſiſt on this argument, becauſe it is of late ſo much ſtood on by Dr *Anderſon* [in his laſt Sermons printed 1656.pag.249.] *where we are not* (ſaith he) *able to diſcharge both: debts of juſtice are to be paid* (ſaith he) *before debts of charity. Now the duty of obedience is* debitum juſtitiæ, *and a matter of right: my ſuperiour may challenge it at my hands as his due; and I doe him* wrong, *if I withhold it from him. But the care of not giving offence is but* debitum charitatis, *and a matter of but* courteſie. *I am to performe it to my brother in love, when I ſee cauſe: but he cannot challenge it from me as his right, nor can juſtly ſay I do him wrong, if I neglect it. It is therefore no more lawfull for me to diſobey the lawfull command of a ſuperiour, to prevent thereby the offence of one or a few brethren, then it is lawfull for me to do one man wrong, to do another man a courteſie withall, or then it is lawfull for me to rob the Exchequer to relieve an Hoſpitall.* (x)

(x) Quis eſt qui dicat, ut habeamus quod demus pauperibus, faciamus furta divitibus? Auguſt. ſent. Mendac. cap. 7.

For anſwer: *Firſt*, if this argument be applied unto our Ceremonies there will be in ſuch application a *meer begging of* the queſtion; for that our Ceremonies were things indifferent, the command of them lawfull, the practiſe of them a *duty of juſtice, a legall debt*, is the maine thing in controverſy betwixt the conformiſts, and non-conformiſts; and therefore all this ſhould be proved, and not barely preſuppoſed as it is. But

Secondly, the fore mentioned rule is to be underſtood with this limitation, *ceteris paribus*, if the termes of the compariſon be equall: and equall they are not, when the *minims* of juſtice are put

put into the ballance with the *weightieſt duties* of charity: and ſo 'tis in the preſent compariſon, though we ſuppoſe our Ceremonies to be indifferent, and the practiſe of them a *dutie of juſtice:* for of what importance is ſuch practiſe in compariſon of the not ſcandalizing of our Brother? Who, that is not extreamly tranſported with prejudice, will think, that the commands of the Prelates to weare the ſurplice, to ſigne children with the ſigne of the Croſſe in Baptiſme &c. carry any tolerable proportion with thoſe precepts of the Apoſtle, *deſtroy not him with thy meat*, thy indifferencies, *for whom Chriſt died*, for *ſuch things deſtroy not the worke of God? Rom.*14.15,20. What lawes, of any earthly wight whatſoever, concerning ceremonies, can be more obligatory, than the Commands of God touching the externalls of his worſhip and ſervice? and yet it is his will, and pleaſure, that theſe externals of his worſhip ſhould be laid aſide for the performance of outward works of mercy? *I will have mercy and not ſacrifice, Matth.*12.7. Thus are we to leave our prayers, both publique, and private, to forſake a Sermon, for to ſave the life of our neighbours, to quench the firing of his houſe, to helpe his cattle out of the ditch: now, if the ſacred Ordinances of God are to give way unto works of mercy unto the bodies of men, ſurely then much more is the traſh of humane inventions to yeild unto a worke of mercy towards the ſoules of men: This anſwer which I now give was made by *Rutherford* in his diſpute of ſcandall unto the Duplies of the Doctors of Aberdeen pa. 50, 51, 52, 53. his diſcourſe there is ſo ſatisfactory, as that I have thought fit to tranſcribe what he ſaies, and I hope the reading of it will not be irkſome unto the Reader.

It is true theſe duties which we owe to others by way of juſtice, are more obligatory then thoſe, which we owe only by way of charity, cæteris paribus: When duties of the Law of nature, and morall Law, are compared together, then indeed the duties, which we owe both by the tye of juſtice and charity, are more obligatory then the duties that we owe onely by the tye of charity. As for example, My Father is in danger before mine eyes to be drowned, in one deep water, and before my eyes alſo my neighbour or friend is in danger of the like kind: the two tyes and bands of juſtice and charity, both by the fifth and ſixt Commandements, are more obligatory, hic & nunc, and do more ſtrictly oblige, that I run to ſuccour and preſerve the life of my Father, than the

life

life of my neighbour: for the obligation to my neighbour, is only Charity, by the obligation of the sixth Commandement, which obligation ceaseth, hic & nunc, *at this time, when my fathers life is in hazard: and thus farre the Doctors argument goeth for strong, as School-men, Casuists, and Divines teach. But it is not to a purpose for the Doctors: for all offices and duties generally, and universally, of what ever kind, which we owe by way of Justice, are not more obligatory, than duties which we owe only by way of charity: as when duties of a positive commandement of God, enjoined by our superiours, and duties which we owe by charity only, are compared together, then the Doctors Major proposition is not cleare of it selfe, as they dreame, neither do Casuists, or Amesius, or Divines say with them; but truth, and all our Divines say against them. Let us suppose that the King, and Convocation, and Assembly of Priests and Prophets of Israel make a Canon according to Gods word. That no manner of man presume to eat shew-bread, save the Priests only. All men owe obedience to this, both because it is Gods expresse Law, and by the band of Justice the Elders and assembly of the Ancients have forbidden it. But if our Doctors argument stand strong,* David *at the point and hazard of famishing for hunger, sinned in eating shew-bread, yet Christ acquitteth him of all sinne, and saith* Matth. 12. 5. *he and his followers are* ἀναίτιοι, *blamelesse. Now* David *was under a duty by mercy, and love to his own life, and the lives of his followers, to eat shew bread, and he was under the band of Justice, by the Law of the Ancients of Israel, and Gods law, not to eat. Therefore in some cases when our superiours commandements are only positive Lawes, they are not more obligatory, than duties of Charity, only commanded in the Law of nature. I cleare it further thus, I see my neighbour in danger before my eyes of drowning, and my father commandeth me to goe and labour, or sow his farme in that time, while I am to preserve the life of my neighbour, in present danger, to loose his life in a great water. By the Doctors maxime, I am under the higher obligatory tie of Justice, to obey my father, who commandeth a thing both lawfull and necessary, by vertue of the higher commandement, to wit the first of the second Table, than I am obliged by the sixth Commandement, and of charity only, to give present succour and helpe to my dying neighbour, so I must let my neighbour dye in the waters, to give a duty of Justice to my father of farre lesse necessity. I would not commit my Conscience to such Casuists, as are the Doctors of Aberdeen.*

But

But if the Doctors would ſee with ſome new light of reaſon; it is cleare that not only, the tye of juſtice maketh the precept more obligatory, but alſo the weightineſſe of the thing commanded; yea, and if the poſitive Commandements of the Lord our God, who of Juſtice, and Kingly ſoveraignty hath right to aske obedience of us above all earthly Superiours, do yeild and cede as leſſe obligatory, then commandments of love only, that are commanded in the Law of nature. What do our Doctors clatter and fable to us of a right of Juſtice, that mortall Rulers have to command in things indifferent, from which the deſtruction of ſoules doth ariſe? for theſe commandements of Rulers, (Kneele religiouſly before bread, the Vicegerent image of Chriſt crucified) (keepe humane holy dayes) (Croſſe the ayre with your thumb above a baptized infants face) at beſt, are but poſitive Commandements, not warranted by Gods word. But ſhall they be more obligatory by a ſuppoſed band of Juſtice that Prelates have over us to command ſuch toyes, than this divine Law of God, and Nature, Rom. 14. *For indifferent dayes, meates, ſurplice, deſtroy not him for whom Chriſt dyed? All the Caſuiſts and Schoolemen, Navarra, Sylveſter, Sanchez, Raphael dela Torre, Meratius, Duvallius, Thomas, Scotus, Bonaventura, Suarez, Vaſquez, Greg: de valentia, Albertus, Richardus, Biel, Corduba, Angelus, Adrianus, Alphonſus, Becanus, Yea, and all the hoſt of our Divines cry with Scripture, that mercy and the precepts of love, and of the Law of nature are more obligatory, than ſacrifice, burnt offerings, and Gods owne poſitive Lawes, yea, and that poſitive Lawes looſe their obligatory power, and ceaſe to be lawes, when the lawes of nature and neceſſary dutyes of mercy, and love (as not to murther our brother) (not to ſcandalize) ſtandeth in their way. I might weary the Reader here with citations, and be wilder my ſelfe alſo, but it is a point of Divinity denyed by none at all. 3. What we owe of Juſtice to our Superiours, is indeed both a morall debt of obedience, and a debt of Juſtice and law, which Rulers may ſeeke by their place, and ex jure, as Ariſtotle ſaith, but this right is limited: Rulers have no right to ſeeke abſolute obedience, but only in the Lord, not againſt charity. And though the place of Rulers be authoritative, yet their commanding power, as touching the matter of what they injoyne is only Miniſterial, and they cannot but in Gods place exact, that which is Gods due, and ſeing God himſelfe, if he ſhould immediatly in his owne perſon Command, he would not urge a poſitive commandement, farre leſſe the commande-*

ment of light and vaine Ceremonies, againſt and beyond the precept of love, not to deſtroy a ſoule for whom Chriſt dyed. Ergò, Superiours under God, who borrow all their light from God, cannot have a higher right, than God hath. 4. The compariſon of a man who oweth moneys to a Creditor, and oweth moneyes to the poore, is cloſe off the way, for he is obliged to pay the Creditour firſt; but the caſe here is farre otherwiſe; the debt of practiſing indifferent feathers, and ſtraws, ſuch as kneeling, croſſing, wearing Surplice, is neither like the debt owen to the poore, nor to the Creditor; For natures Law, and Gods word, 1. Cor. 10. 18. 19. maketh the Non-practiſe, non-murthering obedience to God, when the practiſe of indifferent things is a ſoule ſtumbling to the weake, and the practiſing is but at 'its beſt obedience to a poſitive Law, and ought to ſtoope, and gue off the way, and diſappeare, when natures Law (murther not) doth come in 'its way. When the Doctors put Loyalty above Charity, they ſuppoſe obedience to Commandements commanding ſcandalizing of ſoules to be loyalty to Superiours; which is queſtioned, it being treaſon to the ſoveraigne of Heaven, and Earth, to deſtroy his Image, it is taken as loyaltie by our Doctors, but not proven to be loyaltie, and ſo a vaine queſtion here, whether Loyalty be above Charity or not.

This diſpute of ſcandall is annexed unto his divine right of Church Goverment, which was publiſhed 1646. ſince that Dr. *Sanderſon* 1656 (as I ſhewed you but now) propounds the argument a new, with a great deale of triumph, but without any conſiderable reinforcement; and withall he takes no notice of *Rutherford*, his anſwer, from whence I gather that he never read it: and indeed it is a thing very incident unto the greateſt Schollars of that party to cenſure, but never to reade their adverſaries.

Thirdly, to ſay ſomething unto Dr. *Sanderſon* as well as unto the Duplyers, I muſt needs confeſſe, that I am tranſported with a juſt admiration, that ſo great a ſchollar ſhould ſo extenuate, as he doth, the guilt of an active ſcandall; for he makes the care of not giving offence to a brother to be a matter but of courteſy; he cannot, (ſaith he) juſtly ſay I do him wrong, if I neglect it: But *firſt*, the Apoſtle *Paul* ſpeakes another language, in his account to make *brethren to offend is to ſin againſt them, to wound their weake conſciences, and ſo to ſin againſt Chriſt.* 1 Cor. 8. 12.

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Compared with *ver.*11. 13. and *Rom.* 14. 15. 20. he reſolves, that 'tis a *deſtroying of a brother* for whom Chriſt died, a *deſtroying of the worke of God in him*: whereupon Divines generally determine, that 'tis ſoule-murther: Now, in woundi.g the weake conſcience of our brother, in murthering his immortall ſoule, there is doubtleſſe ſome wrong committed againſt him: not to deſtroy him for whom Chriſt dyed &c. is more than a matter of meer courteſy unto him.

Secondly, ſuppoſe the care of not giving offence be, in reſpect of our brother, but *debitum charitatis*; yet in regard of God 'tis *debitum juſtitiæ*, a legall debt: he may, and doth challenge it as due, and we do him wrong if we diſobey him. Our Saviour thundereth a woe againſt ſuch diſobedience; *Woe to him through whom offences come*, *Luk.* 17. 1. and in the ſecond verſe this woe is aggravated by compariſon with a very grievous puniſhment, *it were better for him that a Mill-ſtone were hanged about his neck, and he caſt into the ſea, then that he ſhould offend one of theſe little ones.*

But to proceed unto the *ſecond compariſon* on which I inſiſted out of *Biſhop Morton* and Dr *Sanderſon*: *a Compariſon betwixt a ſcandall given to a Magiſtrate, and a ſcandall given to one, who is only a brother: I demand whether or no the offence given to, or taken by a Magiſtrate, who is a brother, and withall a Magiſtrate be not greater, than that which is given to, or taken by one, who is only a brother? an impartiall Judg will ſoone determine that the double relation of brother, and Magiſtrate weigheth down the ſingle, and naked relation of a brother &c.* ut ſuprà.

For *anſwer* unto this, diſtinguiſh we of a *two[illegible] acception of ſcandall. Primary*, and *Secundary*.

Firſt, *Primary*, and ſo 'tis an occaſioning culpably the fall of another into ſin.

Secondly, *Secundary*, and ſo 'tis only the angring, vexing, diſpleaſing of another.

This *diſtinction premiſed*; the compariſon may be underſtood; either of the ſcandall of a Magiſtrate in a *ſecundary* acception, with a ſcandall of one, who is onely a brother in a *ſecundary* acception of the word too; or elſe of the ſcandall of a Magiſtrate in a *ſecundary* acception with the ſcandall *of a brother in a primary* acception; or 3. of the ſcandall of a Magiſtrate in a *primary* acception with

the ſcandall of a brother in a *primary* acception alſo.

Firſt, if the Compariſon be on both ſides to be underſtood of ſcandall taken in a *ſecondary ſenſe*, there is no doubt, but the ſcandall of the Magiſtrate is more dangerous, than that of one, who is only a brother: for the wrath of the ſupreame Magiſtrate is *as the Meſſengers of death, Prov.* 16.14. *as the roaring of a Lyon, Prov.* 19. 12. In indifferent things then it will be our ſafeſt courſe to anger a brother, rather then to diſpleaſe the Magiſtrate. But this acception of ſcandall is impertinent unto our purpoſe, and ſo much is confeſſed by Dr *Hammond* in his treatiſe of ſcandall *pag:* 23. *To be angry, grieved, troubled, at any action of another, is not (to be offended) in the ſcripture ſenſe, nor conſequently doth it follow, that I have done a miſſe in doing that which another man is angry at, unleſſe my action be in it ſelfe evill.* The ſcandall we ſpeak of is culpable; but to diſpleaſe a magiſtrate is not alwaies a ſin: the miſtake of ſcandall for the angring of one is taken notice of by *Calvin* alſo upon 1 *Cor.* 8. 13. having affirmed, that ſome corrupted the doctrine of ſcandall with fooliſh gloſſes, and others with their impious calumnies, he ſheweth the originall of both their miſtakes touching the meaning of offence in the Apoſtle. *Utrique errant in verbo offendendi. Nam offendere accipiunt, pro incurrere in odium, vel offenſionem hominum, aut quod idem ferè eſt, facere quod ipſis diſpliceat, vel minus arrideat. Atqui clariſſimè patet ex contextu, nihil eſſe aliud quam malo exemplo tanquam obice fratrem impedire à recto curſu, aut illi præbere cauſam lapſus. Non ergo hic diſputat Paulus de retinendâ hominum gratiâ, ſed de ſublevandis infirmis, nè concidant, & prudenter regendis, nè à rectâ viâ deflectant.*

Secondly, if the compariſon proceed of the ſcandall of the Magiſtrate in a *ſecondary ſenſe* with the ſcandall of a brother in a *primary ſenſe*, doubtleſſe the ſcandall of a brother is more to be declined: it is farre better to anger, and diſpleaſe a pious Magiſtrate, a religious Prince, a Parliament, a whole Church, & Commonwealth, then *culpably to occaſion* the fall of the meaneſt, pooreſt, and moſt illiterate artizan into ſin: and this will be denyed by none who know, that 'tis more dangerous to diſpleaſe God, than man.

Thirdly, if the compariſon be to be underſtood of the ſcandall of the Magiſtrate in a *primary acception* with a ſcandall of a brother in a *primary acception* too: then I ſhould thinke, that the

ſcandall

ſcandall of the Magiſtrate is the greater, and more to be eſchewed, it is a greater ſin culpably to occaſion the fall of the Magiſtrate into ſin, then the fall of a meere brother: becauſe the falls of Magiſtrates are of a more pernicious example, giving greater countenance, and encouragement unto ſin.

But this will no wayes advantage our Sticklers for Ceremonies: for the non-conformiſts deny, that their forbearance of Ceremonies did culpably occaſion the fall of the Magiſtrate into ſinne: and the contrary they expect to have proved and not barely dictated.

One thing let me obſerve on the bie, before I paſſe on: and 'tis: that, if thoſe who make this compariſon of the ſcandall of a Magiſtrate with the ſcandall of a brother, take ſcandall on both ſides in the primary acception thereof: then they ſeeme to intimate, that there may be a caſe wherein a man may be neceſſitated culpably to occaſion the fall, either of a Magiſtrate, or of a brother into ſinne: Of a Magiſtrate if he forbeare what he commands, of a brother if he practiſe it: But this is not *caſus dabilis*, for God by his providence, can never neceſſitate a man unto ſin: of this *Rutherford* ſpeaks very ſolidly in his refutation of the Dupliers *pag.* 41, 42. *You ſhall* (ſaith he unto them) *be forced to give a caſe, wherein we are neceſſitated by Gods providence, and that by way of contradiction, whether we forbeare, or forbeare not to murther either the ſoules of ſome weake ones, or the ſoules of ſuperiours, by our forbearance of the practiſe of things judged expedient by ſuperiours: You make us to murther the ſoules of Superiours, by the non-forbearance, or you will have us to murther the ſoules of weake brethren, if we practiſe. This is a wronging of providence, and a Manichean tenent, that we can be under ſuch a neceſſity of ſinning. Yea, there muſt be two contrary revealed Wills in God, Commanding, by forbearing the Ceremonies, not to murther Superiours, and commanding by not forbearing, not to murther weake brethren: and ſo God commandeth both to forbeare and alſo not to forbeare.* Mr *Tombes* [in his treatiſe of ſcandalizing p. 266, 267, 268.] quarrels with *Ames*, for affirming, that there can be no ſuch perplexity, that it ſhould be neceſſary for a Godly man, whether he do this or that, or not do it, to ſcandalize ſome one: But Dr *Ames* is to be underſtood of a ſcandall in the *primary ſenſe*, a culpable occaſioning the fall of another into ſin: and the objections of Mr *Tombes* proceed only concerning ſcandall in a *ſecundary acception*

ception thereof, as will be apparent unto any one, that will be pleaſed to peruſe them.

There be *two things* more I ſhall take notice of in my forementioned diſcourſe.

Firſt, I ſuppoſe all along that the Convocation was our Mother, and the Church of England: but ſurely ſhe was a ſtep-mother unto divers of the Godly, uſing towards them farre more rigour, then unto ſuch whom profaneſſe rendered obnoxious unto their Courts: if any indifferent man looke upon their Canons he muſt needs confeſſe, that one of their cheife deſignes was to cruſh, and perſecute ſuch religious perſons, whom they nicknamed Puritans, to *d ſtroy* with their Ceremonies ſuch among them for whom Chriſt died. But I wonder upon what account, I, or any man elſe, could think it to be the Church of England. If in any ſenſe it can be called the Church of England, it was becauſe it repreſented the Miniſtry of England, and that it did not; becauſe the farre major part of it were *Cathedrall men*, *Biſhops*, *Deanes*, *Arch-Deacons*, and ſuch as were choſen by the reſpective *Chapters* of each Cathedrall: it might then be a repreſentation of the Cathedrall Miniſters, but not of the miniſtry of England: and that I ſhall make good by two *paralels*.

The firſt ſhall be, betwixt our Convocations, and the Councill of Trent: many ſober, and moderate Papiſts accuſed this to be a pack'd aſſembly, a repreſentation, of, not the *Catholike Church*, but the *Court of Rome*; becauſe the greateſt part of it were of the Popes faction, and depended wholy upon him: So the Major part of our Convocations were of the Biſhops faction, and minded chiefly the intereſts of Cathedrals: and therefore were not a repreſentative of all the Miniſters in England. I ſhall exemplifie this by inſtancing in the *Dioceſſe* of *Bathe*, and *Wells*, wherein I lived: In this there were members of the lower houſe of Convocation, one Deane, three Archdeacons, and one choſen by the Chapter of Wells: and to ballance theſe there were but two Clarkes choſen by the Miniſtry of the whole *Dioceſſe*: Now what impartiall man, but will determine that theſe ſeaven could be no due repreſentation of the Miniſters of the *Dioceſſe* of *Bathe* and *Wells*, as long as five of them were members of the Cathedrall, in whoſe election the Miniſters of the Dioceſſe had no hand at all.

A *ſecond paralell* ſhall be betwixt our convocation, and a civill aſſembly: wherein we will ſuppoſe, that the Prince chooſeth *three hundred*, who are his Courtiers, or elſe ſuch as have their dependance, either wholy, or in great part upon him: and the nation chooſe only a *hundred*: you may call this aſſembly a Parliament, or what you will; but ſurely no rationall man can thinke it to be a repreſentation of the nation: and as irrationall were it to call the Convocation a repreſentation of the Miniſters, of England, ſeeing thoſe choſen by the Miniſters were an inconſiderable part of the Convocation.

And *unto this we may adde*; that there was ſeldome a due, and regular choice made of the Clerks of the Convocation: I was preſent at the laſt election, that was at Wells: and then *Biſhop Peirce* told us, that it was an unqueſtionable priviledge due unto his *See* for him to propound unto us the Clerkes that we ſhould chuſe, unto which he expected our conformity, tacitly menacing all that diſſented.

And when yet, by all this violence, he was unlikely to carry it for ſuch as he had nominated; why then, he had another ſhift, that was (I believe) never heard of before: he enabled the Pluraliſts, of whom either all, or moſt were his favorites, to voice it in ſeverall capacities: to give as many double voices, as they had dignities, and benefices: his Son gave at that time eight ſingle voices, two as he was Archdeacon of Bath, two as he was Prebend of Cudworth, two as he was Parſon of Bucklan-Mary, two as he was Vicar of Kingsbury: Now, to ſay that ſuch an election was regular, and lawfull is as ridiculous, and ſenſeleſſe, as if a man ſhould ſay, that in the Choice of Knights of the Shire for Parliament; men may give as many double voices, as they have Farmes and Livings.

A *ſecond thing* I ſhall take notice of, in the now mentioned diſcourſe, is my miſinterpretation of the *1Cor.*10.32. Upon which I thus deſcanted: *as* Paul *exhorts to give none offence neither to Jew nor Gentile, ſo he addes in a further ſpecialty nor to the Church of God*: The Jewes and Gentiles were but *parts*, the Church of God the *whole*, they but *brethren*, ſhe the *mother*. Here *was a groſſe miſtake*, in thinking, that the Jewes and Gentiles here ſpoken of were *members of the* Church: whereas, by the Apoſtles diſtinction of them

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from the Church of God, it is plaine, that they were not as yet converted unto the Chriſtian faith, but were as yet enemies thereunto, and conſequently ſtrangers unto the Church: And thus having finiſhed my examination of the two limitations that I gave in a former edition of this treatiſe. I ſhall goe on to that which followeth.

But *ſuppoſe* the action in which this appearance of evill is imagined to be as indifferent in it ſelfe, ſo alſo not annexed unto a neceſſary duty, and we alſo left to the uſe of our liberty, what then?

Two things are here eſpecially to be conſidered: *firſt*, the *quality* of the action excepted at; *ſecondly*, *the difference of times, and places.*

To beginne with *the firſt*, the action (at which thy brother is ſcandalized, by his groundleſſe imagination, that 'tis evill, or carrieth a reall appearance of evill) *is* either of *none*, *or great importance to thee.*

If it *be of none importance*, but weightleſſe, as affording thee either none, or but ſmall benefit: offend not thy brother by an unſeaſonable exerciſe of thy liberty. Know that as *authority*, ſo *charity* ſhould alſo reſtraine it: conſider that by this undue uſe of thy liberty thou ſinneſt againſt *thy brother*, and by ſinning againſt him thou *ſinneſt againſt Chriſt*. 1 Cor. 8. 12.

But now if it be of ſome *weight*, and *moment*, as yeelding thee ſome great profit, why thou muſt a while forbeare it, untill thy brother may be better informed; and to informe him that the action is lawfull which offends him, thou muſt take care too, otherwiſe thou wilt prejudice the truth, through thy regardleſſe ſilence, and alſo continue his weakneſſe, and foment in him a negative ſuperſtition. *Let every one of us*, (ſaith the Apoſtle, *Rom.* 15. 2.) *pleaſe his neighbour for his good unto edification*, And for a man to humour his neighbour in an erroneous and ſuperſtitious opinion, however it may pleaſe him, yet not for his *good* unto *edification*: Upon which ground I take it, that the Apoſtle *Paul*, as he refuſed maintenance at Corinth, to avoid appearance of a *coveteous intention*, and *mercenary affection* in *preaching*: ſo alſo his juſt tiale, and unqueſtionable right thereunto he at large both profeſſeth, and proveth.

But

But now if thy brother refuse, and contemne information: *Tunc desinit esse scandalum pusilli ex infirmitate, aut simplici ignorantiâ, et incipit esse scandalum Pharisæi ex purâ malitiâ, aut ignorantiâ affectatâ, & crassâ.* The shelter of weakenesse is thereby taken from him, his judgment being now overshadowed no longer with a meere weakenesse arising out of simple ignorance, but with a proud, and wayward, if not envious and malitious perversneſse, that is accompanied with a grosse, willfull, & affected ignorance, He is no longer then to be accounted a weak one, but a proud and wilfull one, and for his peevishnesse thou mayest choose, whether thou wilt forgoe thy liberty. *Calvin* upon the 1 *Cor.* 8. 13. tells us of some foolish interpreters, that leave unto Christians almost noe use at all of thinges indifferent, upon pretext to avoide the offence of superstitious persons *inepti sunt, inquit, qui nullum prope usum rerum indifferentium reliquum faciunt Christianis, nè superstitiosos offendant*, And he discovers the ground of their mistake to be; because they do not consider, that *Paul* here inveigheth against those, who unseasonably abuse their knowledg before such weake ones, whom they neglect to informe, or instruct concerning the matter, at which they are scandalized: therefore there will be no place for reprehension if such information preceed, *In hoc hallucinantur inquit, quod non considerant Paulum hic invehi adversus eos, qui scientiâ suâ intempestivè abutuntur coram infirmis, quos docere negligunt. Ergò reprehensioni amplius locus non erit, si præcedat doctrina.* Mr *Tombes* [in his treatise of scandalizing, *pag.* 233, 234.] quotes *Peter Martyr*, and *Bucane* for the same purpose, and this what they say is *generally, ordinarily, or for the most part true*; for if we are to forbeare all our conveniences, and matters of expediency, when men are scandalized at them, after we have given them, or offered to give them full information; our Christian liberty in things indifferent would in these our times come to be just nothing: nay our servitude would be greater, and more unsupportable, than that of the Jewes under the Leviticall Ceremonies.

However yet information doth not alwaies alter the nature of scandall; for the scandall of the weake may sometimes last, *Postquam reddita est ratio facti*, after a reason of the fact, whereat they are scandalized, is rendred to them. For, by reason of their extreame

treame ignorance, and ſlowneſſe of underſtanding, they may be utterly incapable of information, and inſtruction; or elſe ſome opinion, or practiſe, whereunto they have been long accuſtomed, may caſt ſuch a miſt before their weak judgments, as that they may not be able preſently to apprehend the reaſon that is given of the action, at which they ſtumble. And we ſhould ſo farre pitty the ſimplicity of ſuch poore ſoules, as to abſtaine from that which ſcandalizeth them, if by ſuch abſtinence there accrue not to us any great loſſe, or inconvenience.

This is obſerved by *Cajetan* upon *Aquinas* 2. 2dæ. q. 43. art. 7. *Vbi dicitur, inquit, articulo 7mo. de ſcandalo puſillorum, ſi autem poſt redditam rationem hujuſmodi ſcandalum duret, jam videtur ex malitiâ eſſe; adverto, quod author non aſſertivo verbo utitur, ſed opinativo, dicendo, jam videtur ex malitiâ eſſe; poteſt ſiquidem contingere, quod puſilli non ſint capaces rationis redditæ, vel propter priſtinam conſuetudinem, quæ facit apparere diſſonum, quod veritati conſonat, vel propter rationem apud eos magis apparentem, vel aliquod hujuſmodi: & tunc quia malitia non facit ſcandalum, ſed ignorantia vel infirmitas, quamvis reddita ſit ratio, ceſſandum eſt ab hujuſmodi ſpiritualibus non neceſſariis. Cajetan. in* 2. 2. q. 43. &c. *Whereas it is ſaid in the* 7th *article, touching the ſcandall of the weak, if after a reaſon given, the ſcandall do ſtill remain, it ſeemeth to be of malice; you muſt note the Author doth not uſe (verbo aſſertivo, ſed opinativo) ſaying, it ſeemeth to be of malice. For it may fall out that the weake are not capable of the reaſon that is rendred, either by reaſon of his former Cuſtome, which maketh that to appeare diſcordant with the truth, or for ſome reaſon which in his eyes is more apparent, or by reaſon of ſome ſuch like cauſe, and then it is not out of malice that he is offended, but out of ignorance and infirmity.*

After *Cajetan*, *Petrus de Lorica* doth roundly and fully expreſſe the matter. *Verum eſt* (ſaith he) *quod Cajetanus advertit, ſcandalum puſillorum perſeverare poſſe adhuc, poſtquam reddita eſt ratio facti, vel quia rationem non capiunt ob mentis tarditatem, vel ob conſuetudinem diu firmatam: in quo caſu docet Cajetanus omittendam eſſe actionem, ex quâ ſcandalum accipiunt; vel differendam, donec ad ſaniorem mentem venerint. Quòd ſolùm verum, ſi actio omitti poteſt ſine jacturâ noſtræ utilitatis. Si enim magna utilitas temporalis vel ſpiritualis intervenial, contemni poteſt ſcandalum puſillorum, poſt-*

quam

quam ſufficienter admoniti ſint. In the next place I will recite a limitation of *Gregory de Valentia*, that comes under this head, and is very remarkable.

Having laid downe a rule, that for avoiding the ſcandall of our neighbour, which ſpringeth, either from his ignorance, or weakneſſe, it behooveth us by the obligation of Charity, to do, or omit, that which may be done, or left undone without ſin: he afterwards puts this exception. *Eſt autem animadvertendum hanc regulam intelligi debere de omni eo, quod ſine peccato fieri, aut omitti poſſit, non quomodocunque, ſed moraliter, attentâ ſuavitate, quæ eſt in jugo legum divinarum: id eſt, quod ſine peccato fieri, aut omitti poſſit, ſine maxima etiam aliqua, & penè intolerabili difficultate, ſpectata quoque in hac conditione perſonæ &c.* And indeed (me thinks) he ſpeaks reaſonably. For improbable ſeems it, that the ſweet moderation, which is in the yoake of divine lawes, ſhould conſiſt with ſo great a rigour, as in all matters whatſoever, not ſimply unlawfull, to exact, not only a brotherly, but alſo a ſervile compliancy with every ſuppoſed weak one, whoſe weakneſſe may be but pretended by thoſe, that are willing to ſpeake favourably of them. For the humouring and contenting of every ſuppoſed weakling in all matters at which he takes offence, I conceive not my ſelfe bound to endanger my life, to hazard my eſtate, and fortunes, or to incurre any other great, or notable inconvenience: for that would truly be *durus ſermo*, an hard ſaying: who were able to beare it?

But now againſt this *may be objected* the reſolution of the Apoſtle, 1 *Cor.* 8. 13. *if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no fleſh while the world ſtandeth, leſt I make my brother to offend*: fleſh is of great expediency for the nouriſhment of mans life, and yet *Paul* reſolves upon a perpetuall abſtinence therefrom in caſe of ſcandall Conſequent; and this example of *Paul* is obligatory unto all Chriſtians.

For *anſwer, firſt*, this fleſh may be underſtood only of ſuch as was ſacrificed unto Idols; for words in ſcripture uſually are to be reſtrained unto the ſubject matter ſpoken of, and the meat, and fleſh, here ſpoken of in the Context, was ſuch as had been offered unto an Idoll.

Secondly, *Calvin* reſolveth that 'tis an *Hyperbole*: *eſt, inquit, hyperbolica locutio, quia vix poſſibile eſt, ut quis à carnibus totâ vitâ abſtineat, ſi remaneat in communi vitâ: ſignificat tamen ſe nunquam uſurum potius ſuâ libertate, quam ut ſit infirmis offendiculo. Nunquam enim licitus eſt uſus, niſi moderatus ad charitatis regulam.* This Hyperbole of *Pauls* you may Parallel with that of our Saviour, *Matth.*5.39,40,41. *whoſoever ſhall ſmite thee on thy right cheeke, turne to him the other alſo. And if any man will ſue thee at the Law, and take away thy coate, let him have thy cloake alſo. And whoſoever ſhall compell thee to goe a mile, goe with him twaine.*

Thirdly, *Paul* is to be underſtood, only upon ſuppoſition that the Goſpell ſhould not be fully promulgated, and brethren ſhould remain uninſtructed concerning the nature of Chriſtian Liberty; for uſually 'tis in this caſe only, that to eat fleſh involves in the guilt of an active ſcandall, makes a brother to offend: hence the Apoſtle exhorts the ſtrong amongſt *the Romans* to abſtaine from meats forbiden by the Law of *Moſes*, for prevention of the ſcandall of the weake: but amongſt the *Galathians*, *and Coloſſians* he diſlikes ſuch an abſtinence, and dehorts from it: & the *reaſon*, of this his *different carriage*, was: becauſe the weak amonſt the *Romans* were not fully taught the doctrine of Chriſtian liberty, & the *Galathians & Coloſſians were*. *Julian*, miſtaking the Apoſtles doctrine of ſcádall, thought to make uſe of it for the ſtarving of the Chriſtiás, and therefore, in *Antiochia*, and in the region round about, he dedicated all the fountaines to the *Goddeſſes* of the *Gentiles*, and cauſed all the victuall, that was to be ſold in market places, to be ſprinkled with Ethnick, holy waters, thinking that ſome would be ſcandalized at the drinking of the water of ſuch fountaines, and at the eating of ſuch victuall, and that the Apoſtles doctrine obliged all to forbeare any thing in the caſe of ſcandall: never-theleſſe Chriſtians, without ſcruple of conſcience, dranke of the water, that was in the Wels, and ate of the meat, which they bought in the market; beeing, ſince the full publication of the Goſpell, fully perſwaded, *that to the cleane all things are cleane.* *Rutherford* determines; that, ſince the plenary promulgation of the Goſpell, wee are not obliged to forbeare the good Creatures of God, things good, fit, and uſefull for the life of man, or of phyſicall uſe in the worſhip of God, though men be ſcandalized at ſuch things, and the reaſon of their ſcandall be, becauſe they have been abuſed unto

Ido-

Idolatry, and ſuperſtition: he inſtanceth in Churches, abuſed unto the ſaying of Maſſe, and unto the Idolatrous worſhip of Saints, and in bells that have been abuſed by Papiſts by being conſecrated, baptized & uſed to chaſe away divels: & for this his determination you may gather out of him [p. 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, &c.] *theſe two reaſõs.*

Firſt, becauſe abſtinence from ſuch things, (upon a religious account, for avoidance of ſcandall, becauſe abuſed to Idolatry, and ſuperſtitiõ,) would be, (after a full publicatiõ of the Goſpel) a Judaizing, an externall Cõformity with the Jew, a betraying of our Chriſtian liberty, a cõfirming & hardning the Jewes in their Apoſtacy: it would make, as *Paul* ſaies, Jeſus Chriſt of no effect, it would make us debters to Circumciſiõ, & to all the Ceremonies of Moſes, *Ga.* 5. 3, 4.

Secondly, the practiſe of ſuch things, ſince we are fully poſſeſſed in that liberty, wherewith Chriſt hath made us free, *is morally* and *Theologically neceſſary*, for the aſſerting of our Chriſtian liberty: to ſhew, that *every Creature of God is good, and nothing to be refuſed*, 1 *Tim.* 4. 4. That *unto the pure all things are pure*, *Titus* 1. 15. that *we dare not call that uncleane which God hath cleanſed*, Act. 10. 15.

But there is one paſſage in this authour concerning ſcandall, which I cannot in any waies approve of: it is pag. 58, 59. where he averreth, that things of meere civill uſe, that are neceſſary with a neceſſity of conveniency are to be forborne, if ſcandall follow, if they be not convenient in the higheſt degree. And that no man may think I miſreport him, take his own words. *There be ſome things of meere civill uſe, as Bells, gownes, Pulpits, preaching on Tueſday or Thurſday. Theſe be conſidered two waies. 1. As neceſſary with neceſſity of conveniency ſimply. 2. With neceſſity of conveniency ſecundum prævalentem gradum, as convenient in the higheſt degree of neceſſity, or that morall maximum quod ſic. In the firſt degree, what ſcandalizeth, is to be rejected: in the laſt reſpect they oblige, and if any be ſcandalized thereat, it is taken and not given.*

But ſure this doctrine if embraced will put and hold mens Conſciences upon a perpetuall rack: *For it will* be a matter of great difficulty eſpecially for ſome men allwaies to determine what in their indifferencies is convenient in the higheſt degree.

Secondly, we muſt put a difference between times, and places: for however they be but circumſtances of actions, and therefore extrinſecall to them, ſo that they cannot cauſe any ſuch eſſentiall

variation in them, as to make thoſe actions materially good, or ſinfull, which are of themſelves in their own nature indifferent: yet notwithſtanding the publick and ordinary abuſe of an action at ſuch a time, or in ſuch a place, may make it then and there, in that place and for that time appeare to be evill; although the ſame action at another time, and in the ſame place; or in another place, at the ſame time, may not be obnoxious to any ſuch cenſure.

Firſt then, time may alter this *imaginary appearance* of evill in an action. Reſervation of the brazen ſerpent, as for other ends and purpoſes, ſo for commemoration of that miraculous deliverance of the Iſraelites thereby, from the ſtings of fiery Serpents, was for a while free from all ſuſpicion, either of Idolatry or ſuperſtition: but when once it became the generall, ordinary, nay daily occaſion, and object of Idolatry, of the groſſeſt, and moſt palpable kind of Idolatry that can be, when incenſe was offered to it: then if the publique Magiſtrate had not demoliſhed it, he might juſtly have been thought to favour that Idolatry wherewith it was polluted. And therefore commendable was *Hezekiah* his zeale in breaking it in peices, 2 *King*. 18.4.

In the former Edition it was obſerved out of *Morton* that the ſame *Hezekiah* did not deſtroy the high places, which *Solomon* had built for *Aſtoreth*, the abomination of the Sidonians: and for *Chemoſh*, the abomination of the *Moabites*; and for *Milchom*, the abomination of the Children of *Ammon*, and yet was never taxed for countenancing of Idolatry. For in his daies the Idols there erected, were diſregarded no man worſhipping them, and therefore might ſafely be ſuffered to ſtand: but when afterwards they were generally and uſually adored, then the good King *Joſiah* juſtly demoliſhed them: and indeed ſhould he have permitted them then when the Idolatry wherewith they were defiled, was flagrant at the height, he might juſtly be ſuſpected to be a favourer of that Idolatry.

But unto this obſervation of *Mortons*, *Ames* thus replyeth. *He propoundeth, as very obſervable, that Hezekiah did not aboliſh the Idols, which* Solomon *ſuffered to be ſet up, becauſe they were neglected. But.* 1. *it may well be thought that thoſe idols were deſtroyed by* Hezekiah, *and ſet up again before the time of* Joſiah, *as many other*

ſuperſtitions

Superſtitions were. 2. *It cannot be doubted but they ſhould have been deſtroyed, even though they were for the time neglected: becauſe either* Hezekiah *had as good cauſe to deſtroy them as* Joſiah; *or elſe he might have prevented that cauſe which* Joſiah *had: and to prevent evill, we are as well bound, as to correct it.*

Unto this Reply of *Ames*, Dr *Burges* rejoineth, whoſe Rejoinder and *Ames* his Triplication I ſhall rather tranſcribe then Epitomize.

Dr *Burges* his Rejoinder unto the firſt part of the Reply.

Say you ſo? then belike it may be well thought that the holy Ghoſt knew not ſo well as you what was done, for the text ſaith, that Joſiah deſtroyed thoſe high places, which Solomon King of Iſrael had ſet up. and then deſcribes by the very place, where, and by name thoſe ſame Idols, which Solomon had ſet up for his outlandiſh wives, 1 King. 11. 5, 7. *I hope you will repent this raſhneſſe, I am ſure you ſhould.*

Ames *His Triplication.*

Becauſe the Defender did make this one ground of denying our conſequence from Hezekiahs *zeale againſt the monuments of Idolatry, that he did not abeliſh the Idols which* Solomon *ſuffered to be ſet up in favour of his ſtrange Wives: becauſe they were (at that time) neglected Idols. It was replyed, that it may be well thought, they were deſtroyed by* Hezekiah, *and ſet up againe before the time of* Joſiah. *This the Rejoinder calleth raſhneſſe to be repented of: becauſe it is ſaid* (2. *Reg.* 23. 13.) *that* Joſiah *deſtroyed thoſe high places, which* Solomon *had ſet up. And was it ſuch a raſhneſſe, to ſay that it may be thought ſo? the phraſe is more modeſt then theirs, who peremptorily affirme thoſe Idols to have been neglected, untill after* Hezekias *time: when the Scripture teſtifieth plainly, that Ahaz. Hezekias his father worſhipped Molech (which was one of thoſe Idols) by making his ſon to paſſe thorow the fire: and was ſo madly given to ſuperſtition, that he ſacrificed under every green tree.* 2. Reg. 16. *Nay leſſe was ſaid, then ſome learned have with great probability affirmed:* (z) *Namely*

(z) Exiſtimamus etiam, vivo Salomone, omnem illam dæmonum officinam diſruptam fuiſſe, dilaceratam, atque diſperditam. Videnturque reſtendæ illæ ſtatuæ, & luci, & aræ & reliqua Idolatriæ monumenta (2. Reg. 23. 13.) ad Manaſſem, & Ammonem (qui excitaverant illa in eodem loco & ſuapra eadem fundamenta) non ad Salomonem, ante annos 150. extinctum. Incredibile dictu eſt, tantum ſcandalum ab Aſa, Joſaphato, Joiada, cum late idolatriam diſperderent, in oculis ipſis poſitum, non vidiſſe, aut non auſos attingere, & ad annum 3406. Mirum profectò ſi Idola illa poſt trecentos 50. annos ſubſiſterent, quæ Salomon ipſe pœnitens, & cæteri reges boni ſuſtuliſſent. Utique dicendum videtur, ab impiis regibus extructa fuiſſe ejuſdem generis fana, & Idola, quæ olim Salomon in iiſdem locis extruxerat: ut illud quæ ædificaverat Salomon, ſit idem ac ſi diziſſet, qualia ædificaverat.

that

that thoſe Idols with their appurtenances were firſt defaced by Solomon *himſelfe, after his repentance; and being reſtored after by Idolaters, were againe defaced.* Salianus (*in his Annals ad an.* 3309.) *ſaith thus: we thinke alſo that while* Solomon *lived, that whole ſhop of Divels was broken up and ruined. And withall the ſtatues, the groves, and altars, as alſo the reſt of Idolatrous monuments.* 2. King. 23. 13. *to have reference to* Manaſſes, *and* Ammon (*who had ſet them up in the ſame place, and upon the ſame foundation*) *and not to* Solomon, *who dyed* 250 *yeares Before. It is incredible to ſpeake, that when* Aſa, Joſaphat, *and* Jehoiada *did farre and neare deſtroy idolatery, they notwithſtanding ſuffered a ſcandall ſo apparent. And to the yeare* 3406. *It were very ſtrange if thoſe idols after* 350 *yeares ſhould yet remaine, the which* Solomon *after his repentance, and other good Kings had aboliſhed. So that it is probable that ſuch like temples, and Idols were repaired, and built up againe by other ſucceeding ungodly Kings, which* Solomon *in former time had made: that that which* Solomon *builded ſhould be all one with ſuch like as he had builded.*

Where he ſheweth by divers inſtances, both out of ſcripture, and out of common ſpeech, how that *word* which, doth *not alwayes note the ſame ſingular ſubſtance; therein confuting all the ground that the Rej. had for cenſuring the Repl. of raſhnes to be repented of. Thus ſentence is the more alſo to be favoured; becauſe according to the other, which our Def. and Rej. maintaine, it will be very hard to anſwer that objection againſt* Solomons *repentance, which* (*a*) Rabanus *on* 2 *Reg.* 23. *groundeth on that ſuppoſition:* Solomon *never truly repented of his Idolatry: for if he had manifeſted fruits worthy repentance, he would have taken order with thoſe Idols, which he had ſet up by removing them, and* (*being ſo wiſe a man*) *never have left them to ſtand for ſtumbling blockes to fooles, as if what he had erroneouſly deviſed, had been well and wiſely done. Beſide all this, it is not credible, that the ſame individuall Temples ſtood by Jeruſalem from* Solomons *time to* Joſias; *if it were but for this, that the Aſſyrians came even to the gates of Jeruſalem, ſpoiling and breaking downe all coſtly buildings,* (*Such as* Solomons *Temples were*) *not ſparing, but deriding the Gods of nations.* 2. Reg. 8.

(*a*) Solomon de admiſſo Idolatriæ ſcelere, nunquam perfectè pœnituit. Nam ſi fractus pœnitentiæ dignos faceret, ſatageret ante omnia, ut idola quæ ædificaverat, tollerentur, & non in ſcandalum ſtultorum, quæ ipſe cum fuiſſet ſapientiſſimus, erronea fecerat quaſi ſapientè ac rectè facta relinqueret.

Unto the ſecond branch of the Reply Dr. *Burges* thus rejoineth

Burges

Burges his *Rejoinder*,

This prooves not that they were, nor is it likely that God himſelfe would have vouchſafed ſuch thorow praiſes to Hezekiah, *as he doth*, 1. Kings. 18. 5. *If* Hezekiah *had been bound to deſtroy thoſe neglected Idols, as well as others then taken in the manner, and did not ſay, why he was bound to do that which he did not.*

Becauſe either Hezekiah *had as good cauſe to deſtroy them as* Joſiah; or elſe he might *have prevented that cauſe which* Joſiah *had; and to prevent evill, we are as well bound, as to correct it.*

If Hezekiah *had as good cauſe to deſtroy thoſe high places, which ſtood neglected, (and had done perhaps about three hundred yeares, even ſince the death of* Solomons *wives, whoſe Chappels they were) as* Joſiah *had, when* Manaſſes, *or* Ammon *had, after* Hezekiah *his time, revived that Idolatry; the holy Ghoſt would have taxed* Hezekiah *for not doing that, for doing whereof he commendeth* Joſiah; *or at leaſt, not have left his integrity crowned with like praiſes, as he doth*, 2 Kings, 18. 5. *nor was* Hezekiah *bound to prevent the cauſe which* Joſiah *had, unleſſe he had ſuſpected it. For though we are bound to prevent evill which we foreſee, ſo farre as we well can, yet are we not bound to foreſee all that may happen. Neither are the ſame meanes alwayes requiſite for prevention, which muſt be uſed for recovery. If you thinke otherwiſe, burne all your popiſh bookes, leſt they fall into the hands of popelings, and do miſchiefe; for you are bound to prevent evill, as well as to correct it.*

Ames *his Triplication.*

It was added by the Repl. that thoſe Idols ſhould have been deſtroyed, (though they had been for the time neglected) becauſe that evill for which Joſiah deſtroyed them, ought as well to have been prevented as corrected. To this the rejoinder anſwereth, that this is not true, except Hezekiah *had ſuſpected that evill. And who will ſay, that there is no cauſe to ſuſpect evill of an Idoll, though it be for a time neglected? or can any man thinke, that if the Iſraelites had neglected them, no Sydonian, Moabite, or Ammonite gave occaſion of any evill to be ſuſpected by thoſe Idols? The Spaniſh and French Papiſts (to ſay nothing of Engliſh) when they in paſſing by the Croſſe in Cheape-ſide, do reverence unto it, give they not cauſe to ſuſpect ſome evill to cleave unto it? The ſame meanes (ſaith the Rejoinder) are not alwaies requiſite for prevention, which muſt be uſed for recovery. Yes truly, about*

Idols (if we judge out of the Scripture) the very same meanes. Burne then (saith the *Rejoinder*) *all your Popish books, lest they fall into the hands of Popelings to abuse them. So will I certainly, if you can shew me, that they must be burned, when Popelings have had them in their hands, and abused them, which here you grant concerning these Idols.*

Here is nothing of the Rejoinder left unexamined, but his quotation of the 2 *Kings* 18. 5. and how impertinent y that is alledged will appeare by comparison of it with 1 *King.* 15. 5. *David did that, which was right in the eyes of the Lord, and turned not aside from any thing, that he commanded him all the daies of his life, save onely in the matter of Uriah the Hittite.* For from this commendation of *David* we may as well conclude, that his numbering of the people, and his purpose and attempt to revenge himselfe of *Nabal* by destroying him and all his, were lawfull; as we may inferre from the praises of *Hezekiah*, that his omission in not demolishing *Solomons* outlandish Idols, must be unlawful: See *Rutherford* pag. 90.

Secondly, wee must *distinguish of places.* That which in some places carries a shew of evill, elsewhere perhaps is not suspected thereof. According to places therefore, in indifferent matters wee may vary our practise. It was the advice of *Ambrose* unto *Austin*, and *Monica*, respected by *Austin*, as if it had been the answer of an heavenly oracle; (*b*) unto whatsoever Church ye shall come, observe the manner or custome thereof, if ye will neither give nor take scandall. Which advice if restrained unto things indifferent is very good: and besides we have *Pauls precept, and president* for it: his precept, 1 *Cor.* c. 10. *v.* 32. *Give none offence, neither to Jew, nor Gentile*, which could not be done, but by complying with them in indifferencies. *His president* also answereth his precept; *To the Jewes he became a Jew, to them that were under the Law, as under the Law; to them that were without the law, as without the Law, to the weake, as weake*, 1 *Cor.* 9. 20, 21, 22. Amongst the Jewes *he shaved his head*, made a *vow*, Acts 18. 18. *and* (*c*) *circumcised Timothy*, Acts 16. 3. and yet amongst the Gentiles, where these actions bore an appearance of Judaisme, he withstood *Peter* for them *even to his face*, Gal. 2. 11. There be *three* other instances in the former edition, which because they are questionable I shall

(*b*) Ad quamcunque Ecclesiã veneritis, inquit, ejus monẽ servate, si pati scandalum non vultis, aut facere. Aug. Ep. 85.

(*c*) Circumcision was then indifferent, but after the full promulgation of the Gospel it became to be not only *mortua* but *mortifera*, not only dead but deadly, as being an interpretative denyall of Christs coming in the flesh.

ſhall wholy wave, and paſſe on unto the examination of my vaine triumph over the non-conformiſts, wherein, as the Proverb is, I reckoned without mine hoſt.

Former Edition.

After theſe limitations of the deny of abſtinence from all appearance of evill; I cannot but wonder at our irregulars miſapplication of it. They hence eagerly cry down the laudable diſcipline, and lawfull Ceremonies of our Church. What fearefull outcries do they make concerning their appearance of Idolatry, ſuperſtition, will-worſhip and Popery? Termes you ſee by the exceptions put to this precept, as much too big for our innocent, and harmleſſe Ceremonies, as Hercules *ſhoe, for a childs foot. Indeed our Ceremonies, for example, the Surplice, Creſſe in Baptiſme, kneeling at the Lords Supper, may have a materiall ſemblance with thoſe that in Popery have been abuſed to Idolatry, and ſuperſtition, and ſo conſequently taken materially, in reſpect of their materialls, may have an outward ſhew of Popiſh Idolatry, or ſuperſtition, but conſider them as impoſed by our Church, and generally uſed by her members, ſo they are formally differenced from thoſe which Papiſts have applyed to Idolatrous ends and purpoſes. For our Church publickly profeſſeth a quite contrary uſe or application, end, or intention of them. And externall actions have their ſpecification, and conſequently diſtinction from their end, and intention, from it they take their ſpecies, or kind, and accordingly are diſtinguiſhed. Now ſince all Popiſh, whether ſuperſtitious, or idolatrous abuſes of our Ceremonies, are publickly diſclaimed, and their right uſe explained, who can juſtly imagine any ſhew of Popery in them? An Iſraelite was not to be ſmitten for an Egyptian, becauſe for a while he once ſojourned in Egypt, if afterward he had his conſtant abode in Canaan. The garment ſpotted with the fleſh was no longer to be hated, than ſpotted: being once waſhed, it might againe be uſed. Our Ceremonies were defiled in Egypt, in Popery, with ſuperſtition, and Idolatrie; but our Church (God be praiſed) hath waſhed them from both in her publique, and profeſſed uſe of them. And therefore now they ſtand above either calumnie or ſuſpicion.* *Hooker.*

Examination.

Firſt, our non-conformiſts will tell us, that there was betwixt our Ceremonies, and thoſe of the Papiſts, even a *formall conformity, inadequate*, and *in part*, though not *totall* and *adequate*. For

though our Prelates diſavowed many, nay moſt of thoſe ſuperſtitious and idolatrous ends, unto which the Papiſts applyed our Ceremonies, yet they ſtill profeſſed one end and intention of the Papiſts in the uſe of them, to wit, *myſticall ſignification*; and this to be a Popiſh and ſuperſtitious end, the non-conformiſts prove at large in their books.

Secondly, *a materiall conformity* in Ceremonies, carrieth many times a reall appearance of evill, and ſcandalizeth actively. It doth not appeare that the Altar which *Uriah* erected, was formally the ſame with that *Ahaz* ſaw at *Damaſcus*, that it had the ſame uſe and intention, the worſhip of a falſe God. The text mentioneth only a *materiall conformity* unto it, and for this reaſon 'tis condemned, 2 *King*. 16. 10, 11. *Peters* conformity with the Jewes *Gal.* 2. was only *materiall*, not *formall*, for a Jewiſh end and purpoſe, and yet tis blamed by *Paul* as guilty of an active ſcandall, *verſ.* 11, 12, 13, 14. Suppoſe a timerous Proteſtant in Spaine or Italy go to Maſſe, and there bow before their breaden God, not out of any *intent* to honour the Idol, but only for *preſervation* of his life; his preſence and bowing will only be *materially* the ſame with that of Papiſts; but will any man think that this can acquit him from the ſin of Idolatry? Indeed *Ælian var. Hiſtor. lib.* 11 *cap.* 21. excuſeth *Iſmenias a Thebane* from adoring the *King of Perſia*, becauſe though he ſtooped downe before him, yet it was not to worſhip him, but to take up a ring that he had for the nonce let fall at his feet: but no rationall man will admit of this his apology, becauſe this ſtooping in common uſe was the adoration of the King, and interpreted to be ſuch by the King himſelfe, and by the ſpectators.

Some thinke that though a different end and intention from Pagans, Iewes, and Hereticks in the uſe of their Ceremonies, cannot legitimate them and free them from ſcandall, yet *that profeſſion of ſuch a different end and intention*, *is* ſufficient for ſuch a purpoſe. But

(d) *Ames* diſpute about humane Ceremonies pag. 127.

Firſt, the primative Church was of a different opinion. (d) *The ſtory of Origen is well known, how he delivered Palme to thoſe that offered it to the image of Serapis, with this expreſſion of his intention: come and receive the boughes, not of the image, but of Chriſt. Yet was he therefore cenſured as a worſhipper of that Idoll.*

Secondly,

Secondly, if this were true, then we might lawfully uſe circumciſion and the paſſeover, ſo we diſclaime the Jewiſh end of them, to ſignifie Chriſt to come; and profeſſe that our intention, was by them only to ſignify, that Chriſt was allready come in the fleſh.

Thirdly, *a materiall conformity* with Papiſts in their Ceremonies, hath nouriſhed in them a hope of our coming up to them, but not inclined them in any degree unto us: for they have ſtill proteſted that they would not ſtep ſo much as one foot to meete with us: and if my memory faile me not, there is ſome ſuch thing in *Franciſcus Sancta Clara*.

Indeed experience hath alwayes ſhewed, how uneffectuall a meanes ſuch a complyance hath been for the converſion of Papiſts. Whom of them hath it ever wonne over unto the Proteſtant party, but *Spalato*, and others of the like temper, who (as Mr *Fuller* ſpeaks of ſome Italians that pretended unto true converſion) were neither *good dough, nor good bread, but like Ephraim a Cake not turned?*

There was a greater materiall conformity with Popiſh Ceremonies in Cathedrals, then in other Churches, but how thin a harveſt of converts can they produce? Nay 'tis obſerved by ſome, that neare them, Popery thrived more then in other places. I heard a Knight of the royall party once affirme, in the preſence of many perſons of worth, that he thought there were more Papiſts in Wells then in all the County of Somerſet beſides: and yet of late yeares that Cathedrall outſtripped moſt in England for Ceremonioufneſſe. In the times immediately preceding the late troubles, not only the former Ceremonies of the Common-prayer booke were urged with more violence than before, but divers others quite antiquated were revived. But though Popiſh Ceremonies were encreaſed, we do not find that the number of Papiſts was hereby any thing diminiſhed. I ſhall conclude this with that of *Didoclave* pag. 540,541. *Formaliſta ſe retinere quoſdam ritus Pontificiorum, ut eos lucrifacere poſſent, & reducere in rectam viam. Deus in dirigendis ſuis prudentiſſimus aliam præſcripſit rationem, longè diverſam, ut nempe ab omni gentium ſuperſtitione & idolatria eſſent, quantum fieri poſſet, remotiſſimi. Nam ſpecies conformitatis, aut reſervata reliquiæ ſuperſtitionis & idolatriæ illa-*

queant pios, & confirmant idolatras in ſuâ ſuperſtitione & idolatria. Gloriarentur Judæi, ut ſuprà dixit Conſtantinus, ſi viderint religionem noſtram non poſſe ſubſiſtere abſque illarum ritibus. Et Hieronymus ait, Judaicas Ceremonias in Eccleſiâ Chriſtianâ retentas non efficere Judæos Chriſtianos, ſed Chriſtianos Judæos. Auguſtinus ſecundum regulam illam à legiſlatore prudentiſſimo datam populo ſuo ſic conſulit. Si quaritis, unde vincantur Pagani, unde illuminentur, unde ad ſalutem vocentur. Deſerite omnes ſolemnitates ipſorum. Deſerite nugas eorum. Etſi non conſentiant veritati noſtræ, ſaltem pudeat paucitatis ſuæ.

But I paſſe on to the ſecond thing I propoſed, the confirmation of the point; where my prooſes ſhall be applied *ſome to reall*, ſome *to imaginary appearances of evill.*

Firſt, *See it backt by* conſonant places of Scripture. *Solomon* adviſeth his young man to walke *cautè*, as well as *caſtè*, *not to come nigh the doore of the ſtrange womans houſe*, *Prov.* 5. 8. This had not evilneſſe reall, but only the appearance of evill, as being in a corrupt mind an incentive to uncleaneſſe, and in beholders an occaſion of jealouſies and ſuſpicions. Now from *Solomons* interdicting this appearance of evill in *ſpeciall*, we may by *way of Analogy and proportion inferre a fitneſſe of forbearing* all in generall. Unto this is *anagogically* applyed the Nazarites preciſe abſtinence from wine, *Num.*6.3,4. The Nazarite, as you may ſee there, was to *abſtaine from wine, from vinegar of wine, from any liquour of grapes, from the materialls* of wine, *grapes, from moiſt grapes, from dryed grapes, from all that is made of the vine tree*, from not only the *kernell, but even the husk of the grape.* The *Jewes* have added, they were not to come nigh a vineyard. With a ſemblable ſtrictneſſe are we to ſeparate from ſinne, from all ſinne, not only from the kernell of ſinne, from a ſinne really ſo, but alſo from the husk, the appearance of ſinne.

The Children of Iſraell were charged not to *doe like the Heathen that were round about them*, 2 *King.* 17. 15. where they are interdicted not *only ſameneſſe with, but alſo likeneſſe* unto their faſhions: they were forbidden the *faſhion of rounding their heads, and cutting their fleſh, of marring the corners of their beards, of making any baldneſſe upon their heads, or between their eyes*, *Lev.*19.28. and *chap.*21.*ver.*25. *Deut.* 14.1. Not becauſe ſo to doe was ſimply in

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'its own nature a ſin, but for that it gave ſhew of a ſin, of inordinate ſorrow for the departed; of which 'twas then an expreſſion much in uſe amongſt the heathen. *Hugo Cardinalis* upon the text alledgeth *Hoſea* 2. 16. *Thou ſhalt call me Iſhi, and ſhalt call me no more Baali.*

The Gentiles gave the title of *Baal*, ſo alſo of *Baalim* unto their great and common Idol-God, ſuppoſed to be the Sun, and to all the ſeverall images, and repreſentations thereof. And therefore God prohibited application of that title unto himſelfe, in worſhip and invocation: Thou ſhalt no more call me, *ô my Baal:* for though there be no harme in the word (it ſignifying in Common uſe *husband*, as well as *Iſhi*) yet by reaſon of the ordinary application thereof unto Idols, there would have been in invocation of *God* by that name, a groſſe and palpable appearance of Idolatry. (e) In *Ezekiel* 44. 20. the Prieſts of the Jewes were prohibited the ſhaving of their heads, not becauſe it was a thing evill in it ſelfe, but only that they might not ſeeme to be like unto the Prieſts of the bordering Gentiles, who were uſually ſhaven, as appeareth by *Baruch cap.* 6. *v.* 31. But becauſe it may be excepted, that moſt of theſe rigid, and ſevere prohibitions, were given unto the Jewes under their *pedagogie of ceremonies, and time* of bondage, and therefore farther then in *a morall admonition lay no reſtraint upon us Chriſtians.* See therefore all this ſeconded in the New Teſtament by (f) St *Jude ver.* 23. Where in reference to that leproſo idolis ſacrificabant. Ut ex Epiſt. Hieremiæ apparet. Quod ex ſe non eſſet malum patet, quia Ezechiel, qui Sacerdos erat, jubetur a Deo radi. Ezech. 5. & præterea Numb. 6. Nazaræus completo tempore conſecrationis ſuæ, jubetur radi. Unde Paulo dicit Jacobus Actor. 21. ſunt nobis viri quatuor habentes votum ſuper ſe, his ergo aſſumptis ſanctificato te cum illis, & radent capita ſua. Solum ergo propter viciniam Idolatrarum prohibebantur Sacerdotes Judæorum radi, quæ fortè cauſa erat, cur Optati, Hieronymi, & Ambroſii, tempore Chriſtiani ſacerdotes non raderentur, ſed tonderentur. Nam adhuc ipſorum tempore erant Sacerdotes Iſidis qui caput radebant. Ut Ambroſius Epiſt. 36. & Hieronymus in c. 44. Ezechielis teſtantur. Bellar: de Monachis lib. 2. cap. 40.

(e) Dico Sacerdotibus Judæorum fuiſſe prohibitam raſuram Ezek. 44. non quod in ſe mala ſit, ſed nè viderentur ſimiles Sacerdotibus Gentilium, in quorum vicinia habitabant, qui toto capite

(f) Locus hic, qui obſcurus alioqui videtur, nihil habebit difficultatis, metaphorâ bene explicata; vult fideles, non tantùm cavere à vitiorum contactu, ſed nè qua ad eos contagio pertingat: quicquid affine eſt ac vicinum fugiendum eſſe admonet, quemadmodum ſi de pudicitia ſermo haberetur, dicemus tollenda eſſe omnia libidinum irritamenta, id etiamnum clarius fiet, ſi amplietur oratio, nempe ut oderimus non carnem modo, ſed tunicam, quæ ejus contactu infecta ſit. Nam particula *kai* ad ampliationem valet, ergo adeo non permittit indulgentia fovere, ut omnes præparationes, omniaque acceſſiora (ut vocant) potius reſecari, jubeat, Calvin: in locum.

gall

gall pollution, which came by touching the garment of one that was Levitically uncleane, he exhorts Chriſtians *to hate the garment ſpotted by the fleſh*, that is, ſaith *Gualter*, *quicquid ingenium carnis ſapit*, whatſoever hath but a ſmack or reliſh of the fleſh, all *preparations and acceſſaries of evill*, any thing that is neere of kin unto, or but bordering upon vice, thinks *Calvin*.

Obſerve here the emphaticall gradation of the Apoſtle, hate not only *the fleſh*, but the *garment* ſpotted by the fleſh, not onely the *garment overſpread, quite covered*, but the garment *that was but here and there a little ſpotted* by the fleſh. Out of Chriſts garment there iſſued vertue, which cured the woman that had the bloody fluxe; but contrary wiſe out of this garment, but ſpotted with the fleſh, *exit vis quædam maligna*, there goeth a poiſonous kind of infection, which ſoone will ſtaine a ſoule with the leproſy of ſinne.

Unto this place of *Jude* I ſhall adde another out of the Apoſtle *Paul*, *Heb.* 4. 1. *Let us therefore feare, leſt a promiſe being left us, of entring into his reſt, any of you ſhould ſeeme to come ſhort of it.* Hence *Dickſon* collects, *that we muſt not only feare, by misbelieving to come ſhort; but to ſeeme, or give any appearance of coming ſhort.* *Pareus* alſo hath the like note upon the place, *verbo δοκῆ, videatur, ſollicitudine tanta hic opus eſſe innuit, ut non modo quæ revera nos fruſtrent, ſed etiam quæ videatur fruſtratura provide caveamus.*

But becauſe (as the old ſaying runs) *praxis ſanctorum eſt interpres præceptorum*, I ſhall intreate you next to take notice, how this precept hath been exemplified, The Church (*g*) *Cant.* 1. 7. profeſſeth againſt, even all ſhew of communion with falſe Churches that pretend unto fellowſhip with Chriſt, *Why ſhould I be as one that turneth aſide by the flockes of thy companions?*

But to come unto particular examples, and here in the times before Chriſt, is very remarkeable the couragious and undaunted reſolution of *Eleazar*, againſt but the appearance of an evill. 2

(*g*) *Thoſe words Cant.* 1. 7. *as one that turneth aſide, may be rendred, as one that is recovered or veiled. The ſenſe the Greeke verſion giveth, according to the uſuall ſignification of the Hebrew word: and this covering either is a ſigne of ſorrow and ſhame: as mourners uſed to cover their faces, Ezek.* 24. 17. *or of lightneſſe and diſhoneſty, as Thimar was thought to be an harlot becauſe ſhe had covered her face Gen.* 38. 14, 15. *So here the ſpouſe deſireth to know where Chriſt feedeth, leſt ſhe ſhould wander about and ſeek him with ſorrow, and be by others reputed an harlot, for ſhe would eſchew all appearance of evill.* Ainſworth in locum.

Mac.

Mac. c. 6. v. 18. *uſque ad finem: When he was beſought to bring fleſh of his owne proviſion, ſuch as was lawfull for him to uſe, and but make as if he did eat of the fleſh, taken from the ſacrifice commanded by the King. v.* 21. *Why? even this evill appearance,* this ſeeming, *this making as if he* did eat of the fleſh taken from the ſacrifice commanded by the King, ſo deepely diſreliſhed him, as that *he choſe death before it.* For it *becommeth not our age* (ſaith he) in any wiſe to diſſemble, whereby many young perſons might think that *Eleazar being fourſcore years old and ten, was now gone to a ſtrang religion, & ſo they through mine hypocriſy, and deſire to live a little time, and a moment longer, ſhould be deceived by me, and I get a ſtain to my old age, and make it abominable. v.* 24 25. But why mention I *Eleazar?* behold the example of one greater then *Eleazar*, the example of the rule and patterne of holines unto the Church, Chriſt Ieſus God bleſſed for ever! whoſe example, in Morals and matters of ordinary obedience, amounts ever unto the authority of a command. How exemplarie he was in this particular you may reade *Matth. c.* 17. from *v.* 24, unto the end of the Chapter. There you have him performing an action, not for that omiſſion of it would have been evill, but becauſe in opinion of the Jewes, it would have given ſhew of evill. For if *firſt*, you underſtand the words, as moſt Interpreters do, of the tribute to be paid unto the ſecular Magiſtrate, then ſinfull it had not been in our Saviour to have refuſed paiment of tribute unto *Cæſar*. For how could the Son to the living God (who was King of Kinges, and Lord of Lords, King of heaven, and earth, whoſe the earth and all the fulneſſe thereof was,) be juſtly tributary unto any mortall? The *Kinges* of the *earth take tribute, or cuſtome, not of their owne children*, (however they expect obedience from them) but of *ſtrangers*; becauſe paying of tribute denoteth ſome degree, or kinde of Servitude. *The children then are free, verſ.* 25, 26. Therefore from all taxes and impoſitions, juſtly was to be exempted Chriſt, the Son of *David*; there was no reaſon he ſhould pay tribute unto *Cæſar*: nay more reaſon (he being of the blood royall) ſhould receive tribute from the Jewes, than *Cæſar*, a forrainer, having no title to the Crowne, but that which the ſword gave him. Not paiment, conſtant denyall of paiment, had not been (you ſee) morally evill in our Saviour; and yet becauſe it would have borne

appearance of an evill, of diſloyaltie, and diſobedience, and ſo have drawn prejudices againſt, and ſcandall upon his unſpotted perſon, holy and heavenly office, and doctrine: becauſe *ſeemingly* it would have croſſed a doctrine he afterwards delivered, *Render unto Cæſar the things which are Cæſars*: therefore he ſtands not to pleade his priviledge, but voluntarily parted with his right, payed the tribute, and to pay it wrought a miracle: *notwithſtanding*, Peter, *leſt we ſhould offend them, goe thou to the ſea, and caſt an hook, and take up the fiſh that firſt cometh up, and when thou haſt opened his mouth, thou ſhalt find a peice of money, that take, and give unto them for me and thee*, verſ. 27.

Or if *ſecondly*, with the learned *Cameron*, you rather conceive to be here meant the halfe ſhekell, which by preſcript of the Ceremoniall Law, *Exod.* 30. was by the Jewes to be paid for the uſe of the Sanctuary. Why yet ſo alſo ſinfull it had not been in our Saviour to have refuſed paying of it: for *firſt*, it was a Ceremonie, and the Ceremoniall Law Chriſt was above, Lord he was of the Sabbath, *Matth.c.*12.*ver.*8. *Mar. c.*2. *v.*28. where it is manifeſt (thinks *Cameron*) the Sabbath ſhould *ſynecdochically* ſignify the whole Ceremoniall Law. Then *ſecondly*, this Ceremony, together with Sacrifices and all other Legall, typicall Ceremonies, preſuppoſed ſin in the party, to whom they were commanded, and were a note, or badge contracted by ſinne; and therefore reach not unto Chriſt, a man without ſin. *Thirdly*, as our Saviour well argues, even as Kings of the earth take not tribute of their owne Children, ſo neither the King of Heaven of his Sonne, therefore ſeing this halfe ſhekel is a tribute to be paid to the King of Heaven, for the Tabernacle of witneſſe. 2 *Chro* 24.6. Chriſt was certainely free, and ſo might lawfully have refuſed to pay it: Yet becauſe the Jewes would have taken offence, and umbrages at ſuch his refuſall, and charg'd it with appearance of a profane contempt of the Law of *Moſes*, and the Sanctuary, therefore he voluntarily paid it, and ſo became a Jew to the Jewes, as under the Law to them that were under the Law. Notwithſtanding *leſt we ſhould offend*, &c. And if this be the ſenſe of the place, what is ſaid of this one Ceremonie, may be applyed unto all; for one of the reaſons, and ends, why Chriſt obſerved the whole Ceremoniall Law was, to prevent ſcandall, to abſtaine from all appearance of evill.

evill. In nature (ſaith *Cameron*) there is, *appetitus quidem unionis*, which cauſeth things to be moved, and to reſt often, beſides the proper condition of their particular nature, whence ſometimes light things are moved downewards, heavie things upwards. Unto this appetite of union in nature, there is anſwerable in grace, the deſire *to promote Gods glory*, which often inclineth and carrieth the Godly beyond and beſides the ordinary *obligations, ariſing out of their particular and perſonall conditions and relations*. And unto the meaſure of grace is proportionable the degree of the deſire of Gods glory, ſo that the holier any one is, the more vehemently he deſireth the promotion thereof: and if it require any thing to be done of him, why he will do it, although otherwiſe by vertue of his particular, and perſonall condition, he be not bound thereunto. Therefore although Chriſt, *ſecundum ſpecialem rationem perſonæ ſuæ*, if we eye the ſpeciall conſideration, and dignity of his perſon, was not tyed to keepe the Ceremoniall Law, yet he kept it, in as much as the Glory of God required him ſo to doe. If you demand how the glory of God exacted this at Chriſts hands, why Chriſt himſelfe tells us, *Nè ſimus illis ſcandalo*, leſt we ſhould offend them; for if Chriſt had not obſerved the Ceremoniall law, he had doubtleſſe wonderfully eſtranged the Jewes from him.

In obſerving it then he did but as Kings often doe in ſtooping to many things, unto which they are no waies obliged, for to win the hearts and affections of their humorous ſubjects. This example of our Saviour, was followed by the *Apoſtles, and elders in the firſt generall Councill at Jeruſalem*, where they impoſed upon the Gentiles abſtinence from meat *offered to Idols, from things ſtrangled, and from blood*, Acts 15. 29. Not for that theſe meats were in themſelves uncleane, and abominable, but becauſe they appeared to be ſo to the froward and peeviſh Jewes, who were kept off from Chriſt, becauſe theſe meats, in which they ſuppoſed to be ſuch abomination and uncleaneſſe, were uſually eaten by the Chriſtians. But this was but a temporary injunction they gave to others. Let us view their own practice. Maintenance for preaching was due unto *Paul*, from both the *Corinthians* and *Theſſalonians*, and yet he did forbeare exacting it, 1 *Cor.* 9. 1 *Theſ.* 2. that ſo he might take away all colour for ſuſpicion of any

mercenary or greedy appetite after gaine, to be in his preaching, and quite cut off all ſcandalls thereby, which in that dawning of Chriſtianity upon them, would haue put a rub to the progreſſe of the Goſpell, and have made his miniſtry to be evill ſpoken off. And of St *Paul*, the Saints in ſucceeding ages were followers, as he of Chriſt. Thoſe *Libellatici*, ſo often, and ſharply cenſured by St *Cyprian Epiſt.* 15. 31. 52. *lib. de lapſis. lib. de exhortatione Martyrum*. Though they did not ſacrifice, or directly deny Chriſt, were yet by the Church put to their penance, for ſeeming to deny him, becauſe they either by themſelves, or others, at leaſt accepted from the Magiſtrate bills, or ſcroules teſtimoniall of their abnegation. *Secundus* (as *Parker* relates out of *Baronius*) *was commanded to deliver his bibles, he maketh anſwer,* Chriſtianus ſum & non Traditor. *Hereupon he is commanded to deliver* aliqua Ecvola, *that is certaine ſtuffe which was caſt aſide for that it had no uſe. Will he not deliver this to ſave his life? no not this. It was lawfull, but it had a ſhew of their ſin whome the Church called Traditores for their delivering the holy bookes to be burnt by the officers of the Tyrant* Diocleſian. (*h*) Auxentius being commanded by *Licinius* to ſet a branch of a Vine-tree loaden with Cluſters at the ſeete of *Bacchus* his image, preſently ſhaped him this round, and reſolute anſwer, God forbid, O Emperour, that I ſhould do it, for I am a Chriſtian. The matter was not great in it ſelfe, yet becauſe it would have favoured Idolatry, or given manifeſt appearance of it, rather than do it, he choſe baniſhment from the Court, and loſſe of the Emperours ſervice. As (*i*) *Valentinian*, afterwards Emperour, went before *Julian* the Apoſtate into a Temple of the Goddeſſe Fortune, one of the Prieſts beſprincled *Julian* with a kinde of purging, or holy water, a drop of which by chance fell upon *Valentinian*, at which he was ſo extreamely incenſed, as that he ſtroake the Prieſt, tore, and rent in peices that part of his garment on which it fell with a great diſdaine, and holy indignation throwing it away from him, that ſo he might avoid the leaſt tincture of their ſuperſtitious, and idolatrous religion. But above all, very remarkeable is the zeale of the (*k*) boyes of *Samoſatene*, who becauſe a tenniſ-ball, with which they played, had but touched the foote of the aſſe whereon *Lucius* rode, their Hereticall Biſhop, they preſently cryed out that it was defiled,

Scripſit etiam Secundus & ad ſeipſum miſſos à Curatore & ordine Centurionem & Beneficiarium, qui peterent divinos codices exurendos, eiſque reſpondiſſe, Chriſtianus ſum & Epiſcopus, non traditor: Et cum ab eo vellent aliqua ecvola (per ecvola intelligit res ejectas, nempe quarum nullus eſt uſus, ab, ἐκβολὴ, quod eſt ejectio, ſeu expulſio) aut quodcunque accipere, neque hoc eis dediſſe, exemplo Eleazari Macchabæi, qui nec fingere voluit ſuillam carnem ſe manducare, ne aliis præberet prævaricationis exemplum. Vid. Aug. in Brevic. Collat. die. 3 cap. 13. Damaſc. Hiſt. pag 578.

(*h*) Baronius out of Suidas.

(*i*) *Theodoret. l. 3. c. 15. Niceph. l. 11. c. 1. Zo. l. 6. c. 6.*

(*k*) *Theod. l. 4. c. 15 Niceph. l. 14. c. 21.*

filed, (although indeed it was not capable of any morall pollution) and therefore to purge or expiate it, threw it into the fire in the mid'ſt of the Market place. This may be thought, but a Childiſh pranke, and therefore not imitable, however yet it aptly ſerves to demonſtrate that their education, framed them unto a hatred of whatſoever had any remote reference, unto either evill actions, or perſons. St *Ambroſe* forbad *Monica* the bringing of wine and cakes to the Celebrities of the Martyrs, *nè ulla occaſio ſe ingurgitandi daretur ebrieſis, & quia illa quaſi parentalia ſuperſtitioni Gentilium eſſent ſimillima*, as St *Auſtin lib. 6. Confeſſ. c. 2.* leſt occaſion of exceſſive quaffing ſhould be given to drunkards, and becauſe thoſe *parentalia*, funerall feaſts, were very like to heatheniſt ſuperſtition, the offerings of the Pagans which were made at the Tombs of their parents, and to their ghoſts. Biſhop *Morton* aſſignes another reaſon, becauſe this cuſtome, had ſome reſemblance of thoſe ſuperſtitious, and idolatrous Colorydians, mentioned by *Epiphanius*, who offered cakes to the Virgin *Mary*, in imitation of that heatheniſh cuſtome condemned by the prophet *Jeremy* chap. 7. ver. 18. of ſuch as did offer cakes to the Moone, as unto the Queene of heaven. Now when *Monica* underſtood that Saint *Ambroſe* had forbidden this, *tam piè, atque obedienter amplexa eſt, ut ipſe miraret*, ſaith St *Auſtin* in that forecited place, *quòd tam facilè accuſatrix potius conſuetudinis ſuæ, quam diſceptatrix illius prohibitionis effecta ſit*: ſhe ſo piouſly, and obediently embraced this prohibition, as that I my ſelfe, ſaith *Auſtin*, wondered to ſee her ſo eaſily rather accuſe her own cuſtome, than diſpute his command. When once the cuſtome of thrice dipping or ſprinkling in Baptiſme was uſed by Hereticks, to ſigniſy a trinity not of *perſons*, but *natures* in the Godhead, then Saint *Gregery* thought fitting that it ſhould be left off, not becauſe it was evill, but for that it might ſeeme to countenance their damnable hereſie: his words are theſe, *De trina verò merſione baptiſmatis nihil reſponderi verius poteſt, quam quod ipſi ſenſitis, quod in una fide nihil officit ſanctæ Eccleſiæ conſuetudo diverſa, &c. ſed quia nunc hucuſque ab hæreticis inſans in baptiſmate tertiò mergebatur, faciendum apud vos eſſe non cenſeo, ne dum merſiones numerant divinitatem dividant, dumque quod faciebant faciunt, ſe mortem noſtrum viciſſe glorientur. lib. 1. Epiſt. 41. Gabriel Biel lectione 38.* ſaith, that the Church of

Rome thought it meet to uſe common leavened bread in the adminiſtration of the Euchariſt, leſt in uſing unleavened bread, they ſhould be deemed to imitate *Ebion* the heretick. Nay *Bellarmine* in his recognition of his book *de verbo Dei*, admoniſheth the Reader, that in the title of the third Chapter of the firſt book, *Divi Pauli* is put for *Beati Pauli*, for in making mention of the Saints, I never approved (ſaith he) the uſe of the word *divus*, or *diva*, and one of his reaſons, is, becauſe amongſt the Heathens, 'twas uſually aſcribed to *their falſe, or fained Gods*.

To heape up other, either teſtimonies, or inſtances, were to prejudice, if not the *authority* of thoſe before mentioned, yet your *eſteeme* of them, as if you were not by them ſufficiently perſwaded and convinced. My labour (I ſuppoſe) will be better ſpent in demonſtrating unto you the *expediency* of that, which may ſeeme rigour in this Doctrine, in diſcovering unto you what good reaſons Saint *Paul* had to exact ſo great a meaſure, and ſo high a pitch of abſtinence from ſinne. Thoſe that I will ſpecifie ſhall be drawn from *God*, from *Satan*, from our *ſelves*, from our *brethren*, *Firſt*, from God, we have theſe two, our *relations unto him*, our *danger in offending of him*.

Firſt, our *Relations unto him*, he is our *Father*, our *Soveraigne*, *Chriſt Jeſus is our ſpirituall huſband*. Now a dutifull child declines not only diſobedience, but whatſoever hath the colour of it; an obedient, and loyall ſubject ſtartles at not only *treaſon*, but alſo whatſoever may occaſion *ſuſpicion* thereof: a *faithfull* and *chaſt wife* abhorres not only *adultery*, but whatſoever may make her husband *juſtly jealous*, others but *ſuſpicious* of her *chaſtity*. And ſhall not every child of God, every one that profeſſeth ſubjection unto heaven, be fearfull of the appearance of diſobedience, and undutifulneſſe to ſo indulgent a *father as God*, of the appearance of Treaſon and Rebellion againſt ſo Almighty a *King as God*? Doth it not beſit the *Spouſe* the Church, every member of Chriſt to dread all ſhewes, and ſignes of diſloyaltie, and unfaithfulneſſe to ſo loving a ſpouſe as Chriſt Jeſus? Did *Julius Cæſar*, but an earthly potentate, thinke it not enough that his wife was without a fault, unleſſe withall ſhe was without ſo much as the ſuſpicion of a fault? And will not Chriſt (thinke you?) who is King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, expect as great unblameableneſſe

in

in his Spouſe? (l) *Theophan. Leſbiai* to diſſwade *Pompey* from flying into Parthia, tels him, that his wife would be lyable to a great deale of danger amongſt thoſe barbarous people; and though (ſaid he) they proffer no villany unto her, yet it is an undecent thing to thinke that the wife of *Pompey* might have been diſhonoured: To diſſwade us from the appearances and occaſions of ſin it ſhould, (me thinks) be an effectuall argument, that our ſoules, which are married unto Chriſt in righteouſneſſe, judgment, and holineſſe, will hereby be obnoxious unto danger of pollution. What though they be not actually defiled? yet it is an undecent thing to think, that the Spouſe a member of Chriſt might have been diſhonoured, might have been foild with a luſt, raviſhed, varquiſhed by Satan, defiled with ſinne. (l) *Plutarch.*

If from theſe appearances of evill, our *relations* to God cannot *draw* us, yet (me thinks) in the *ſecond place*, our *danger* in offending of him, ſhould *drive* us: for he is a conſuming fire unto, as the *Works*, ſo alſo the *workers* of impiety: and how can we then but be afraid to venture on not onely that we know doth, but what we feare others ſuſpect may, deſerve the wrath of ſo ſinne revenging a God?

That we ſhould abſtaine from all appearances of evill, may, *ſecondly*, be gathered from *Satan*, from the conſideration, *Firſt*, of his *cruelty* and *malice* againſt us, *Secondly*, of his *temptations* of us.

Firſt, from the conſideration of his *cruelty* and *malice* againſt us, which the Scripture ſhadoweth out by terming him, the *enemy* by way of excellency, the *envious man*, the *accuſer*, the *tempter*, the *deſtroyer*, the *devourer*, a *murtherer from the beginning*: as alſo by comparing him unto a *roaring Lyon*, unto *a great red Dragon*, and *an old Serpent*.

Now me thinks we ſhould feare to come, not only under the power, but alſo into the ſight of ſuch an adverſary: and yet by ruſhing upon the ſhew's, the occaſions of evill, what do we but hazard the ſurprizall of our ſoules by him?

This will be more apparent from the conſideration,

2. Of *Satans temptations* of us: of his temptations of us to *ſinne*, of his temptations of us to *deſpaire*, or at leaſt *diſcomfort*, for ſinne: becauſe in both ſorts of temptations he goes about by theſe

theſe appearances of evill, to wreak his malice upon us.

For *firſt*, in his temptations of us to ſinne, they are, *firſt*, the *baite* by which he *allures*: *Secondly*, an *argument* by which he *perſwades* us thereunto. *Thirdly*, an *encouragement*, whereby he is heartned to perſiſt in tempting of us.

Firſt then, the appearances of ſinne, are a *baite* whereby Satan allures us unto ſin, which if we bite at, our conſciences will ſoone be enlarged to ſwallow ſinne it ſelfe. Satan well knowing that Gods Children would even ſtartle at your groſſe, and more hideous ſinnes, ſuch as are, Idolatry, Adultery, Drunkenneſſe, and the like, therefore cheifly plyeth them with enticements to the ſignes, ſhewes, and occaſions of them; for theſe will ſmooth the paſſage unto the ſins themſelves. Of this we have a remarkeable inſtance in *Alipius*, who (as St *Auſtin* relates *Confeſſ. lib.* 6. *cap.* 8) being drawn by his friends importunity to accompany *him* unto the Roman Gladiatorie Games, yet reſolveth though he were preſent with his body, to be abſent in his heart, and for that purpoſe to keep his eyes ſhut, that he might not defile them with ſo barbarous a ſight: yet at laſt upon a great ſhout, that the people gave at the fall of one of the Combatants, his curioſity made him behold the occaſion, and thereupon he preſently became an applauſive ſpectator of that bloudy and inhumane ſpectacle. An Italian, as *Holerius* writes, by his often ſmelling to the hearb *Baſile*, had a ſcorpion ingendred in his head: even ſo wee by our often dallying, and tampering with things that carry a ſhew of unlawfulneſſe, may have Satan, as I may ſo ſpeak, even formed in us, for as St *Hierome* ſaith upon *Eccleſiaſtes* the ninth, *Diabolus ſerpens eſt lubricus, cujus ſi capiti, id eſt, primæ ſuggeſtioni non reſiſtitur, totus interna cordis, dum non ſentitur, illabitur*, that is, the Divell is a ſlippery ſerpent, and if we do not keep out his head, that is, his firſt ſuggeſtions, it is not to be doubted but that he will ſtealingly ſlide into the moſt ſecret corners of the heart: and ſo we actuated by him, ſhall at laſt proceed from things onely appearing ſinfull, unto the practiſe of moſt horrid and gaſtly crimes.

Secondly, the appearance of evill is an *argument* by which he perſwades us unto what is in its owne nature evill, for if a man have but ſlipt into ſuch actions as the beſt minded judge to have a reall appearance of evill, Satan forthwith will ſuggeſt unto

to him, that he hath by this quite crackt his credit amongſt thoſe that are accounted religious: by them (will he ſay) thou art as much ſuſpected, and as deeply cenſured for thy ſeeming evill, as for thy being ſo: wert thou not better therefore, be as thou ſeemeſt, for they cannot think worſe of thee then they doe, thy ſhame, and diſgrace, their jealouſies, ſuſpicious, and cenſures cannot be greater for ſinne it ſelfe, than it is allready for the ſhew of it. Now this temptation of Satan, receives great advantage from our nature, for we naturally are addicted to ſociety, and therefore if we finde that upon the ſignes and ſhewes of ſuch and ſuch ſinnes in our practiſe, good men condemne us as guilty of the ſinnes themſelves, and therefore beginne two reſerve and eſtrange themſelves from us, refuſing any longer to reach out unto us the right hand of fellowſhip, why, then we will preſently have fellowſhip with the unfruitfull workes of darkneſs, and couple in with looſe, carnall and formall men, whoſe converſation will quickly infect us, ſo that it will not be long e're we runne with them to the ſame exceſſe of riot.

And thus you ſee how Satan takes occaſion from the appearance of ſinne, to draw us on unto ſinne it ſelfe, which me thinks ſhould be ſufficient to diſſwade us from them. For is Satan ſo backward in tempting, or is his invention grown ſo barren, as that our lives and practiſe muſt put arguments into his mouth? is the *purchaſe* of hell and damnation ſo difficult, as that we muſt needs furniſh the Divell with baits to allure us, with reaſons to perſwade us unto our everlaſting perdition, this were folly and madneſſe that would want a name.

But in the *third place*, the ſignes and appearances of ſinne are not only a *baite*, by which he *enticeth* us, an *argument* by which he perſwades unto ſinne, but withall an *encouragement*, by which he is heart'ned to goe on in tempting of us, for they make him gather heart, and hope that we are coming on to ſinne it ſelfe; and this hope will breed diligence, make him a more importunate ſolliciter, make him to double and ſtrengthen his aſſaults, to plie us even thick and threefold with temptations: A dog will not runne from a man as long as he throwes bread unto him, and can any man ſuppoſe the Divell will flie, ſo long as he gives place unto him, as long as he throwes himſelfe upon temptations, by

practiſing ſuch things as have a maniſeſt ſhew of evill? for though in themſelves they be never ſo ſmall, yet will they ſerve to uſher in farther and greater matters: being then preparatives unto ſinne, they cannot be (as ſome have imagined) good fences againſt ſinne: ſeeming to be evill is not, cannot be a meanes to ſheild us from being ſo, no more then the opening the Gates of a City can be the way to raiſe the ſeige of it, or letting go the ſluces of a river can be the courſe to ſtop its current.

You have ſeen arguments from Satans temptations of us to ſin: take next one from his temptations of us *to deſpaire*, or at leaſt *diſcomfort* for ſin, a temptation of ſo hideous a nature, as that, me thinks, our actions ſhould not lend it the leaſt advantage. His *Firſt* labour is by the appearance of ſin to make us offend God, but when he cannot proceed ſo farre, his *Second* endeavour will be, to make us diſquiet our ſelves: when he cannot wound us by them, he will vex us for them; for he will wreſt and miſconſtrue all that we have done unto the worſt ſenſe, he will ſwell motes into beames, mole-hils into mountaines, appearances of evill into realities, and thunder unto us that there is not a pinne to chooſe betwixt thoſe and theſe; unto which our ſoules beeing diſtracted by the violent importunity of this temptation, will be over apt to give credence. And for a man to be thus toſſed between Satans powerfull ſuggeſtions, and his own feares and ſuſpicions cannot but even cruſh his ſpirits, and quite eclipſe the peace and joy of his heart.

Abſtinence from all appearances of evill is, *thirdly*, needfull in regard of *our ſelves*, for by them we may incurre a double danger, a *danger* of beeing *infected with*, a danger of being *puniſhed for ſinne*.

Firſt, a danger of being infected with ſinne: what *(m) Bernard* ſpake of *Eves* beholding the forbidden fruit, is true concerning every appearance of evill: *Et ſi culpa non eſt, culpæ tamen indicium eſt, & ſi culpa non eſt, culpæ tamen occaſio eſt, indicium commiſſæ, & cauſa eſt committenda.* Although it be not in it ſelfe a ſinne, yet it is a token, yet it is an occaſion of ſinne, a token that ſinne hath been committed, a cauſe of committing it for the future. Now our natures are ſtrongly bent to evill, when this (then) our naturall inclination, is furthered by outward occaſions

(m) Bernard. de grad. humilitatis.

ſions, we may ſoone be led to the realities of ſinne, though the occaſions of themſelves are weake, they working but as *objects*, and the *objective cauſality* being of all moſt imperfect, yet Satan is ſtrong, our luſts are ſtrong, theſe occaſions are ſutable to our luſts: our ſoules therefore, by a little helpe from Satan will quickly catch infection from them. For this reaſon were the Iſraelites, in the time of the paſſeover prohibited not onely the eating, but the very having of leavened bread in their houſes. For this reaſon too were the Nazarites forbidden to eat ſo much as the huskes of the grapes, for if that had been permitted, they would perhaps have ſoone proceeded to the eating of the grapes, and thence to drinking of the wine it ſelfe: hence alſo grew that preciſe reſolution of *David*, Pſal. 101.3. *I will ſet no wicked thing before mine eyes*: well may the world, and Divell ſet wicked things before mine eyes, but for mine own part I will not invite temptations, *I will ſet no wicked thing before mine eyes*, as much as I can I will decline the objects, examples, and ſhewes of wickedneſſe: do but put fire unto flax, and it will preſently be on flame: ſo preſent wee unto our looſe and corrupt natures the ſhewes, (which (as you have ſeen) are alſo the occaſions of evill) and how ſuddenly will they take fire? This *Joſeph* knew, and therefore when his Miſtris ſollicited him to that foule act of uncleanneſſe, he harkned not unto her to lie by her, or ſo much as to be with her, *Gen.* 39.10. but fled, and got himſelfe out of her preſence, *ver.* 12. doubting leſt the very ſight of her might kindle luſt. Nay to the ſhame of many ſecure and venturous Chriſtians, of this even *Scipio* an Heathen, and Souldier too, was apprehenſive and fearefull, and therefore would not ſuffer certaine captive Virgins, though of an exquiſite beauty, to be brought ſo much as into his preſence *Nè quid* (ſaith *Florus*) *de virginitatis integritate deliberaſſe, ſaltem vel oculis videretur*. That he might not ſeeme to have ſpot, or skimmed the honour of their chaſtity, ſo much as with beholding them. As *Apelles* then by drawing the picture of *Campaſpe* fell in love with the patterne of his worke *Campaſpe* her ſelfe, ſo we from retaining, from affecting the ſhew of ſin, will ſoone proceed to a delight in ſin it ſelfe.

Some indeed are ſo ſtrangely confident of their abhorrence from ſinne, as they doubt not infection from appearance of it:

they can venture into the looſeſt company, yet ſo bridle their appetite, as that they feare no exceſſe, be preſent at an Idolatrous Maſſe, and yet be in no danger of being affected with it, unleſſe it be with diſlike of it.

Surely theſe men are dropt from Heaven, never borne in ſinne, or conceived in iniquity: for they, whoſe originall is from men, may poſſibly be drawn away by ſinfull objects, and ſhewes: but theſe men (forſooth) are above *gun-ſhot*, beyond the reach of temptation; Their profeſſed hatred of ſinne brings me in mind of *Pigmalions* averſeneſſe from women; he was a profeſt, almoſt a ſworne enemie to woman kind, yet drawing but the picture of a woman, he fell in love with it, and he hug'd, and kiſt it ſo long, till at laſt by the power of *Venus* (as the Poët fables it) it became a woman. Their caſe is like, they profeſſe deteſtation of ſinne, and yet delight in ſome things, that have the appearance, the reſemblance thereof: let them take heed they dote not ſo long upon theſe, as that at length by the power of Satan, and the ſtrength of their own luſts, they be transformed into reall ſins. I will end this reaſon with that of *Chryſoſtome*, in his fifteenth Homily unto the people of Antioch.

Τῆτο ἀσφαλείας ἡμῖν ἔσται μεγίστη ὑπόθεσις, τὸ μὴ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα φεύγειν μόνον, ἀλλα καὶ τὰ ἀδιάφορα ἔτι δοκοῦντα, ὄντα δὲ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμᾶς εἰσπαιλίζοντα, &c.

Μὴ τοίνυν ἁμαρτήματα φεύγωμεν μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα μὲν ἀδιάφορα εἶναι, κατὰ μικρὸν δὲ καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰς τὰς πλημμελείας ἄγοντα· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁ παρὰ χείμαρρον βαδίζων, κἂν μὴ κατάπτωσιν, τρόμον, καὶ πολλάκις ὑπ' αὐτῆ τῆ πρόμα σπαραττόμενος κατέπεσεν. ἕτω καὶ ὁ μὴ πόρρωθεν ἐφεύγων τὰς ἁμαρτίας, ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς αὐτῶν βαδίζων μετὰ φόβου βιώσεται, καὶ πολλάκις καὶ εἰς αὐτὰς ἐμπεσεῖται.

It will be to us the occaſion, or ground of greateſt ſecurity if we do not only flee ſins, but ſuch indifferent things alſo, which are meanes whereby they doe ſupplant us: for as he who goeth upon the edge of a ſteepe, and craggy rock, though he falleth not, yet with feare trembleth, and ſo fals through his trembling, ſo he who leaveth not ſinne a looſe, and a farre off, but approacheth cloſe to the brink of it, hath juſt cauſe to live in feare, ſeeing he hath juſt cauſe to feare to fall into it.

Secondly,

Secondly, danger of being *puniſhed for ſinne*, not *by God*, for he is an Omniſcient Judge, and therefore cannot miſtake the appearance of evill for evill it ſelfe: he is a juſt Judge, and therefore will not puniſh the appearance of evill, for evill it ſelfe: but by man, by the *Secular Magiſtrate* with temporall puniſhments, by the governours of the Church, with Eccleſiaſticall cenſures, and by all men generally with ſhame and obloquie. *Jehoſaphat* you know in the apparell of *Ahab*, was like to have been kild for *Ahab*. (n) *Megacles* having on the Cloake, and armour of *Pyrrhus*, was ſlaine for *Pyrrhus*: even ſo many times ſome men, for the bare appearance of ſome crimes, are as hardly thought of, and as ſeverely handled, as if they had committed the crimes themſelves. (o) *Tiberius Gracchus* was butchered by the Romans, becauſe it ſeemed unto them, that by touching his head with his hand, he had demanded a Diadem, when he thereby as a ſigne only exhorted them to ſtand upon their defence. Becauſe the Iſland of Creete ſeemed to have favoured *Mithridates*, for this ſeemings ſake, the people of Rome tooke revenge by the ſword, *Faviſſe Mithridati videbatur, hoc placuit armis vindicare*. Indeed the Lord ſeeth not as man ſeeth, he looketh on the heart, and thereunto ſquareth his judgment, but man looketh on the outward appearance, 1*Sam.* 16. 7. and according to it cenſureth, and ſo he may doe, and yet often times judge righteous judgment. For if when there is wanting ſufficient evidence of fact, Judges, and Juries ſhould not ſometimes proceed upon pregnant ſignes, and ſtrong preſumptions, howmany villanies would paſſe unpuniſhed? And if Eccleſiaſticall Governours, ſhould not take the ſame courſe too, how could they poſſibly ſtop the ſpreading miſcheifs of ſcandall.

(n) *Plutarch.*

(o) *Florus l.* 3. *c.* 14.

This abſtinence from appearance of evill, is laſtly expedient in regard of *our brethren*, to avoid ſcandall unto them.

Firſt, as it is taken by *Thomas*, and the School-men, for that which occaſionally leads unto ſin, which puts a ſtumbling block, or an occaſion to fall in the way of others, *Rom.* 14. 13. for ſo doe all evill ſhewes, and that both in the *way* of the *weak*, and in the *way* of the *wicked*.

Firſt, in the *way* of the *weake*, for they are miſguided, and drawn unto the practiſe of that evill, the appearance whereof they ſee in us,

Secondly, in the *way* of the *wicked*, for *firſt*, hereby the obdurate are heartened, confirmed, and comforted: *ſecondly*, hereupon adverſaries take occaſion to ſpeake reproachfully of that holy name, and profeſſion which we beare, to blaſpheme the Croſſe, Truth, and Goſpell of Chriſt.

Secondly, as 'tis uſed vulgarly, and commonly for ſorrow, greiſe, diſlike, or diſpleaſure at an action, for it matters not much whether our facts be evill, or beare ſhew of evill, they equally would wound the hearts, and vexe the righteous ſpirits of the Godly, and therefore are both violations of Saint *Pauls* precepts, *Rom.* 15.2. Let every one of us pleaſe his neighbour for his good to edification. *Valerius Publicola* (ſaith *Florus*) *nè ſpecie arcis offenderet, eminentes ædes ſuas in planâ ſubmiſit*: he levelled with the ground his high and lofty building, leſt he ſhould offend the people with the appearance of a Cittadell: and wilt not thou throw aſide a vanity, an excrement, ſome idle if not monſtrous faſhion, rather than offend thy brother (for whom Chriſt died) with the appearance of an evil? A ſoule ſhame were it, that *popularity* ſhould prevaile more with a Roman, than *Charity* with thee, who art a Chriſtian.

But ſome will be ready to *object*, that this doctrine is prejudiciall to our Chriſtian liberty. For that reacheth to the uſe of all things that are of an indifferent nature, and ſuch are theſe actions charged with the appearance of evill, and therefore if you ſtreighten us in the uſe of them, you injuriouſly deprive us of that liberty which we have in Chriſt Jeſus unto the uſe of all indifferent things. For *anſwer*,

Firſt, thoſe actions, in which there is a reall appearance of evill, are not indifferent in their nature, but evill, and ſinfull, forbidden, *firſt, by the* generall prohibition of ſcandall, they are *per ſe* ſcandalous of themſelves and in their own nature, and therefore *alwais*, for *à per ſe ad de omni valet argumentum*: prohibited, *ſecondly*, by thoſe precepts which are againſt thoſe evils of which they have a reall appearance, becauſe they are a ſtep unto, and occaſion of them, *whereas* 'tis uſually ſaid that they are evill *only in appearance*, this is not to be underſtood ſo as to *exclude evill from them*, but *to reſtraine the evill of them* unto this *particular*: that they have a reall appearance of evill, the meaning is, they

are

are evill in no regard but this, and this regard, for the reaſons aboveſaid, is ſufficient to denominate them evill: they are allwaies temptations unto evill, ſo that there is allwaies committed in them an active ſcandall. This was the opinion of the vulgar tranſlater, who tranſlates, 1 *Theſ.* v. 22. *ab omni ſpecie malâ abſtinete vos*, abſtaine from every evill appearance, this reading *Cornelius à Lapide* and other Popiſh Expoſitors think equivalent with our tranſlation *abſtaine from all appearance of evill*, according to it then every appearance of evill is evill, if it be reall and not meerly imaginary. Unto this let me adde that of *Suarez* allready quoted, an action, ſaith he, onely evill in appearance tranſgreſſeth ſome virtue, though not *per ſe primo*, yet *ex conſequenti connexione virtutum*, by reaſon of the muruall connexion and commerce of one virtue with, and dependance upon another.

But to come to, *ſecondly*, thoſe indifferent actions in which there is only an imaginary appearance of evill, two things are here to be anſwered.

Firſt, however they be in *theſi* in their generall nature indifferent, yet they do in *caſu* and in *hypotheſi* become to be accidentally evill, becauſe done againſt *Conſcience*, when they appeare to be evill to our ſelves; *againſt charity*, when they appeare to be evill unto others: and then we are bound to abſtaine from them, though not *lege communi*, yet *lege particulari*, by reaſon of particular circumſtances.

Secondly, Although our Chriſtian liberty extendeth to the uſe of all things indifferent, yet ought we in godly wiſdome, and diſcretion to abridge our ſelves of the outward exerciſe of this our liberty, whenſoever 'tis very probable that it will become *dangerous* to our ſelves, or *ſcandalous to others*. *Ye have been called unto liberty, only uſe not liberty for an occaſion to the fleſh, but by love ſerve one another*, *Gal.* 5. 13. *As free, and not uſing your liberty for a cloake of malitiouſneſſe*, the 1 *Pet.* 2. 16. Now we uſe or rather abuſe our liberty for an occaſion to the fleſh, for a cloake to malitiouſneſſe, by practiſing ſuch indifferencies, as have ſhew of evill; for they, (as I have ſhewen at large) are likely to prove, as occaſions of ſinne unto our ſelves, ſo alſo active ſcandalls to miſguide our brethren, and therefore, though they be not *abſolutely, and ſimply in their nature unlawfull to be done*, yet they are by *accident* unlaw-

unlawfull for me to doe, as long as they carry ſhew of evill. *All things* (indeed) *are pure* (ſaith the *Apoſtle*) *but it is evill for that man, who eateth with offence: It is good neither to eat fleſh, nor drinke wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother ſtumbleth, or is offended, or is made weake*; *Rom.* 14.20,21. (p)

(p) Infirmitas nominat promptitudinem ad ſcandalum, offenſio autem nominat indignationem, &c. ſcandalum autem importat ipſam impactionem ad ruinam, *Aquin.* 2. 2dæ. q. 44 *art.* 1.

What remaineth then but that all be admoniſhed in the Lord Jeſus to take to heart a matter ſo deeply concerning them, both in *conſcience* as a duty expreſly enjoined by God, practiſed by Chriſt, his Apoſtles, and Saints; and *in conſequence*, as befitting us as the Sonnes, ſubjects of God, as the ſpouſe, members of Chriſt, as being needfull to defeate Satans malice, to cut off his temptations unto ſinne, and unto diſcomfort for ſin, to avoid ſinne, &c. in our ſelves, ſcandals unto others, unto the weak, obſtinate, and ſtrong. If therefore there be in you any love of God, any care to walke worthy of thoſe high relations you carry to him, any regard to the ſafety of your own ſoules, any feare of Satan, ſinne, or puniſhment, any compaſſion over the Conſciences of your poore brethren, keepe a looſe from whatſoever neighbours, and borders upon ſinne, whatſoever hath the bluſh and ſhew thereof: hate, as (q) *Ambroſe* exhorts, not only ſinne, but the coate of ſinne, the garment ſpotted by the fleſh. Even an heathen will adviſe, you hereunto. (r) *Carendum non ſolum crimine turpitudinis, verum etiam ſuſpicione.*

Application.

(q) *Ambr. l.* 6. *Hexaem.*

(r) *Quint. l.* 2. *cap.* 3.

Want we *inducements*, take we theſe *three*. It will be a courſe, Firſt, *Safe, and Secure*: Secondly, *Comfortable*: Thirdly, *Honourable*.

Firſt, *Safe*, and *Secure*, by it ſinne and Satan ſhall be ſtav'd off, kept out at daggers end, your own ſoules ſecured, kept out of gun ſhot either of infection or puniſhment, ſo that they ſhall not come nigh, ſcarce ſo much as the confines either of Sinne, or Hell.

Secondly, Comfortable: For what an unſpeakable comfort will it be unto thy drooping ſoule in the houre of death, or in the time of ſpirituall deſertion, when thy Conſcience can truly ſuggeſt, that thou haſt been ſo abhorrent from ſinne, as that thou haſt ſhunn'd whatſoever hath been homogeneall thereunto, whatſoever hath look't but like unto it, it muſt needs ſtop Satans mouth, and make thine own triumph in the calmneſſe of a cleare, and good conſcience.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Honourable, for 'twill gaine thee eſteeme amongſt both *good*, and *bad ones*, with thoſe 'twill make thy name precious, twill muzzle the mouthes of theſe, when they behold ſuch uprightneſſe in thy life, as that thou ſhunneſt not only down-right irreligiouſneſſe to God, injuſtice to men, but even their very picture and reſemblance, this cannot but extort from them, though never ſo malicious, an ingenious acknowledgment, that thou art a true Iſraelite, a ſincere Nathaniel, in whom there is found no guile. Now though our maine and firſt endeavour muſt be to keep a good Conſcience, yet is not the jewell or precious ointment of a good name, to be in the meane while neglected, our care ſhould be to preſerve that likewiſe unſpotted, St *Paul*, (*Acts* 24.16.) profeſſeth that *he exerciſed himſelfe* to have *alwaies a conſcience void of offence, as towards God: ſo towards men, and he adviſeth us to provide things honeſt in the ſight of all men*, *Rom.* 12.17. *To walke honeſtly towards them that are without.* 1 *Theſſ.* 4.12. *To ſtrive for a good report of them that are without*, 1 *Tim.* 3.7.

I will but preſcribe *two cautions* directing how we are to abſtaine from the appearance of evill, and then I ſhall have done with the *generall application* of the words. We are to abſtaine neither *only nor chiefly* from the appearance of evill.

Firſt, not *only*, that were foule *Hypocriſy* of which yet there are even a generation guilty, who only combate with the ſhadow of ſinne, and in the meane while embrace the body of ſinne, reall ſinnes: who abſtaine from the ſhew of every evill worke, and yet remaine reprobate to every good worke, who profeſſe deſtation of gaine by gaiming, becauſe they conceive it to be an appearance of theft, and yet make no conſcience of fraud, deceit, and couſenage in their dealings, who ſtand at defiance with all ſhewes of uncleaneſſe, and yet make no ſcruple of the groſſeſt acts thereof.

Secondly, not *chiefly*, that were a great incongruity, for ſo care of the meanes ſhould be greater than that of the end, becauſe abſtinence from the appearance of evill, is enjoyned as a preſervative againſt the evill it ſelfe. The evils themſelves therefore ſhould cheifely be avoided, the body of ſin ſhould be oppoſed more than the ſhadow, than the ſhewes of ſin. The fleſh ſhould be abhorred in a higher degree, than the garment ſpotted therewith.

You have ſeene the point preſt generally as it concernes all mens abſtinence from the appearance of all evils. I will only crave your pardon to call more particularly.

Firſt, upon *all men* for abſtinence from the appearance eſpecially of *ſome evills.*

Secondly, upon *ſome men* eſpecially for abſtinence from the appearance of *all evills*, and then I will put a period to my meditations upon theſe words.

Firſt, We muſt decline the ſhewes of ſome evils above others, of our *Maſter*, our *boſome evils.* For from them is moſt danger to be feared, they having commonly moſt ſtrength from our natures: and Satan beſides knowes but too well how our tide ſtands, he quickly acquaints himſelfe with our predominant luſts, and moſt raging corruptions, and unto them eſpecially fits and accords his temptations: as (ſ) *Agrippina*, when ſhe poiſoned her husband *Claudius*, mixed the poiſon in the meat which he moſt loved.

(ſ) Tacitus, Suetonius.

Secondly, *ſome men* above others are eſpecially to decline the appearance of *all evils.* All publick men ſhould do ſo, but eſpecially we of the Miniſtry. *The high Prieſts and Nazarites, under the Law were not to come nigh a dead body*, *Lev.* 21.11. *Numb.* 6.6. And in imitation of them among the Romans, the Prieſt might not touch the dead, nay they might not ſee the dead: for if a Prieſt pronounced a Funerall Oration, 'twas not without a veile drawn betwixt him and the Corps. Nay a Flaminian Prieſt might not heare the ſound of pipes uſed at Funerals nor come into a place where there was a grave. Was there ſuch *rituall* purity under the Law? ſuch *Ceremoniall ſtrictneſſe* in heathenish Prieſts? and ſhall there not be found an anſwerable degree of *morall preciſeneſſe* in the miniſters of the Goſpell? ſhall they be willingly within ſight, ſent, and hearing of impiety, except to reprove it?

(t) As a woman big with Child, for fear, and danger of miſcarrying forbeareth Phyſick, violent exerciſe, and many meats and drinks, which otherwiſe ſhe might freely uſe: even ſo thoſe who travell in birth with the Children of Chriſt, are put to deny and abridg themſelves of many indifferencies. I will eat no fleſh, ſaith St *Paul while the world ſtandeth, rather then make my brother to offend*, 1 *Cor.* 8. 13.

(t) Dr Ed. Reyn. Pſal. 110.

Reaſons enforcing their abſtinence after an eſpeciall manner from

from the appearance of evill *are two*: Becauſe in them they occaſion: *Firſt*, greater *looſeneſſe in bad ones*: *Secondly*, *more heavineſſe to good ones.*

Firſt, *Greater looſeneſſe in bad ones.* Strange it is how the lower, and more ignorant ranke of men will be hereby ſtrengthned in their downright ſinfull courſes; Nay if a Miniſter do but wiſely, and lawfully uſe his Chriſtian liberty the rude vulgar will thereupon open themſelves a gappe unto all licentiouſneſſe. If he be but innocently pleaſant, think they we may be mad. If he but ſip, we may carouſe. If he ſpend but ſome few houres, in his honeſt, and harmeleſſe recreations, the common gameſter preſently concludes his miſpenſe of both time, and patrimony in gaming to be thence juſtifiable.

Secondly, more *heavineſſe to good ones*: it grieves the ſpirits of the righteous to ſee them in any, it wounds their ſoules, it makes their bloods, their hearts riſe to behold them in a man of God. It becomes not my weakneſſe to adviſe, only in mine own and others behalfe, I unfainedly wiſh, and pray, that this were ſeriouſly thought upon, and practiſed by us all, that all of us in a tender regard to the reputation, and honour of our high calling would walke with great ſurcumſpection, make ſtrait ſteps unto our feet, tread every ſtep as nicely, as gingerly, as if we went among ſnares, walked upon ropes, or pinnacles.

I will conclude with that of *Bernard* to *Eugenius*, lib. 3. *de conſideratione*, cap. 4. which though written particularly unto him, may yet fittingly enough be applied to every Miniſter, nay every Chriſtian. *Intereſt tuæ perfectionis malas res, & malas pariter ſpecies devitare, in altero conſcientiæ, in altero famæ conſulis.* It becomes your holineſſe to decline as evill things, ſo alſo evill appearances, in that thou conſult'ſt for thy Conſcience, in this for thy fame, nay (indeed) if it be not preſumption to adde unto the Father, in this thou provideſt both for *Conſcience, and Fame*: for *Conſcience* firſt; for *the purity*, *for the peace* of thy *Conſcience*; *for the purity of thy Conſcience*, to keep it void of offence both towards God, and towards men, *for the peace of thy Conſcience*, to preſerve it from the violence of Satans temptations, from the vexations of thine own feares, and jealouſies. *Secondly*, for fame, ſo to hedge it in from ſcandall, as that it ſhall be above the reach of ſuſpicion. Therefore to

goe on in the words of the Father. *Puta tibi non licere, etsi aliis fortasse liceat, quicquid malè fuerit, coloratum, non sit in fama nævus malæ speciei.* Think not for the lawfull, though perhaps otherwise lawfull, whatsoever shall be evill coloured: In thy fame let there not be so much as a spot of evill appearance, so shalt thou follow things, that are of good report, *Phil.* 4. 8. and thereby quite take off all private prejudices, all open calumnies against either thy person, or profession. However thou shalt procure the testimony and approbation of God, and thine own Conscience, and be presented unblameable, cleare from offensiveness before men, from faultinesse before God, at the appearing of the Lord Jesus Christ: To whom with the Father, and Holy Ghost, be ascribed by us, and the whole Church, the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory, from this time forth for evermore. AMEN.

FINIS.